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Abstract
The purpose of the present study was to examine the feasibility of choiceless control in 
determining perceptions of control, influence, responsibility, and helplessness over 
outcomes. After reviewing and critiquing some traditional theories and research that 
exist in the control literature, a new conceptualization of control is presented. Based on 
research by Nickels et al. (2005), an extended research design was proposed and tested, 
which examined the separate effects of actual control, choice, and predictability. The 
present findings show significantly higher ratings of perceived influence under conditions 
in which individuals made their own choice (whether voluntary or involuntary) between 
options that made a difference (actual control) in a failed outcome that was predicted. 
Whereas perceived control ratings were significantly higher with actual control, feelings 
of responsibility over the outcome were significantly higher when actual control was 
combined with a voluntary choice. Although feelings of helplessness were not 
significantly affected, ratings of frustration over the outcome were significantly higher 
when actual control was combined with the prediction that a failed outcome would occur. 
The theoretical relevance of these findings is discussed, and the generalizability of the 
new conceptualization of control is explored in terms of its relation to positive 
psychology (e.g., humour) and cross-cultural research frameworks.
iv
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Over the past few decades, the notion of personal control has played an important 
role in many psychological investigations. Specifically, a number of these studies have 
reported that controlling important outcomes is instrumental in the development of 
self-esteem (e.g., Rodin & Langer, 1980), fulfilment of personal goals, reduction of stress 
(e.g., Cohen & Edwards, 1989; Elliott, Trief & Stein, 1986), higher levels of well-being 
(Matheny & Cupp, 1983; Mineka & Henderson, 1985; Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978; 
Thompson, 1981), and lowered cardiovascular responses (e.g., Baker & Stephenson, 
2000a; Breier, Albus, Pickar, Zahn, Wolkowitz, & Paul, 1987; Carr &  Wilde, 1988;
Corah & Boffa, 1970; Geer & Maisel, 1972; Peters, Godaert, Ballieux, Vliet, Willemsen, 
Sweep, & Heijnen, 1998). Conversely, the absence of control has been linked with the 
likelihood of experiencing learned helplessness (e.g., Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; 
Seligman, 1975), general physical illness (e.g., Lin &  Peterson, 1990), and psychological 
distress (e.g., Cohen & Edwards, 1989; Lachman, Ziff, & Spiro, 1994).
Despite extensive research demonstrating the benefits of control, more recent 
findings have indicated that people do not always prefer to control the situations they 
encounter (e.g., Burger, 1989; Perreault & Towson, 2005; Thompson, Cheek, & Graham, 
1987). For example, if individuals believe that others are better able to deal with the 
serious consequences of a difficult situation, then they may prefer giving control to these 
others (Burger, McWard, & LaTorre, 1989; Perreault & Towson, 2005).
Debate still surrounds the definition and conceptualization of control, particularly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with regard to people’s beliefs about the causal connections between their actions and 
efforts, and outcomes. Whereas traditipnal control theorists postulate that providing a 
choice for an individual’s actions increases feelings of control and decreases feelings of 
helplessness (e.g., Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1975), recent findings indicate that the 
benefits of control result only when a person’s choices make a difference in the outcome 
(e.g., Cramer, Nickels, &  Gural, 1997; Langlois, Cramer, & Mohagen, 2002; Nickels, 
Cramer, & Gural, 1992). These recent findings have instigated a new conceptualization 
of the traditional views of control, choice, and prediction in explaining responses to 
challenging situations.
Whereas traditional views have failed at unconfounding the concepts of control, 
choice, and prediction, the new conceptualization has permitted the separation of the 
effects of control and prediction (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Nickels, Gural, Cramer, & 
Ross, 1992). In addition, proponents of the new conceptualization have not only 
emphasized the importance of examining both choice and control as conceptually 
separate entities, but have also successfully demonstrated their separate effects in the 
laboratory (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002; Cramer &  Perreault, 2005).
At present, however, choice and control have only been completely unconfounded 
under conditions of unpredictability (i.e., Nickels, Peters, & Twerdochlib, 2005). In other 
words, the complete separation of the concepts of choice and control has not yet been 
examined under conditions of predictability due to the conceptual and methodological 
difficulties of such an investigation (Nickels et al., 2005).
One of the purposes of the present paper is to review and critique the theory and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research on control to determine its importance in explaining why people respond or fail 
to respond in the face of challenge. This will be accomplished by examining some 
traditional views of control, which will determine the use of this concept as a foundation 
for explaining individuals’ perceptions of various types of events. In addition, the 
procedures that appear necessary to test these concepts and theories will be presented, and 
experimental evidence will be examined in order to determine its support for the various 
conceptualizations of control discussed in the literature.
Due to its consistent success at unconfounding the effects of control, prediction, 
and choice, there will be a particular emphasis on a recent reconceptualization of control 
(e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al, 
1992; 2005). Specifically, this new conceptualization will be presented as having:
(1) successfully unconfounded control and prediction whilst others had failed;
(2) systematically investigated the separate effects of control and choice; and
(3) developed an unique experimental design which permitted the examination of 
choiceless control without prediction.
The purpose of the present study is to further disentangle the effects of control and 
choice in determining perceptions of control, influence, responsibility, and helplessness 
over outcomes. This will be accomplished by examining the conceptual and empirical 
feasibility of choice and control variations under conditions of predictability, where 
choiceless control will be discussed in terms of its potential confound with prediction. 
Furthermore, the relevance of choiceless control will be examined in social psychological 
contexts, such as situations in which personal information is gleaned for exclusory or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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discriminatory purposes. Finally, some hypotheses will be generated, and a 
methodological design which extends and refines Nickels et al.’s (2005) investigation 
of unpredictable choice and control variations will be presented.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CHAPTER 2 
Some Traditional Views of Control 
A vast amount of research has been conducted in the area of control, and 
consequently several operational definitions of the term have been proposed. For 
example, some researchers suggest that the amount of control individuals have is 
determined by the number of choices available in their environment and the amount of 
responsibility provided by their environment (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976). In this case, 
as induced responsibility and the number of available choices increase, the amount of 
control also increases.
Other researchers propose that control should be defined in terms of probable 
(rather than absolute) response effectiveness. According to this view, Seligman (1975, 
p. 17) explains that the outcome is controllable “if the probability of an outcome when 
some response occurs is different from the probability of the outcome when that response 
doesn’t occur...” In other words, outcomes are controllable when they depend upon one’s 
response. However, the outcome is uncontrollable “when the probability of an outcome 
is the same whether or not a given response occurs” (Seligman, 1975, p. 16). In other 
words, outcomes are uncontrollable when they occur independently of one’s response.
Others take this definition one step further, and suggest that control is defined as 
response effectiveness in addition to the achievement of a desired outcome 
(see Thompson, 1981, for a review). In this case, merely having an influence over an 
outcome does not imply control unless the end result was desired. For example, Suzanne 
is reaching for the last handhold on a difficult rock climbing route. She wants to use this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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hold so she can complete the route by pulling herself over the cliff edge. If  Suzanne 
succeeds, she has control over the outcome. However, if  an alternative finish is required 
because the handhold crumbled under her weight, Suzanne does not have control.
The concept of response effectiveness is central to many operationalizations of 
control. According to this view, control exists when individuals are capable of 
influencing an outcome through their actions. For example, if Agnes gives her nephew 
smothering kisses every time he sits on her lap, but does not smother him when he 
refrains from sitting in her lap, the kisses are controllable. On the other hand, if Agnes 
smothers her nephew affectionately regardless of whether or not he sits on her lap, the 
kisses are not controllable.
A study by Alloy and Abramson (1979) tested the conceptualization of control as 
determined by response effectiveness. Specifically, objective contingencies occurred 
when the outcome was, in actuality, contingent upon one’s response. Subjective 
contingencies occurred when the outcome was perceived as contingent upon one’s 
response, which could include accurate estimations as well as underestimations or 
overestimations. It was expected that perceptions of control should increase with 
increases in actual control.
Presented with various degrees of actual control, participants estimated the degree 
of contingency between their responses and an environmental outcome. Actual control 
was measured by the percentage of trials (i.e., 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75%) on which the 
outcome (i.e., onset of a green light) occurred when the participant responded 
(i.e., pressing or not pressing the button). Consistent with the conceptualization,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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participants perceived more control when they actually had more control over the onset of 
the light. In other words, a link was found between objective (i.e., actual control) and 
subjective (i.e., perceived control) contingencies. Similar results are also reported by 
Mikulincer, Gerber, and Weisenberg (1992), Tang and Critelli (1990), and Vasquez 
(1987; see also Alloy & Abramson, 1988).
Some Psychological and Physiological Effects of Control 
A number of studies have been conducted based on these traditional views of 
control. Consequently, due to the variability in the operationalizations and methodologies 
utilized, a variety of findings has been reported regarding the psychological and 
physiological effects of control. For instance, whereas some studies have examined 
conditions of both control and uncontrol, other research has solely investigated situations 
of control. Therefore, findings range from ‘control as beneficial’ to ‘control as 
detrimental.’
Some Benefits o f Control
A number of research findings have demonstrated the benefits of having control.
For example, in older adults, increased control has been linked with significant physical 
and psychological changes such as increased alertness and more active participation 
(Langer & Rodin, 1976), lower mortality rates (Rodin & Langer, 1977), fewer health 
problems (Rodin, 1983), a decrease in required medication (Schulz, 1976), and improved 
memory (Langer, Rodin, Beck, Weinman, & Spitzer, 1979).
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Many studies report that having control not only benefits older adults but people 
of all ages. For example, a study by Eitel, Hatchett, Friend, Griffin, and Wadhwa (1995) 
examined the effects of control over treatment in patients with end-stage renal disease. 
Level of control of dialysis patients was determined by whether the treatment was self- 
administered (high control) or administered by medical staff (low control). Results 
showed that if the illness was not severe, patients who self-administered their treatment 
had lower depression rates than those who had their treatment administered by medical 
staff.
In addition, several researchers have considered the impact of control in the 
workplace. For example, Carayon and Zijlstra (1999) examined the effects of three types 
of control: (1) Organization-Control (i.e., influence over the distribution of work, timing, 
policies, and training of employees); (2) Task-Control (i.e., influence over the variety and 
order of tasks, the amount of, pace of, and quality of work, and timing of work schedule 
and rest breaks); and (3) Resource-Control (i.e., influence over the availability of 
supplies, equipment, and materials). The findings indicated that high Task-Control 
resulted in lower total mood disturbances, and both high Task-Control and high 
Organization-Control resulted in higher job satisfaction.
Some Negative Consequences of Absence of Control
Whereas some research has explored the psychological effects of having control, 
other studies have focused on exposure to outcomes in the absence of control. 
Specifically, it appears that absence of control can have devastating consequences such as
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an increased likelihood of learned helplessness (Abramson, Garber, & Seligman, 1980). 
Researchers have documented the development of learned helplessness in a wide variety 
of animals such as dogs, cats, fish, rats, and subsequently, in humans (Abramson et al., 
1980).
One of the initial learned helplessness studies, conducted by Overmier and 
Seligman (1967), examined the responses of adult mongrel dogs to controllable and 
uncontrollable shocks. Three groups of dogs received unsignalled inescapable shocks of 
varying duration and intervals. The fourth group was not exposed to shock. After twenty 
four hours, all groups were exposed to instrumental training that consisted of several 
presentations of escapable shock. During the instrumental training, the authors found that 
dogs with no previous exposure to inescapable shocks responded by barking, yelping, 
running, and jumping until they escaped. Similarly, dogs that were previously exposed to 
inescapable shocks reacted much the same way in response to the initial shock but, over 
subsequent trials, these dogs became quiet and passively accepted the shocks. Overall, 
dogs previously exposed to controllable shocks were more likely to jump the barrier and 
escape shocks during instrumental training. On the other hand, dogs exposed to 
uncontrollable shocks later failed to develop appropriate escape behaviour when the 
shocks were controllable.
A study by Hiroto (1974) represents a typical learned helplessness experiment 
involving humans. College students were divided into three groups: ( I)  exposure to 
controllable noise; (2) exposure to uncontrollable noise; or (3) no exposure to noise.
Some participants had to figure out a solution to a problem in order to terminate the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aversive tone (i.e., noise). Others were told that the experimenter would control the 
solution to the problem, and if they guessed the solution correctly, the aversive tone 
would automatically stop. For participants with direct control, the noise could be 
terminated by pressing a button four times. For participants with no control, the noise 
stopped independently of their responses. Later, participants were tested on a hand task 
involving a hand shuttle box. All participants could control the termination of noise by 
moving their hand from one side to the other. The results showed that participants in the 
control condition (or no exposure condition) learned to terminate the noise in the hand 
task, whereas those in the no control condition failed to terminate the noise.
As these studies illustrate, learned helplessness results when one is repeatedly 
exposed to outcomes that cannot be affected, and can ultimately lead to deficits that 
include cognitive, motivational, and emotional components (Abramson et al., 1980).
First, a cognitive deficit occurs when there is a failure to perceive a contingency between 
responses and outcomes, and is reflected in one’s inability to learn when outcomes 
become controllable. For example, dogs that are exposed to uncontrollable shocks will 
fail to learn how to escape the shocks when they later become controllable 
(e.g., Overmier & Seligman, 1967). Second, a motivational deficit occurs when the 
desire to control outcomes is reduced, leading to passivity, social impairment, and 
intellectual slowness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). For example, dogs that 
have been exposed to uncontrollable shocks will passively accept the shocks even after 
they have become controllable (Overmier & Seligman, 1967). Finally, when an 
unpleasant experience is prolonged, emotional deficits, such as increased anxiety and
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depression, can occur. For example, comparable to humans, animals have been shown to 
display increases in general activity level, high autonomic arousal, passivity, social 
isolation, and/or feeding disturbances when they are exposed to prolonged stress 
(see Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978).
This learned helplessness theory was later reformulated due to a number of 
conceptual and methodological difficulties (Abramson et al., 1978). The theory remains 
consistent with regard to uncontrollability as crucial to the development of learned 
helplessness, but it now takes three types of attributions into consideration: (1) internal/ 
external; (2) stable/unstable; and (3) global/specific. The reformulated theory proposes 
that the development of learned helplessness is dependent upon why people think they 
lack control (Abramson et al., 1978). For instance, individuals who attribute lack of 
control to internal, stable, and global causes are more likely to experience long-lasting, 
generalized effects such as performance deficits, lowered self-esteem, and depression 
(Burger & Arkin, 1980; Mineka &  Hendersen, 1985; Tiggemann & Winefield, 1987). On 
the other hand, individuals who attribute lack of control to external, unstable, and specific 
causes are less likely to experience generalized effects and major mood changes (Mineka 
& Henderson, 1985).
Abramson et al.’s (1978) reformulated learned helplessness theory also considers 
the distinction between personal and universal helplessness. Whereas personal 
helplessness may occur when individuals believe they cannot solve a solvable problem, 
universal helplessness may occur when people believe that a problem cannot be solved by 
anyone. However, despite much empirical support for learned helplessness theory, there
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exists some evidence that disproves the premise that non-contingent reinforcements lead 
to feelings of helplessness (e.g., Matute, 1994; 1995).
Some Negative Effects of Control
While it has generally been acknowledged that having control leads to positive 
effects, some researchers have challenged this conclusion. For example, in their review 
of the control concept, Rodin, Rennert, and Solomon (1980) challenged two assumptions 
about the traditional views of control: (1) that people are intrinsically motivated by the 
opportunity to gain control; and (2) that the enhancement of self-esteem is an important 
process involved in making control desirable.
First, Rodin et al. (1980) presented some studies that were conducted to test the 
assumption that people value control for its own sake. In one study, choice was 
investigated because it seemed to be the form of control closest to White’s (1959) classic 
description of control as environmental manipulation. Whereas some participants worked 
on a visual perception task in order to obtain a choice of some flavours that were 
guaranteed to taste good, others were given the same choices but were not guaranteed a 
successful outcome (i.e., obtaining a tasty flavour was determined by work on a visual 
perception task). The findings indicated that choice was motivating in itself only when a 
good outcome was guaranteed (Rodin et al., 1980).
After reporting the findings of similar studies, Rodin et al. (1980) concluded that, 
although control may be the motivating factor in many instances, it is not the result of an 
intrinsic need for environmental manipulation. Rather, it is a response to the belief that
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having control will increase the odds of a positive outcome. The fact that there exists a 
condition under which people are not motivated to exert control challenges White’s 
(1959) assumption that people are intrinsically motivated by the opportunity to gain 
control.
Second, Rodin et al. (1980) presented some studies that tested White’s (1959) 
assumption that enhancing self-esteem is important in making control desirable. In one 
study, half of the participants selected which three personality questionnaires they wanted 
to complete (i.e., Control condition). The other half were simply given three personality 
questionnaires that the experimenter had selected for them (i.e., No-Control condition). It 
was found that, in comparison to those in the No-Control condition, participants with 
control over the task scored lower on subsequent self-esteem measures (Rodin et al.,
1980).
Miller (1980) has reported similar findings in her review of the control literature.
In one study using the yoked control paradigm (i.e., a stimulus is presented to the person 
with control is also presented in exactly the same way to the individual without control), 
participants were led to believe that either their reaction time ability or their memory task 
ability was superior, comparable, or inferior to that of a yoked confederate. Participants 
were then given a choice of either retaining control or relinquishing control (i.e., to a 
yoked confederate) over administering an electric shock. It was found that the 
participants who retained control were more anxious and more hostile than the 
participants who chose to relinquish control, regardless of which task they performed and 
regardless of whether their performance was superior, comparable, or inferior to that of
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the confederate.
Burger’s (1989) review further explained individuals’ negative reactions to 
personal control by suggesting three features of increased personal control that may 
decrease the desirability of that control: (1) concern for self-presentation; (2) achievement 
of desired outcomes; and (3) increase in predictability. In essence, situational and 
personality variables that increase the probability and the severity of negative 
consequences of a poor outcome will lead to a greater chance that the person will 
relinquish control, experience anxiety, and perform more poorly on a subsequent task.
First, Burger (1989) explains that personal control will be seen as less desirable 
when it leads to an uncomfortable level of concern for self-presentation. The individual 
with the most influence in a situation is also most likely to be held responsible for the 
outcome. When the possibility of failure is high and the price for failure is significant, a 
person who has a high degree of control over an event may also be concerned about the 
possibility of social disapproval following a poor outcome. In this type of situation, 
individuals are likely: (a) to opt for relinquishing or reducing their amount of control over 
the situation (e.g., Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984; Rothbaum, 
Weisz, & Snyder, 1982); (b) to experience negative affect such as lower feelings of self- 
worth and lower self-esteem (e.g., Rodin et al., 1980) or higher anxiety and hostility 
(e.g., Burger, Brown, & Allen, 1983); and (c) to perform more poorly on the task over 
which they have personal control (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 
1985; Baumeister & Steinhilber, 1984).
Second, personal control will also be seen as less desirable when it decreases the
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likelihood that one will achieve desired outcomes (Burger, 1989). When a person who is 
in control believes that the probability of a poor outcome is higher than the probability of 
a good outcome, then that person is more likely: (a) to opt for relinquishing control 
(e.g., Ball & Vogler, 1971; Miller, 1980); (b) to respond with negative affect such as 
increased anxiety and hostility (e.g., Miller, 1980; Mills & Krantz, 1979); or/and 
(c) to perform more poorly (e.g., Keinan, 1987).
Finally, personal control will be seen as less desirable when increased 
controllability leads to a person’s increased attention to the aversive aspects of a 
predictable event (Burger, 1989). Although the findings concerning predictability have 
been inconsistent (cf. Averill, 1973; Miller, 1981; Thompson, 1981), Burger (1989) 
explains that individuals are more likely: (a) to opt for relinquishing control when their 
cognitive response styles fall under high blunting (i.e., typically prefer a less active role 
with regard to their response to threat-relevant information) and low monitoring 
(i.e., typically prefer less information about potentially stressful events) (Miller, 1987; 
Miller, Brody, & Summerton, 1988); (b) to respond with negative affect such as increased 
physiological and/or self-reports of stress when their attention is drawn to a predictable 
stressor (e.g., Matthews, Scheier, Brunson, & Carducci, 1980; Monat, Averill, & Lazarus, 
1972); and (c) to perform more poorly when their focus is on unpredictable stressors 
which require more attention than predictable ones (e.g., Cohen, 1978).
The fact that personal control has been demonstrated to have detrimental effects 
for individuals’ psychological well-being has also been reported in some of the research 
examining human physiological responses to stressful situations. For instance, several
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studies have shown that situations involving instrumental control lead to increased 
cardiovascular responses (e.g., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp, 1997; Bongard, 
Hodapp, Frisch, & Lennartz, 1994; Hodapp, Bongard, & Heiligtag, 1992; Hodapp, 
Heiligtag, & Stormer, 1990).
Burger et al. (1983) explain that having control in these experiments resulted in 
negative effects because the participants were not allowed to demonstrate personal 
competence. These participants were either given a choice about which tasks they would 
complete (i.e., Control), or were assigned a task by the experimenter (i.e., No-Control). 
Participants were also either given a choice or were assigned to an easy block design task 
(i.e., competence), or were given a choice or were assigned to a difficult anagram or 
mirror drawing task (i.e., incompetence).
Burger et al. (1983) found that personal control, or having choices, resulted in 
positive effects only when individuals were allowed to demonstrate competence. Perhaps 
control leads to lowered self-esteem and negative mood in situations where people cannot 
demonstrate their mastery over a task (Burger et al., 1983). This suggests that personal 
characteristics (e.g., competence), and perhaps even other stressor variables 
(e.g., prediction), may play an important role within the control framework.
Vogeltanz and Hecker (1999) examined neuroticism as a personal characteristic, 
and both prediction and control as stressor variables in their study. Specifically, they 
investigated physiological and subjective arousal following exposure to mildly aversive 
stimuli (i.e., viewing unpleasant slides). Participants were first divided into high and low 
neuroticism groups based on test scores and then they were given either: (1) both control
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and prediction over slide onset and duration; or (2) no control and prediction over slide 
onset and duration. In the Control/Prediction condition, participants could terminate an 
aversive photo if they chose to do so by pressing a button on a hand-held box. They were 
also informed, at the beginning of the experiment, when a warning signal would occur 
and how long inter-trial intervals would last. In the No-Control/No-Prediction condition, 
participants were not instructed of the option of terminating the photo presentation, nor 
were they given information about warning tones or the duration of inter-trial intervals.
The results showed that the high neuroticism group was more physiologically and 
subjectively aroused than the low neuroticism group. However, there were no differences 
between groups with regard to control and prediction. This suggests that personal 
(i.e., neuroticism) rather than stressor characteristics (i.e., control and prediction) exerted 
more influence on participant arousal (Vogeltanz & Hecker, 1999).
Some Control-Related Conceptual Confounds 
Due to the lack of consistent findings regarding the psychological and 
physiological effects of control, researchers have questioned the assumption that ‘control 
is beneficial.’ This has involved a re-examination of some of the traditional views of 
control as well as the operationalizations and methodologies employed to test the effects 
of control. As a result, a number of conceptual and methodological confounds have been 
observed in the traditional control literature, many of which appear to stem from the 
conceptual heterogeneity and interchangeable use of control-relevant terms. Table 1 
illustrates, in chronological order, a variety of traditional conceptualizations of control.
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Table 1
Some Traditional Conceptualizations o f Control
STUDY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONTRCI
AN CH CO PC RE Other
white ( 1959) ✓ Manipulation of environment
Overmier &  Seligman (1967) ✓
(jeer &  Maisel (1972) ✓
Averill (1973) Behavioural, cognitive, &. 
decisional control
Hiroto (1974) Potential contingency
Langer (1975) ✓
Langer &  Roth (1975) ✓
Seligman (1975) ✓
Wortman (1975)
Langer &  Rodin (1976) ✓ ✓
Schulz (1976) ✓
Alloy &  Abramson (1979) ✓ ✓
Burger &  Arkin (1980) ✓ ✓
Rodin, Rennert, &  Solomon (1980) ✓
Burger, Brown, &  Allen (1983) ✓ Perceived competence
Tiggeman &  Winefeld (1987) ✓
Taylor &  Brown (1988) ✓
Helgeson (1992) ✓ Perceived vicarious control
Hodapp, Bongard, &  Heiligtag (1992) ✓
Reed, Taylor, &  Kemeny (1993) ✓ Perceived vicarious control
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1 (cont’d)
Some Traditional Conceptualizations o f Control
19
STUDY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONTROL
AN CH CO PC RE Other
Thompson et al. (1993) ✓
Bongard (1995) ✓
Eitel et al. (1995) ✓
Vogeltanz &  Hecker (1999) ✓
Baker &  Stephenson (2000a) ✓
Baker &  Stephenson (2000b) ✓
Note. AN = Actual contingency; CH = Choice; CO = Competence; PC = Perceived 
contingency; RE = Responsibility.
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The Conceptual Heterogeneity o f Control
For decades, research has variably conceptualized and/or operationalized control 
as a term ranging in meaning from environmental manipulation (e.g., White, 1959), locus 
of control (e.g., Lefcourt, 1966, 1991a, 1992; Rotter, 1966, 1975), perceived locus of 
control (e.g., Lefcourt & Telegdi, 1974), locus of desired control (e.g., Reid & Zeigler,
1981), desire for personal control (e.g., Burger, 1989, 1992; DeCharms, 1968), potential 
control (e.g., Glass & Singer, 1972), illusory control (e.g., Langer, 1975; Lefcourt, 1973), 
choice (e.g., Rodin et al., 1983), personal responsibility (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976), 
response effectiveness or actual control (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979), perceived 
competence (e.g., Burger, Brown, & Allen, 1983), belief in personal efficacy (e.g., Taylor 
& Brown, 1988), perceived vicarious control (e.g., Helgeson, 1992), actual contingency 
or instrumental control (e.g., Bongard, 1995), and perceived contingency (e.g., Baker &  
Stephenson, 2000a).
Confounding Control with Choice
For example, Langer and Rodin (1976) tested “the generalizability of feelings of 
control” (p. 193) by operationalizing control as “perceived choice and decision-making 
responsibility” (p. 197). Participants with control were informed that they had choice 
and responsibility over environmental variables such as caring for a plant and watching a 
movie, whereas participants with no control were told that they had no options and no 
personal responsibility. The results indicated that increases in control had beneficial 
effects. In comparison to those who had no control (i.e., decisions made for them and the
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plant cared for by the nursing home staff), the participants with control showed 
significant improvements on alertness, active participation, and a general sense of 
well-being.
By comparison, Burger et al. (1983) examined why increases in personal control 
sometimes lead to negative reactions such as lowered self-esteem and increased negative 
mood. In their investigation, control was operationalized as choice and perceived 
competence (rather than choice and responsibility; cf. Langer & Rodin, 1976). In 
Experiment 1, participants either had choice or no choice of experimental tasks. 
Participants were also led to believe that they were either competent or incompetent 
regarding the task they had selected. Although perceived competence had no effect, 
increases in negative mood were found among participants who had choice. In 
Experiment 2, participants again were allowed either a choice or no choice of tasks, but 
half of the participants were led to believe that their performance on the task would be 
unknown to the experimenter. Lower self-esteem and increases in negative mood were 
found only among participants who had both choice and the perception that the outcome 
of their performance would be known. In Experiment 3, the results indicated that 
participants who were given a choice of two tasks at which they believed they were 
competent did not display the increases in negative mood that were found in participants 
who were given a choice of one task at which they believed they were competent and one 
task at which they believed they were incompetent.
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The Conceptual Interchangeability o f Control-Related Terms
In addition to the variety of meanings attributed to traditional conceptualizations 
of control is the variable way in which these terms have been used interchangeably 
throughout much of the relevant literature. For example, in their conceptualization of 
control, Langer and Rodin (1976) presented various terms such as personal control, 
perceived competence, perception of control, perceived personal control, feelings of 
control, choice, perceived choice, freedom to choose, personal responsibility, decision­
making responsibility, and perceived responsibility. Simultaneously referring to such a 
variety of concepts confounds terms that may have similar but not synonymous meanings, 
embraces an ambiguous operationalization of control, fosters much variance in the 
methodologies used to examine the concept, and creates difficulties with regard to 
interpreting and discussing findings pertaining to control.
Nevertheless, a number of classic literature reviews have included discussions of 
varied control-related terms without differentiating one conceptualization from another.
For example, in their review of the positive and negative effects of control, Burger et al. 
(1983) considered, en masse, a cluster of studies examining “personal control” as choice 
(e.g., Savage, Perlmuter, &  Monty, 1979), response effectiveness (e.g., Abramson et al., 
1978; Garber & Seligman, 1980), actual control (e.g., Schulz, 1976; Schulz & Hanusa, 
1978), potential control (e.g., Glass & Singer, 1972), and desire for control 
(e.g., DeCharms, 1968).
The interchangeable use of conceptually and/or operationally distinct terms still 
occurs, at present, in the control literature. For example, Baker and Stephenson (2000a)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
reviewed, as an assemblage, a variety of studies involving distinct conceptualizations of 
control, such as active and passive coping (e.g., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp,
1997; Bongard, Hodapp, Frisch, & Lennartz, 1994), actual and potential stressor control 
(e.g., Carr & Wilde, 1988), perceived control (e.g., Corah & Boffa, 1970), actual control 
(e.g., Geer & Maisel, 1972; Nickels et al., 1992), and choice (e.g., Miller, 1979b; Phillips, 
1989). In addition, Baker and Stephenson (2000a; 2000b) used the terms control, 
instrumental control, control-beiief, perceived control, perceived instrumental control, 
active coping, and/or subjective awareness of control interchangeably throughout their 
research.
Despite its intuitive appeal and its preponderance in the literature, the absence of a 
standard and organized conceptualization of control has resulted in substantial differences 
in methodological approaches. It has also led to ambiguities regarding any clear effects 
of this concept. In considering such inconsistencies, some researchers have attempted to 
separate the effects of various control concepts.
Confounding Actual Control with Perceived Control
Traditional research has tended to utilize the term “control” interchangeably with 
other related concepts, such as illusion of control (e.g., Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth,
1975). For instance, some researchers specifically refer to the term “illusion of control” 
in their conceptualization of perceived control. According to Langer (1975) and Langer 
and Roth (1975), the illusion of control occurs when individuals overestimate the control 
they have over events. Their research indicated that people are more likely to
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overestimate their control over an outcome when competition, choice, stimulus/response 
familiarity, or passive/active involvement are introduced into a chance situation, such as 
gambling. But by unsystematically manipulating these variables, however, concepts such 
as perceived control, perceived choice, and actual control (i.e., passive/active 
involvement in affecting an outcome) have been confounded. For example, in their 
literature review, Taylor and Brown (1988) present a variety of studies that have applied 
different terms in reference to the general concept of perceived control (e.g., illusion of 
control, positive illusions, perceptions of control, personal control beliefs, beliefs in 
personal efficacy). In fact, a literature review solely examining previous illusion of 
control studies concluded that it is still debatable what illusion of control is, and that the 
findings of these studies need to be reconsidered due to differences in the types of 
independent and dependent variables examined (Masuda, Sakagami, &  Hirota, 2002).
Consequently, in order to avoid confounding such conceptualizations, more recent 
investigations have emphasized the distinction between different types of control, 
specifically, between the concepts of actual control and perceived control. For instance, 
Cramer (1988) distinguished the two concepts by operationalizing actual control as the 
extent to which the outcome is actually and objectively affected by an action (i.e., actual 
contingency). Perceived control was operationalized as the extent to which an individual 
subjectively believes (perceives) that the outcome is affected by an action (i.e., perceived 
contingency).
As a result of such distinctions, it has been possible to separate the effects of 
actual and perceived control. For instance, studies examining the theory of planned
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behaviour have differentiated actual control from perceived control (see Armitage & 
Conner, 2001 for a review). For example, in the context of antenatal screening for Down 
syndrome, one study explained that returning to the hospital for a separate visit (rather 
than screening during a routine visit) may involve barriers such as transport difficulties or 
taking time off work, which influence actual control rather than perceptions of control 
(Michie, Dormandy, French, &  Marteau, 2004).
A number of recent findings have clarified the fact that individuals do not 
necessarily need to have actual control in order to reap benefits. Merely believing that 
one has control is enough to produce positive psychological and physiological effects.
For example, lower levels of depression and better physical and psychological adjustment 
have been linked with greater perceptions of control over symptoms and course of illness 
in cancer patients (Thompson, Sobolow-Shubin, Galbraith, Schwankovsky, & Cruzen, 
1993), cardiac patients (Helgeson, 1992), and gay men living with AIDS (Reed, Taylor,
&  Kemeny, 1993).
Some researchers have also examined a distinction between different types of 
perceived control. For example, Helgeson (1992) investigated hospitalized cardiac 
patients’ adjustment to chronic illness by examining perceived personal control (i.e., the 
perception that one has control over outcomes) and perceived vicarious control (i.e., the 
perception that someone or something other than oneself has control over outcomes). 
Perceived personal control was assessed by asking patients whether they thought their 
heart problem was something over which they themselves had control. Perceived 
vicarious control was assessed by asking patients whether they thought their heart
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problem was something that could be controlled by someone or something other than 
themselves. The results indicated that internal health locus of control and perceived 
personal control (i.e., feelings of control stemming from oneself) were associated with 
adjustment for all of the participants. Vicarious control (i.e., perception that control 
stems from something or someone other than oneself) was only adaptive for patients who 
had undergone invasive procedures by physicians (e.g., angioplasty or bypass surgery).
Similarly, Reed et al. (1993) examined the concept of perceived control with 
AIDS patients. Personal control beliefs were measured as the extent to which the patients 
felt they had control over their symptoms, their health, and their medical care and 
treatment. Vicarious control beliefs were measured as the extent to which people or 
things outside themselves had control over their symptoms, their health, and their medical 
care and treatment. The results indicated that beliefs in personal control over day-to-day 
symptoms and over course of illness were positively related to adjustment, whereas 
beliefs in control by others over course of illness and over medical care and treatment 
were negatively related to adjustment. Since it can include any number of variables, such 
as physicians, other individuals, or other things such as luck, God, or some other spiritual 
element, the operationalization of vicarious control has been criticized for being 
imprecise (e.g., Helgeson, 1992).
While some researchers have separately examined different conceptualizations of 
perceived control, others have integrated both actual control and perceived control into 
their conceptualization. For instance, in the context of stressful or aversive situations, 
Cramer (1988) presents a conceptualization of control which consists of two levels of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
actual control (i.e., Control/Uncontrol) that cross two levels of perceived control 
(i.e., Veridical/Illusory) (see Figure 1). Specifically, in Veridical-Control, individuals 
have actual control and they hold accurate perceptions of their level of control 
(e.g., correctly believing that the stereo volume will turn down when turning the volume 
button to the left). In Veridical-Uncontrol, individuals do not have actual control and 
they hold accurate perceptions of their level of control (e.g., correctly believing that, as an 
unfortunate bystander with no access to the neighbour’s stereo, one cannot turn down the 
volume). In Illusory-Control, as presented by Langer (1975), individuals incorrectly 
overestimate the probability that they will succeed in influencing an outcome 
(e.g., by cursing loudly at the ceiling, an unfortunate bystander inaccurately expects that 
the volume of the neighbour’s stereo will inevitably turn down). Finally, in 
Illusory-Uncontrol, individuals underestimate their ability to influence an outcome 
(e.g., incorrectly believing that absolutely nothing can be done to influence the volume of 
the neighbour’s stereo). It is noteworthy that, consistent with Seligman (1975), Cramer’s 
(1988) conceptualization of control is defined in terms of probable (rather than absolute) 
response effectiveness.
In the past, distinguishing actual control from perceived control has allowed 
researchers to examine separate instances of illusory control and uncontrol (e.g., Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979). Such distinctions have also refined our understanding of situations 
in which individuals are led to believe that they either have control or not, even under 
conditions of constant actual uncontrol (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980). By further 
acknowledging the clear distinction between the two concepts, Cramer’s (1988)
j
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Figure I. An illustration of Cramer’s (1988) conceptualization of actual control versus 
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model emphasizes the continued importance of separating the effects of actual control 
and perceived control.
Confounding Control with Prediction
In addition to the importance of unconfounding actual control from perceived 
control is the relevance of separating the effects of control from those of prediction. 
Indeed, prediction plays a significant role within the control framework, and is most 
commonly defined as the ability to anticipate an outcome regardless of whether or not one 
has influence over that outcome (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002; Miller, 1979a). According to 
some findings, a person’s ability to predict an outcome is at least as important as actual or 
perceived control.
In fact, several positive effects that had previously been attributed to control have 
recently been attributed to prediction. For example, Rosellini and colleagues found that 
animals exposed to controllable shocks showed less fear than animals exposed to 
uncontrollable shocks (DeCola, Rosellini, & Warren, 1988; Rosellini, DeCola, & Warren, 
1986; Rosellini, Warren, & DeCola, 1987). However, animals exposed to uncontrollable 
shocks but provided with an external feedback stimulus (i.e., prediction) also showed a 
reduction in fear. Based on these findings, it appears that prediction alone is capable of 
decreasing feelings of helplessness.
The preference for predictable rather than unpredictable outcomes has been well 
documented in both animals and humans (Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978). Furthermore, 
prediction has been considered a building block of perceived control (Fisher, 1984).
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For instance, Baker and Stephenson (2000a) have demonstrated that both prediction and 
perceived control are instrumental in determining cardiovascular responses to mildly 
aversive situations.
Although many studies have shown the importance of control and/or prediction 
(e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Schulz, 1976; Wortman, 1975), interpretational problems 
exist due to the fact that these variables are typically confounded. Burger and Arkin 
(1980) argue that participants who are provided with control over outcomes are also 
characteristically provided with prediction of outcomes. In other words, individuals may 
perceive control over an outcome, not simply because they affect the likelihood of that 
outcome, but because they can predict or anticipate the likelihood of that outcome 
(Craske, Glover, & DeCola, 1995; DeCola et al., 1988; Mineka & Henderson, 1985; 
Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978; Nickels et al., 1992; Rosellini et al., 1987; Veltman, van 
Zijderveld, van Dyck, Bakker, 1998; Vogeltanz & Hecker, 1999; Wortman, 1975).
Indeed, individuals may feel control, not only because they can exert an influence on the 
outcome but also, because they are able to predict the outcome.
For example, Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) participants may have felt control, not 
because pressing or not pressing a button influenced whether the light turned on 
(i.e., actual control), but because they anticipated (via a feedback signal) whether the light 
would turn on (i.e., prediction). Even traditional control theorists recognize the existence 
of the control-prediction confound. For instance, Seligman (1975, p. 124) admits that 
“these two variables are very hard to separate, for when control is present, prediction is as 
well.” In agreement, Peterson et al. (1993, p.58) explain that “there are many potential
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interactions between control and prediction, and they will not be easy to separate.” 
According to Langlois et al. (2002), the control-prediction confound is best 
illustrated by examining the four combinations that result from crossing two levels of 
prediction (i.e., prediction and no-prediction) with two levels of actual control 
(i.e., control and no-control). In the Control/Prediction condition, the individual knows 
the outcome and influences it (e.g., the manager of a fast food chain types Command-A 
into the computer, which expectedly deletes a customer’s food order). In the No-Control/ 
Prediction condition, the individual knows the outcome but does not influence it (e.g., the 
manager of a fast food chain knows that Command-A deletes a customer’s food order, but 
must patiently wait for an employee-in-training to commit the action herself). In the 
No-Control/No-Prediction condition, the individual does not know the outcome and does 
not influence it (e.g., the manager of a fast food chain must patiently wait for an 
employee-in-training to type a command which may or may not actually delete the 
customer’s food order as intended). Finally, in the Control/No-Prediction condition, the 
individual does not know the outcome but influences it. This final arrangement of 
predictionless control has been especially difficult for traditional theorists to 
conceptualize (Langlois et al., 2002).
Early Attempts at Predictionless Control
Most studies that have manipulated control independently from prediction have 
examined learned helplessness in animals (see Mineka &  Henderson, 1985 for a review). 
For instance, physiological investigations of animals demonstrate that control leads to
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greater reductions in gastric ulcerations in prediction rather than no prediction conditions 
(e.g., Weiss, 1971). In studies examining human participants, it has been shown that both 
action (i.e., actual control) and prediction are related to perceptions of control. For 
example, Taylor and Brown (1988) report that individuals infer that they have greater 
control when they personally throw dice (i.e., action) than when someone else does it for 
them.
Furthermore, Miller and Ross (1975) explain that, when individuals expect to 
produce a certain outcome and the outcome then occurs (i.e., prediction), they often 
overestimate the degree to which they were instrumental in bringing it about. Indeed, a 
number of findings indicate that, in comparison to individuals with either control and/or 
prediction, those having neither control nor prediction over aversive events demonstrate 
greater performance deficits (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Winefield & Tiggeman, 1978).
Over the years, some researchers have attempted to include a predictionless 
control (i.e., control/no-prediction) condition in their studies. However, most of these 
attempts involved methodological difficulties which confounded the concepts of control 
and prediction. For example, Wortman (1975) conducted a study that involved three 
experimental conditions: (1) the experimenter chose a marble for the participants who 
knew beforehand which marble stood for which outcome (i.e., No-Control/Prediction);
(2) the participants themselves selected a marble, knowing beforehand which marble 
stood for which outcome (i.e., Control/Prediction); and (3) the participants themselves 
selected a marble and assigned themselves an outcome, knowing only after their selection 
which marble stood for which outcome (i.e., Control/No-Prediction).
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The results indicated that prediction induced feelings of perceived control. 
However, all of the participants were aware of which prize they would receive before 
perceptions of control, choice, and responsibility were measured. In other words, the 
No-Prediction condition was quite similar to both Prediction conditions. Although 
participants with no prediction found out which outcomes they would receive only after 
(rather than before) marble selection occurred, the fact remains that the participants in 
each experimental condition knew their outcome before their perceptions were assessed 
on the dependent measures questionnaire. Therefore, the Control/No-Prediction 
condition was not truly “predictionless.”
«
Burger and Arkin (1980) also attempted to include a predictionless control 
condition in their study. The four following conditions were examined: (1) in Control/ 
Prediction, participants were able to terminate an aversive noise by correctly solving an 
anagram problem; (2) in Control/No-Prediction, participants were informed that if they 
solved an anagram problem correctly, the length of the next noise would be cut in half.
In reality, the noise blasts were presented at random intervals and for various durations 
regardless of the participants’ anagram performance; (3) in No-Control/Prediction, 
participants were unaware of a connection between solving the anagram problem and the 
duration of noise blasts that were presented at consistent intervals and durations; and
(4) in No-Control/No-Prediction, participants were unaware of a connection between 
solving anagram problems and the duration of noise blasts that were presented at 
inconsistent intervals and durations. The results indicated that participants who had 
either control or prediction experienced positive performance and positive emotional
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effects. Only participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition displayed 
performance deficits and depressive affect.
Burger and Arkin’s (1980) findings are difficult to interpret because the 
experimental groups differed both in the instructions they received and in the way that 
prediction was operationalized. For instance, the outcomes involving control and the 
outcomes involving prediction differed depending on the experimental condition. 
Participants in the Control/Prediction condition were able to predict both noise onset and 
noise termination, but participants in the No-Control/Prediction condition were only able 
to predict noise onset. Furthermore, participants in the Control/Prediction condition had 
control over absolute noise duration while participants in the Control/No-Prediction 
condition (i.e., predictionless control) actually had no control over the noise, even though 
they were led to believe that the duration of the next noise blast could be reduced by 
solving the anagram.
This last point also demonstrates an incongruence within Burger and Arkin’s 
(1980) conceptualization of control. For instance, in the predictionless control condition, 
the experimenters wanted participants to perceive control without actually having control. 
But by unintentionally manipulating the participants’ perceptions of control in only some 
of the experimental conditions, perceived control and actual control (two separate 
concepts) were confounded. Specifically, in the predictionless control condition, which 
included perceived control but no actual control, two control variables were 
unintentionally manipulated. The Control/Prediction condition only manipulated actual 
control.
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Acknowledging such conceptual difficulties, other researchers have opted to 
either completely omit the predictionless control condition, or to replace it with a 
no-treatment condition. Unfortunately, this makes it impossible to determine whether 
positive effects are attributable to control or to prediction. For example, Geer and Maisel 
(1972) exposed participants to a slide show of aversive photographs using only three 
conditions: (1) Control/Prediction; (2) No-Control/Prediction; and (3) No-Control/ 
No-Prediction. In the Control/ Prediction condition, participants could turn off the slides 
when they became too aversive, thus making the viewing time predictable. Participants 
in the No-Control/Prediction condition could not terminate the photographs but were told 
how long each photograph would be viewed. In the No-Control/No-Prediction condition, 
participants could not turn off the slides and were not told how long each photograph 
would be viewed. The results indicated that participants who could terminate the viewing 
of aversive photographs (i.e., Control/Prediction) had significantly lower galvanic skin 
responses than both the participants who had No-Control/Prediction and those who had 
No-Control/No-Prediction. This finding suggests that the positive effects are attributable 
to having control rather than prediction.
Geer and MaiseFs (1972) results too are difficult to interpret because: (1) the 
control and prediction variables were only partially manipulated in the absence of a 
predictionless control condition; and (2) the operationalization of prediction was flawed 
due to a methodological consideration in the Control/Prediction condition which involved 
imposing a 35-second time limit for viewing a photograph regardless of a participant’s 
decision to continue viewing a slide for a longer period of time. In fact, it was not
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reported whether or not it became necessary to limit participants’ viewing time, which 
would consequently take away the individual’s ability to control and predict the length of 
time exposed to a slide.
In contrast to the other studies examining both control and prediction, Schulz 
(1976) examined positive rather than negative outcomes. The predictionless control 
condition was replaced with a no-treatment condition, and the effects of control and 
prediction were examined in older adults living in institutions. The study involved four 
experimental conditions: (1) Control/Prediction; (2) No-Control/Prediction; (3) Random; 
and (4) No-Treatment. Participants in the Control/Prediction condition had the 
opportunity to control the duration and frequency of the visits they received. Participants 
in the No-Control/Prediction condition were informed when a visit would take place, but 
were not given the opportunity to control the duration and frequency of the visits. 
Participants in the Random condition were neither given the opportunity to control the 
frequency nor the duration of the visits, and were not notified when a visitor was coming. 
In the No-Treatment group, there were no visits at all, thus serving as a baseline group.
The results showed that, in comparison to the random and no-treatment groups, 
the participants in both the Control/Prediction and No-Control/Prediction groups 
demonstrated significantly higher levels of activity as well as physical and psychological 
well-being (e.g., decrease in the quantity of daily medication, happier, more hopeful, and 
more zest for life). Whereas Geer and Maisel’s (1972) results seemed attributable to 
controlling rather than predicting an aversive event, Schulz’s (1976) findings suggest that 
predicting is more important than controlling a positive event. Once again, however,
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these results remain difficult to interpret because a predictionless control condition was 
absent in both studies.
Tiggeman and Winefield (1987) also replaced the predictionless control condition 
with a No-Treatment condition. Participants were randomly assigned to the following 
experimental conditions: (1) Control/Prediction; (2) No-Control/No-Prediction;
(3) No-Control/Prediction; and (4) No-Treatment. All of the participants in the treatment 
conditions were informed that a buzzer would turn on, and their task was to find a way to 
stop it. The noise generated by the buzzer was not considered aversive, and all of the 
treatment groups received the same instructions.
Participants in the Control/Prediction condition could terminate the tone by 
pressing a switch four times. Participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition 
could not terminate the noise and were exposed to the same pattern of tone duration as the 
yoked participants in the Control/Prediction condition. For participants in the 
No-Control/Prediction condition, the buzzer consistently sounded for a set amount of 
time. Comparable to Burger and Arkin’s (1980) findings, the results confirmed that it is 
necessary to consider both the roles of control and prediction in explaining learned 
helplessness. Specifically, only participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition 
displayed performance deficits when completing the same task at a later time.
Although their results confirmed that unpredictability and uncontrollability need 
to be considered separately in explaining helplessness, Tiggeman and Winefield (1987) 
emphasized that their study was limited in the fact that they “were unable to form a 
feasible controllable/unpredictable condition within the standard instrumental
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helplessness induction procedure” (p. 261). Due to this limitation, it was not possible to 
satisfactorily examine the effects of predictionlessness alone (Tiggeman & Winefield, 
1987).
In sum, the predictionless control condition has posed a great deal of difficulty for 
researchers. While some investigators have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to include 
predictionless control in their studies (e.g., Burger &  Arkin, 1980; Wortman, 1975), 
others admittedly excluded the condition due to conceptual difficulties (e.g., Tiggeman 
& Winefield, 1987). The resulting findings have been inconsistent, which has admittedly 
hindered any fruitful elaboration of the roles of control and prediction within the learned 
helplessness framework.
Even more encumbering is the belief in the unfeasibility of unconfounding control 
and prediction, a conviction held by many researchers. For example, Peterson et al.
(1993, p. 58) explain that “there are many potential interactions between control and 
prediction, and they will not be easy to separate.” Tiggeman and Winefield (1987, 
p. 154) agree that, even if a predictionless control condition could be arranged, “it is hard 
to see how one could convince people that they were controlling outcomes they were 
unable to predict.” Further deterring any attempt at finding any clear answers is 
Seligman’s (1975, p. 128) remark that “the problem of disentangling the effects of 
controllability from predictability may be next to logically impossible.”
Recent Attempts at Predictionless Control
In comparison to previous studies, recent investigations have provided both
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alternative operationalizations of control and prediction, as well as alternative methods of 
assessing participants’ responses to an aversive situation. Specifically, the latter 
investigations have included: (1) the manipulation of perceived control rather than actual 
control (e.g., Geer & Maisel, 1972); (2) the assessment of participants’ objective 
physiological responses rather than participants’ subjective self-rated experiences 
(e.g., Wortman, 1975) of a mildly aversive rather than a harsher event (e.g., Geer 
& Maisel, 1972), or a more positive event (e.g., Schulz, 1976); and (3) the measurement 
of actions that lessened the severity of the duration of an aversive event rather than 
actions that involved either the termination (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980) or avoidance 
(Wortman, 1975) of an event.
For instance, a recent study by Baker and Stephenson (2000a) kept control and 
prediction methodologically distinct by randomly assigning the participants to one of four 
experimental conditions: (1) in Perceived-Control/Prediction, a warning signal permitted 
the prediction of the onset of an aversive noise and participants were led to believe that 
they could reduce noise duration if their reaction time to the message “press button now” 
occurred within pre-determined limits; (2) in No-Perceived-Control/Prediction, a warning 
signal permitted the prediction of noise onset and, having no knowledge of a contingency 
between reaction time and noise duration, participants were instructed to press the 
reaction time button as quickly as possible; (3) in Perceived-Control/No-Prediction, 
participants were informed that a warning signal and noise onset would occur randomly 
while being led to believe that they could reduce noise duration if their reaction time to 
the message “press button now” occurred within pre-determined limits; and (4) in
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No-Perceived-Control/No-Prediction, participants were informed that a warning signal 
and noise onset would occur randomly while being led to believe that they had no control 
over noise duration.
Although participants in the control conditions were led to believe that they could 
alter noise duration, the noise was actually under experimenter control (i.e., actual control 
was held constant at “no control”, across all trials, regardless of experimental condition). 
Consistent with the yoked control paradigm, all of the participants were matched in terms 
of the nature of the task, as well as the number and time of reception of both a warning 
signal (i.e., prediction) and the aversive noise. Heart rate reactivity, reaction time, and 
performance increase were measured.
Baker and Stephenson (2000a) reported the finding that both control and 
prediction functioned independently in reducing heart rate responses to the aversive noise. 
Furthermore, a combination of prediction and control led to greater ratings of perceived 
control, which suggests that prediction facilitated feelings of control (Baker 
& Stephenson, 2000a). Neither perceived control nor prediction led to better 
performance in the reaction time task.
Baker and Stephenson (2000a) point out that these findings are difficult to 
interpret due to some methodological limitations related to the fact that some participants 
in the control condition perceived little or no control over noise duration, and therefore 
did not recognize a contingency between their task performance and noise duration. It 
was explained that this may have been caused by the fact that, regardless of reaction time, 
noise duration was held constant (i.e., 3 seconds) across all four experimental conditions.
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Consequently, participants may have realized over time that, irrespective of their 
performance, noise duration was the same in all trials, thus weakening their control belief. 
Baker and Stephenson (2000a) also considered the possibility that their study was limited 
in the fact that the level of noise stimuli was mild in comparison to that of other studies 
examining performance and physiological responses to aversive stimuli such as shock 
(e.g., Light & Obrist, 1980).
In a separate investigation of the relative contributions of perceived control, 
feedback, and prediction in determining cardiovascular function, Baker and Stephenson 
(2000b) examined eight experimental conditions: (1) Perceived-Control/Feedback/ 
Prediction; (2) Perceived-Control/Feedback/No-Prediction; (3) Perceived-Control/ 
No-Feedback/Prediction; (4) Perceived-Control/No-Feedback/No-Prediction;
(5) No-Perceived-Control/Feedback/Prediction; (6) No-Perceived-Control/Feedback/ 
No-Prediction; (7) No-Perceived-Control/No-Feedback/Prediction; and (8) No-Perceived- 
Control/No-Feedback/No-Prediction.
Participants in the Perceived-Control conditions were led to believe that they 
could reduce noise duration if their reaction time to the message ‘‘start” occurred within 
pre-determined limits. In the No-Perceived-Control conditions, participants were 
instructed to press the button as quickly as possible to the word “start” without being 
informed of any relationship between reaction time and noise duration. In the feedback 
conditions, participants received the message “noise duration will be (2 or 5) seconds”.
In the No-Feedback conditions, participants received the message “the noise will follow”. 
In the Prediction conditions, a warning signal was presented before the noise occurred.
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In the No-Prediction conditions, the mildly aversive noise was presented either before or 
after the warning signal, and participants received different durations of inter-stimulus 
intervals across trials.
Although participants in the control conditions were led to believe that they could 
alter noise duration, the noise was actually under experimenter control (i.e., consistent 
across all trials regardless of experimental condition). All of the participants were 
matched in terms of the nature of the task, as well as the number and time of reception of 
both a warning signal (i.e., prediction) and the aversive noise. Heart rate reactivity and 
reaction time were measured.
Baker and Stephenson (2000b) found that, in comparison to the No-Feedback 
conditions, participants who received feedback displayed greater increases in heart rate 
following the aversive noise as well as smaller decreases in heart rate during the period 
following the stimulus impact, particularly in the Prediction conditions. However, 
contrary to previous investigations describing stronger heart rate reactions with control 
(e.g., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp, 1997; Muller, Gunther, Habel, & Rockstroh,
1998), perceived control had no effect at all on participants’ heart rates. Instead, it was 
found that prediction (i.e., rather than control) was responsible for changes in heart rate 
function (Baker &  Stephenson, 2000b). None of the variables led to better reaction time.
The fact that Baker and Stephenson’s (2000b) perceived contingency 
(i.e., perceived control) had no effect on heart rate is in direct contrast with similar 
studies. Investigations examining actual contingency (i.e., actual control) between 
performance and aversive outcomes have found that contingency leads to increases in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
heart rate (i.e., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp, 1997). Baker and Stephenson 
(2000b, p. 249) suggested “that the manipulation of instrumental control leads to 
differences in heart rate responses, whereas manipulation of subjective awareness of 
control does not.” Perhaps differences in results exist due to differences in 
operationalizations of actual control on the one hand, and perceived control on the other.
Despite operational differences between actual and perceived contingency, 
however, there was also an important difference within Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 
2000b) results, which still remains unaddressed. Whereas perceived control reduced 
heart rate activity in the earlier study, it did not affect cardiovascular responses in the later 
study. Baker and Stephenson (2000b, p. 249) attempted to justify the discrepancy 
between their findings and the findings of other active coping studies by stating that 
“results from previous studies that have utilized perceived instrumental control (Manuck 
et al., 1978; Sherwood et al., 1986) have shown differential cardiovascular effects of 
control.”
Alternatively, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 2000b) differential findings might 
be due to the fact that perceived control, feedback, and prediction were confounded. For 
instance, in Baker and Stephenson (2000b, p. 243), feedback was operationalized as the 
knowledge of the duration of the mildly aversive noise (i.e., participants received the 
message: ‘noise duration will be 2 or 5 seconds’), and no-feedback was defined as no 
knowledge of duration (i.e., participants received the message: ‘the noise will follow’). 
Consistent in both feedback conditions, however, was the appearance of a message before 
noise onset.
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Furthermore, Baker and Stephenson (2000a; 2000b) operationalized prediction as 
participants’ knowledge of the feedback/outcome relationship (i.e., a warning signal 
preceded the noise and the duration of inter-stimulus intervals was consistent). In 
no-prediction, participants had no knowledge of a contingency between the warning 
signal and the noise (i.e., the warning signal either preceded or followed the noise, and 
the duration of inter-stimulus intervals was inconsistent).
Conceptually, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 2000b) prediction conditions 
resemble the perceived contingency conditions from past studies (e.g., Alloy &
Abramson, 1979; Thompson et al., 1993). Specifically, in the former, prediction was 
operationalized as the perceived contingency between an uncontrollable event 
(i.e., warning signal over which participants had no control) and the outcome 
(i.e., duration of noise).
In addition, given the fact that it permitted participants to predict the outcome they 
would receive, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000b) feedback condition appears to mimic 
conceptualizations of prediction (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Nickels et al., 1992). For 
example, Nickels et al. (1992, p. 159) define prediction as “knowing which outcome will 
likely occur before it occurs.” Therefore, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000b) feedback 
condition did mimic prediction in the fact that it informed participants of the outcome 
they would receive before it even occurred.
Furthermore, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 2000b) predictionless perceived 
control conditions resemble the random conditions included in some of the early attempts 
at achieving predictionless actual control (e.g., Schulz, 1976). Whether examining actual
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control or perceived control, an unconfounded predictionless control condition seems to 
have consistently eluded researchers. However, as remarked by Cramer and Perreault 
(2005), what researchers have consistently overlooked amidst the control-prediction 
confound is the uncertainty in explaining participants’ ratings of perceived control:
Is it a function of individuals’ level of actual control, level of outcome predictability, 
or some combination of the two? Under the traditional conceptualization, it is impossible 
to know which.
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CHAPTER 3 
A New Conceptualization of Control 
Due to the variety of meanings that have been attributed to both control and 
prediction, it has been difficult for social scientists to systematically examine the 
literature. In their approach to the problem, many have attempted to convey a 
conceptualization of control and prediction that incorporates a number of studies that 
differ in their methodology and operationalization of the terms. Consequently, many 
definitions of control and prediction have either been too limited (e.g., control is 
determined by meaningful choices available in the environment; Rodin et al., 1980) or too 
broad (e.g., “Controllability...means that you can do something about the event. 
Predictability merely means that you know something about the event, whether or not you 
can do anything about it”; Miller, 1980, p. 288).
Separating the Effects o f Control and Prediction 
In their approach to further understand the effects of control and to rectify the 
control-prediction confound, Nickels et al. (1992) reconceptualized control as 
independent from prediction. Consequently, control was redefined as “exerting an 
influence over which outcome will likely occur” (Nickels et al., 1992, p. 160). In other 
words, “one’s characteristic actions or aspects completely determine (make a difference 
in) the outcome received, which may or may not be realized” (Cramer and Perreault,
2005, p. 6). For example, if a game show contestant can choose either of two doors in the 
hopes of uncovering a desired prize, there is control because the contestant will get a
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different outcome (desired or undesired) depending upon the door that is chosen. 
Conversely, there is no control if both doors conceal the desired prize (or both doors 
conceal the undesired prize), because the player will receive the same outcome, regardless 
of the door that is chosen.
Prediction, on the other hand, “refers to knowing which outcome will likely occur 
before it occurs” (Nickels et al., 1992, p. 159). To use the above example, if  the 
contestant learns the outcome of a choice, then there is prediction because the contestant 
can anticipate the receipt of the prize. Under this reconceptualization, the traditionally 
impossible predictionless control condition becomes possible. For instance, 
predictionless control exists if one door conceals a prize and (after choosing either door), 
the player does not learn the result of that choice until after the assessment of perceived 
control. Table 2 illustrates both some traditional studies which include control-prediction 
confounds, and studies based on the new conceptualization which have successfully 
separated control from prediction by including a predictionless control condition.
Situations of predictionless control, wherein an individual performs an action 
without knowing its effect on the outcome (Nickels et al., 1992), occur in everyday life. 
For example, the owner of a new video game system decides to influence the movements 
of his game character by using the buttons on a joystick with which she is unfamiliar.
The new player does not know which joystick button makes the character kick its 
opponent, and which one makes the character throw fire. However, she knows that 
pushing either of the two buttons will have some kind of effect on the character’s 
movements. The video game player has control but cannot predict what the outcome of
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Table 2
Traditional Views of Control: A Chronological Survey of Some Conceptual Confounds 
Based on a New Conceptualization o f Control
STUDY TRADITIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONTROL CONFOUNDS
CN CH CO PC RE Other AC PR
White (1959) ✓ Manipulation of environment X X
Overmier &  Seligman 
(1967)
✓ * X
Geer &  Maisel (1972) ✓ X X
Averill (1973) Behavioural, Cognitive, &  
Decisional control
X X
Hiroto (1974) Potential contingency X X
Langer (1975) ✓ X 1
Langer &  Roth (1975) ✓ X '
Seligman (1975) ✓ X X
Wortman (1975) X X
Langer &  Rodin (1976) ✓ ✓ X X
Schulz (1976) ✓ X X
Alloy &  Abramson (1979) ✓ ✓ X X
Burger &  Arkin (1980) ✓ ✓ X ' X
Rodin et al. (1980) ✓ X '2 X
Burger et al. (1983) ✓ Perceived competence X X
Tiggeman &  Winefeld
(1987)
✓ X X
Taylor &  Brown (1988) ✓
Helgeson (1992) ✓ Perceived vicarious control X X
Hodappetal. (1992) ✓ n.a.! X
Reed et al. (1993) ✓ Perceived vicarious control X X
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Table 2 (cont’d)
Traditional Views o f Control: A Chronological Survey o f Some Conceptual Confounds 
Based on a New Conceptualization o f Control
STUDY TRADITIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF 
CONTROL
CONFOUNDS
CN CH CO PC RE Other AC PR
Thompson et al. (1993) ✓ X X
Bongard (1995) ✓ X X
Eitel et al. (1995) ✓
Vogeltanz &  Hecker (1999) ✓ X X
Baker &  Stephenson (2000a) ✓ X 1 X
Baker &  Stephenson (2000b) ✓ X ‘ X 3
Note. CN = Actual Contingency; CH = Choice; AC = Actual Control; CO = Competence; 
PC = Perceived Contingency; PR = Prediction; RE = Responsibility. Superscript1 = 
Perceived Control; Superscript2 = Potential Control; Superscript3 = Feedback;
Superscript4 = Knowledge of Control.
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those actions will be.
In a further example, hospital beds contain a number of buttons which can affect 
bed position. Individuals who are lying in a hospital bed cannot clearly see any of these 
buttons, but they know that pushing any one of these buttons will have some kind of 
effect over bed height (i.e., control), even though it is unknown (i.e., no prediction) what 
that effect will be (e.g., the bed might rise as desired).
Another example of predictionless control involves ordering a meal in a restaurant 
from a foreign language menu that one does not comprehend (Cramer et al., 1997). The 
individual has control because her choice makes a difference in the type of food that will 
arrive (i.e., control). However, she cannot predict exactly what that food will be (i.e., no 
prediction). Finally, an individual may take care of a cold by eating properly and taking 
medication (i.e., control), even without knowing for certain (i.e., no prediction) how long 
the recovery will take (Burger & Arkin, 1980).
Cramer and Perreault (2005) describe yet another example of predictionless 
control which involves a student who has enrolled in a course taught in equivalent 
timeslots and buildings by either an excellent or a terrible professor without knowing 
which professor will teach which section because that information has not yet been 
released by the registrar’s office. Whereas the registrar’s office knows which professor 
will instruct which section (i.e., prediction), the student does not (i.e., no prediction). 
Nevertheless, the student’s choice of section will completely determine the quality of 
course instruction received (i.e., control).
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Recent Success at Achieving Predictionless Actual Control 
Although predictionless control situations are possible to arrange, some 
researchers remain doubtful of the possibility that individuals will actually recognize that 
their actions are indeed controlling an unpredictable outcome (e.g., Tiggeman & 
Winefield, 1987). In order to test this possibility, Nickels et al. (1992) conducted two 
innovative experiments. Experiment 1 consisted of four conditions: (1) Control/ 
Prediction; (2) No-Control/Prediction; (3) Control/No-Prediction; and (4) No-Control/ 
No-Prediction. Participants were informed that they would listen to an aversive noise for 
either a short or a long time period. Some of the participants inserted plugs (which 
looked identical but were believed to determine a given time period) into a box. Fast 
plugs were preferred because they made the counter device briefly cycle faster, resulting 
in what appeared to be less time spent listening to the aversive noise. On the other hand, 
slow plugs made the device briefly cycle slower, which seemed to increase aversive 
listening time. In actuality, the device produced the aversive noise for the same period of 
time for all of the participants. Therefore, perceived control and prediction were 
manipulated while actual control was held constant.
In the Control/Prediction condition, participants selected one of two plugs 
(i.e., control) and later viewed either a slow or fast cycling of numbers (i.e., prediction).
In the No-Control/Prediction condition, the experimenter flipped a coin to determine 
which plug would be inserted (i.e., no control) and the participant viewed either a slow or 
fast cycling of numbers (i.e, prediction). In the Control/No-Prediction condition, 
participants selected a plug (i.e., control) but were prevented from viewing the counter
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(i.e., no prediction). In the No-Control/No-Prediction condition, the experimenter flipped 
a coin to determine which plug would be inserted into the box (i.e., no control), and the 
participants were prevented from viewing the counter (i.e., no prediction).
The findings indicated that the participants did in fact recognize that they had 
control even without prediction. Specifically, participants with control (i.e., those who 
freely chose a plug) rated themselves as having more ‘influence’ in determining which 
time period they received, regardless of prediction. Furthermore, participants with 
prediction (i.e., those who viewed cycling numbers) rated themselves as more confident 
in their ability to predict how long they would be listening to the aversive noise.
Despite the encouraging finding that it is methodologically possible to test 
predictionless control, Nickels et al. (1992) noted some key shortcomings to 
Experiment 1. First, it is possible that an illusion of control, or “an expectancy of a 
personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would 
warrant” (Langer, 1975, p. 311), presented itself. In Nickels et al. (1992), an illusion of 
control may have been induced due to the element of choice involved in selecting a plug. 
Whereas the participants in the control group chose either one of two plugs, those with no 
control were not presented with a selection of options at all. Furthermore, the term 
“control” was mentioned in the instructions, which may have led to demand 
characteristics. Therefore, Nickels et al. (1992) designed a second experiment that 
addressed these concerns.
In Experiment 2, participants were placed into like-sexed pairs and informed that 
they would engage in an aversive task (i.e., repetitive and boring) for either a short or a
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long period of time. Two cards containing the invisible words “short” or “long” were 
placed on a platform. One person in the pair was either (a) controller-shooter,
(b) controller-watcher, (c) uncontroller-shooter, (d) uncontroller-watcher; the other person 
was designated as the opposite (i.e., d, c, b, a, respectively). To determine each pair’s 
time period, the controller selected a card, and the shooter (possibly the same person as 
the controller) hit the selected card with a toy dart gun. In this case, only the person who 
chose the card (controller) had control regardless of whether he or she was also the person 
who shot the card. Half of the pairs were assigned to the Prediction condition, so the time 
period indicated on the chosen card was revealed before the questionnaire and aversive 
task were completed. The other half of the pairs were assigned to the No-Prediction 
condition. This meant that the time period indicated on the chosen card was only 
revealed after the questionnaire had been completed.
Similar to the findings obtained in Experiment 1, regardless of control, 
participants with prediction provided higher ratings of prediction and confidence than 
participants with no prediction. Furthermore, regardless of prediction, participants with 
control provided higher ratings of control, influence, responsibility, and credit or blame; 
and lower ratings of helplessness. Since no difference was found between shooters and 
watchers in terms of ratings of influence and control, it was concluded that an illusion of 
control due to choice had not actually been induced in the first experiment. In other 
words, shooters did not feel more control simply because they were responsible for 
shooting the card.
Nickels, Gural, Cramer, and Ross (1994) also conducted a study that would
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provide further evidence that predictionless control is not only recognized, but also 
preferred over predictionless uncontrol. In this instance, however, only two conditions 
were examined: (1) Control/No-Prediction; and (2) No-Control/No-Prediction. 
Participants were presented with two trays. Each tray contained two envelopes, and each 
envelope contained a card that indicated whether or not they had won a prize.
Participants first selected a tray and then selected one of the two envelopes in that tray. 
Participants in the Control/No-Prediction condition were informed that one tray held 
envelopes containing different outcomes (i.e., one offering a prize and one offering no 
prize), while the other tray held envelopes containing the same outcome (i.e., both 
offering a prize or both offering no prize), but the participants were not told which 
outcome to expect. Participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition were 
informed that all of the envelopes in both trays contained the same outcome (i.e., either 
all offering a prize or all offering no prize), but the participants were not told which 
outcome to expect. After selecting a tray, it was explained that participants could choose 
an envelope if they were willing to wait for up to 20 minutes. I f  they decided not to wait, 
the participants were permitted to choose an envelope from the unselected tray.
The results indicated that participants in the Control/No-Prediction condition 
preferred having a choice between envelopes containing different and unpredictable 
outcomes (i.e., blind control) than envelopes containing the same unpredictable outcome 
(i.e., no control). Furthermore, participants in the Control/No-Prediction condition 
waited longer in order to be able to choose between envelopes in their preferred tray than 
those in the No-Control/No- Prediction condition. The findings demonstrated that
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predictionless control was both recognized and preferred over no control. These findings 
are difficult to interpret, however, because actual control was confounded with yet 
another variable -  choice.
Separating the Effects o f Control and Choice 
Both theoretically and empirically, the new conceptualization has allowed the 
separation of the effects of control and prediction, thus making predictionless control 
scenarios possible (Cramer et al., 1997; Gural, 1992; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et 
al., 1992, 1994). Despite theoretically and empirically separating the effects of control 
and prediction, however, deficiencies still exist with regard to disentangling the concepts 
of control and choice.
For instance, despite successfully separating the effects of control and prediction, 
Nickels et al.’s (1992) manipulation of control was still confounded with choice.
Whereas participants with control were permitted to choose a plug, participants without 
control were not. Therefore, it is unclear whether enhanced feelings of control, influence, 
and responsibility were actually due to the veridical influence of the cycling speed 
(i.e., actual control), or to the act of selecting a plug (i.e., choice). Were Nickels et 
al.’s (1992) results due to the level of actual control, the level of choice, or the 
combination of both actual control and choice?
Advocates of the illusion of control would certainly challenge Nickels et 
al.’s (1992) results by intimating that the higher ratings of controllability found in the 
control condition were illusory, simply produced by the act of selecting a plug
I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
(i.e., Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Indeed, recent findings support the notion that, 
regardless of actual control, individuals who are given a choice show better personal 
adjustment and better coping (e.g., Burleson, Kegeles, & Lund, 1990; Harchik, Sherman, 
Sheldon, & Bannerman, 1993), as well as increased feelings of comfort (Mills & Krantz, 
1979) and perceived control (Feehan & Enzle, 1991; Langer, 1975).
A number of studies commonly conceptualize control as choice and no-control as 
no-choice. For example, in Langer (1975), whereas participants in the control condition 
chose their lottery ticket, individuals in the no-control condition did not make a choice. 
When asked to estimate the resale value of their ticket, the participants in the control 
(i.e., choice) condition appraised their ticket at a higher value, therefore implying that 
ticket choice gave individuals a greater sense of control at winning at this chance task.
Similarly, in their investigation of the effects of repeated movie exposure in post- 
surgical patients, Rotton and Shats (1996) operationalized perceived control as giving 
patients a movie choice and giving them information about the benefits of watching 
movies. It was found that choice interacted with benefit expectations in affecting the 
amount of medication that patients self-administered. Specifically, patients who were 
neither given a choice nor informed about the benefits of movie-watching self­
administered the most medication.
Tafarodi, Milne, and Smith (1999) separated their choice conditions into three 
categories: (a) effective (i.e., difference-making) choice; (b) ineffective choice; and
(c) no choice. The participants who made an effective choice provided significantly 
higher ratings of control than those who had made either an ineffective choice or no
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choice at all. Therefore, only effective choices (which impacted the outcome) were 
associated with perceptions of control.
Although many studies have demonstrated the benefits of choice, it is clear that 
choice and control are often confounded. This confound exists in the literature despite 
the caution that these two concepts are not interchangeable (e.g., Nickels et al., 2005; 
Williams, 1998). Consequently, the results of many studies have been questioned -  
whether choice independently increases or decreases perceptions of control remains an 
empirical question (Skinner, 1996).
Paterson and Neufeld (1995) suggest that the point of contention is not related to 
the simpler confound between two variables (i.e., control and choice, or control and 
prediction). Rather, the confound exists among all three variables, in the fact that choice 
influences the amount of control a person feels while anticipating a stressful event. In 
their investigation of this triple confound, Paterson and Neufeld (1995) manipulated the 
availability of information (i.e., prediction) about coping options in an imagined scenario, 
and then examined the effects of anticipated stress and control in selecting coping 
options. The results indicated that, when information about choice was available, 
actually having choices among coping options increased perceived control and reduced 
stress. This suggests that providing non-productive choices does not increase perceptions 
of control nor reduces perceptions of threat. Rather, it was the rational anticipation of the 
effects on the outcome which governed participants’ perceptions.
Several studies have avoided the triple confound of control, choice, and prediction 
by holding one variable constant while manipulating the other two. For instance, Cramer
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et al. (1997; see also Gural, 1992) held choice constant, but manipulated prediction and 
control. Choice was held constant by allowing all participants to make a choice on every 
trial. Multi-trial control conditions were also included within this context. In addition, 
whereas Nickels et al. (1992) only compared the effects of 0% with 100% actual control, 
Cramer et al. (1997) compared the effects of 0%, 25%, 50%, and 75% actual control.
In Cramer et al.’s (1997) study, participants were informed that they would listen 
to an aversive noise for the length of time determined by the positioning of a card 
(i.e., which end of the card was placed in the slot). Each participant was given a total of 
24 cards that the experimenter placed in either the A or B slot of the card reader. 
Participants received a time reduction if  a white square on the card was positioned 
opposite the card-reader photocell. Card position made no difference for cards with 
either two white or two black squares (i.e., No-Actual-Control). However, card position 
did make a difference for cards with one white and one black square (i.e, Actual-Control). 
Participants were informed whether their choice of card position (A or B) would make a 
difference for each card, and then they were randomly assigned to one of twelve 
conditions derived by crossing three levels of prediction (i.e., Predicted-Success, 
Predicted-Failure, and No-Prediction) with four levels of actual control (0%, 25%, 50%, 
and 75%).
Participants in the Predicted-Success condition knew they had received more than 
13 time reductions, while participants in the Predicted-Failure condition knew they had 
received less than 11 time reductions. Participants in the No-Prediction condition did not 
know how many time reductions they received. Level of actual control (0%, 25%, 50%,
I
i
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and 75%) was determined by how many cards the participants received with one white 
and one black square (0, 6, 12, and 18 cards, respectively). It was found that, regardless 
of prediction, participants with no actual control over the length of time of an aversive 
noise felt less control, less responsibility, less influence, and more helplessness than those 
with any amount of actual control (25%, 50%, or 75%).
Cramer and Nickels (2005) addressed the triple confound by manipulating actual 
control while holding both choice (all participants made one selection) and prediction 
constant (at No-Prediction). To determine how long they would engage in a boring motor 
task, participants blindly selected among a series of letters (A and B) denoting short and 
long time periods. Similar letters (all A  or all B, e.g., “AA”, “BBB”, “AAAA”) 
represented the same time period (i.e., No-Actual-Control) while different letters (mix of 
A and B, e.g., “AB”, “AAB”, “BBAA”) represented different time periods (i.e., Actual- 
Control). Whereas some participants selected a letter and then completed the dependent 
measures, others completed the dependent measures first and then selected a letter. It was 
found that participants who made a choice among different options (i.e., Actual-Control) 
had higher ratings of perceived control than participants choosing among identical 
options (i.e., No-Actual-Control). Interestingly, there was no difference in control ratings 
when measures were taken either before or after the choice of option. In other words, 
control ratings were equivalent whether a choice was made or not, which emphasizes the 
unimportance of choice in determining perceptions of control.
In order to further investigate the three-variable confound, Langlois et al. (2002) 
conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, based on the findings of Alloy and
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Abramson (1979) and Nickels et al. (1992), it was hypothesized (1) that even without 
being able to predict the outcome, participants with actual control will report higher 
perceived control, responsibility, influence, and lower levels of helplessness than 
participants with no actual control. Furthermore, based on the findings of Langer (1975) 
and Wortman (1975), it was hypothesized (2) that even without being able to predict the 
outcome, participants with choice of option will report higher perceived control, 
responsibility, influence, and lower levels of helplessness than participants with no choice 
of options. These hypotheses were tested by considering control as implying choice, 
although having a choice did not necessarily imply having control. In other words, 
participants with actual control had the opportunity to make a choice that made a 
difference in the outcome they received.
First, the participants were informed that they would engage in a boring 
proofreading task for either a short 2-minute or a long 20-minute period of time. Then, 
one of three experimental conditions was introduced: (1) Actual-Control/Choice;
(2) No-Actual-Control/Choice; and (3) No-Actual-Control/No-Choice. In the 
Actual-Control/Choice condition, participants were informed that their choice would 
involve selecting one of two envelopes containing different time periods (i.e., one 
envelope contained the 2-minute time period and the other contained the 20-minute time 
period), but they didn’t know which envelope contained which time period. Participants 
in the No-Actual-Control/Choice condition were aware that they would choose one of 
two envelopes containing the same time period (i.e., both envelopes contained either 
2-minute or 20-minute time periods), but they didn’t know which time period the
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envelopes contained. The No-Actual-Control/No-Choice participants watched the 
experimenter select one of the two envelopes by flipping a coin. Since flipping a coin 
generally involves neither knowledge nor selection skills on the experimenter’s part, 
illusory control by choice was considered to be justifiably minimized. In order to keep 
both No-Actual-Control conditions consistent, both envelopes actually did contain the 
same outcome. For all three experimental conditions, the outcome was not disclosed 
until the experiment and questionnaire had both been completed by the participant. The 
participants did not actually have to engage in the proofreading task.
The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the first hypothesis. Participants with 
actual control and choice reported significantly more perceived control, responsibility, 
and influence (but not any less helplessness) than participants with no actual control, 
regardless of choice. In the fact that providing a choice failed to produce higher ratings 
of perceived control in participants with no actual control, the second hypothesis was 
disconfirmed. Langlois et al. (2002) concluded that, in order to feel control, one’s actions 
must make a difference in the outcome that is received.
Contrary to learned helplessness theory, which predicts that a lack of actual 
control is sufficient to produce emotional deficits (Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1975), 
the results of Experiment 1 showed no significant differences in the helplessness ratings 
between participants with actual control and those with no actual control (Langlois et 
al., 2002). This finding is inconsistent with the results of past studies, which have 
demonstrated that helplessness decreases with increased actual control (e.g., Burger 
& Arkin, 1980; Nickels et al., 1992; Tiggemann & Winefield, 1987). However, as
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Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 1) explain, this discrepancy may be due to 
methodological differences such as the time of outcome disclosure. For example, 
whereas previous studies have typically shared the outcome with participants before 
assessing dependent measures (e.g., Cramer & Nickels, 2005), Langlois et al. (2002, 
Experiment 1) disclosed their participants’ outcomes only after all measures were 
assessed, and upon completion of the experiment.
The finding that one’s actions must make a difference in order to feel control can 
be applied to a number of situations. For example, Langlois et al. (2002) describe a 
cancer patient who is given the choice of receiving a new drug that may either completely
9
eradicate the liver tumour (desired outcome), or may not at all have an effect on the 
tumour (undesired outcome). What becomes important for control is not choosing 
between the drug treatments, but the understanding that the choice will actually have an 
effect on the patient’s own health. Therefore, it is not the act of making a choice that 
makes an individual feel control; it is the fact that one’s choice will make at least some 
difference in the outcome.
Whereas some studies had held both choice and prediction constant 
(e.g., Cramer & Nickels, 2005), or held either choice (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997) or 
prediction (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002, Experiment 1) constant, Langlois et al.’s (2002, 
Experiment 2) manipulated all three variables (i.e., actual control, choice, and prediction), 
and considered desire for control and locus of control as individual difference covariates 
that might affect the dependent variables of perceived ratings of control, influence, 
responsibility, and helplessness.
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Specifically, in Experiment 2, the participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four levels of the actual control variables: (1) in the Actual-Control/Choice condition, 
participants blindly selected one of two envelopes containing different time periods, but 
were not informed which envelope contained which time period; (2) in the No-Actual- 
Control/Choice condition, participants blindly selected one of two envelopes which both 
contained either a 2-minute or a 20-minute time period, but were not informed which 
time period the envelopes contained; (3) in the No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (same 
outcomes) condition, participants were assigned one of two envelopes which contained 
the same time period and were selected by the experimenter using a spinner; and 
(4) in the No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (different outcomes) condition, participants were 
assigned one of two envelopes that contained different time periods and were selected by 
the experimenter using a spinner. Whereas Experiment 1 examined different outcomes 
only under the Actual-Control/Choice condition, Experiment 2 examined different 
outcomes under both Actual-Control/Choice and No-Actual-Control/No-Choice 
conditions. These last two conditions permitted the comparison of situations in which 
participants actively chose a meaningful option versus situations in which participants 
were simply assigned a meaningful option.
Participants were also randomly assigned to one of three levels of prediction:
(1) in Predicted-Success, participants were informed that they had received the short time 
period before completing the dependent measures; (2) in Predicted-Failure, participants 
were informed that they had received the long time period before completing the 
dependent measures; and (3) in No-Prediction, participants were not aware of the time
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period they had received until after the dependent measures were completed.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that desire for control and locus of control 
did not significantly relate to the dependent variables. Consistent with the results of 
Nickels et al. (1992), it was found that participants in the prediction conditions were more 
confident about the time period they received than those who did not learn their time 
period. Also supporting previous findings that indicate prediction is not needed in order 
for participants to perceive control (Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002, Experiment 
1, Nickels et al., 1992), the results demonstrated that regardless of prediction, participants 
with actual control and choice felt more control, responsibility, and influence, and 
reported feeling less helplessness than participants in all other conditions. Although it 
was expected that participants’ ratings of control, influence, and responsibility in the 
No-Actual-Control/Choice and No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (same outcomes) 
conditions would be similar, the results were inconclusive due to insufficient evidence 
(Langlois et al., 2002). It was found, however, that a meaningless choice neither reduced 
nor increased feelings of helplessness. Finally, it was also demonstrated that an illusion 
of control was not induced in the No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (different outcomes) 
condition.
Langlois et al.’s (2002) results are consistent with past findings (Cramer et 
al., 1997; Nickels et al., 1992; Paterson and Neufeld, 1995) and provide further support 
for the new conceptualization of control. In short, actual control is beneficial only when 
one’s actions make a difference in one’s outcome. Furthermore, merely providing a 
choice neither increases feelings of control nor decreases feelings of helplessness unless
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the outcome is known or not.
In sum, support has been provided for the new conceptualization of control and 
prediction despite many researchers’ doubts (e.g., Tiggemann & Winefield, 1987).
Indeed, people are able to recognize that they have control over an outcome even if they 
are unable to predict what that outcome will be (Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et 
al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992). Research has also demonstrated that these instances of 
predictionless control are sometimes preferred over conditions of no control (Nickels et 
al., 1994). Surprisingly, research has shown that 100% control is not needed to prevent 
feelings of helplessness but rather even a little control (25%) will provide equivalent 
beneficial effects (Cramer et al., 1997). Cramer and Nickels (2005) shed doubts on the 
necessity of choice by demonstrating that control can be perceived even before a choice is 
made. Finally, Cramer and Perreault (2005), Langlois et al. (2002), and Paterson and 
Neufeld (1995) demonstrated that choice will not yield benefits unless meaningful 
options are provided.
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CHAPTER 4
Choiceless Control: Its Conceptual and Empirical Feasibility 
Although the new conceptualization has successfully separated the effects of 
control from the effects of prediction (i.e., Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Nickels, 2005; 
Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992; 1994), there has not yet been success at 
completely unconfounding control from choice. In fact, the conceptual difficulty of 
unconfounding these variables appears to be the key reason why proponents of the new 
conceptualization have had problems in completely crossing choice with control. For 
instance, Langlois et al. (2002, p. 172) admit that, in their study, a choiceless control 
condition “was omitted due to conceptual difficulties.” Specifically, while some 
participants had choice but no control (e.g., participants could choose an envelope 
containing identical time periods), no participants had control without choice (Langlois et 
al., 2002).
Langlois et al. (2002) suggested that one reason why choiceless control has been a 
challenge for researchers is the existence of an ambiguity inherent in the new 
conceptualization of control. For instance, Nickels et al. (1992) broadly explain that 
having control involves affecting an event, contributing to it, making an impact on it, or 
even simply bringing it about. In addition to implying that actions or behaviours may not 
necessarily be required for actual control to occur, this explanation also suggests that 
control may even imply choice. It is quite possible for individuals to make choices that 
affect an event, contribute to it, or make an impact on it. Consequently, it remains 
unclear whether any observed benefits are due to simply having control (i.e., without
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
choice), or due to having both control and choice.
Langlois et al. (2002) admit that the new conceptualization has been inconsistent 
at uncovering significant differences in helplessness, and suggest that future research 
should also consider awareness of choice (see also Cramer et al., 1997). In Langlois et al. 
(2002), participants were informed (by a clearly visible sign) whether their choice of 
envelope made a difference in the outcome. But would participants still feel control if  
they: (1) were unaware of the fact that the envelopes contained same or different time 
periods; or (2) were unaware that they were even making a choice (Langlois et al., 2002)?
By systematically crossing two levels of actual control (i.e., control and no 
control) with two levels of awareness of choice (i.e., awareness and no awareness), it may 
be possible to determine the specific conditions under which individuals feel helpless or, 
alternatively, perceive control, responsibility, and influence over the outcomes they 
receive. Figure 2 illustrates the four conditions which are derived by combining actual 
control with awareness of choice variables: (1) Actual-Control/Awareness; (2) Actual- 
Control/No-Awareness; (3) No-Actual-Control/Awareness; and (4) No-Actual-Control/ 
No-Awareness.
A variety of such conditions occur in everyday life events such as job interviews, 
dating situations, and sport competitions. For example, an employer may prefer to 
promote an employee who sits in the chair nearest the interviewing team because it 
indirectly demonstrates positive character traits such as bold assurance, self-confidence, 
and assertiveness. In this situation, a number of scenarios are possible: (1) A candidate 
interviewing for the desired promotion chooses to sit in the nearest chair, being entirely
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68




► Choice between options ► Choice between options
leading to different leading to the same
Yes outcomes outcome
► Awareness that the chosen ► Awareness that the chosen
option makes a difference option makes no
in the outcome received difference in the outcome
received
AWARENESS Cell1 Cell 3
OF CHOICE
Cell 2 Cell 4
No ► Choice between options ► Choice between options
leading to different leading to the same
outcomes outcome
► No awareness that the ► No awareness that the
chosen option makes a chosen option makes no
difference in the outcome difference in the outcome
received received
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
aware that this choice will lead to the promotion (i.e., Actual-Control/Awareness);
(2) A candidate interviewing for the desired promotion chooses to sit in the nearest chair, 
even though he is unaware that this choice will lead to the promotion (i.e., Actual- 
Control/No-Awareness); (3) A candidate interviewing for the desired promotion chooses 
to sit in the nearest chair, being entirely aware that he will get the promotion regardless of 
the chair he chooses (i.e., No-Actual-Control/Awareness); and (4) A candidate 
interviewing for the desired promotion chooses to sit in the nearest chair, being unaware 
that he will get the promotion regardless of the chair he chooses (i.e., No-Actual-Control/ 
No-Awareness).
Another example which demonstrates the four combinations of actual control with 
awareness of choice occurs in the context of dating relationships. For example, Chris 
wishes to impress Sam during their first dinner date in order to win her love and approval 
for a second date. Sam is very impressed by a person’s good judgement and careful 
consideration, personal traits that can be inferred when individuals taste their food first, 
before adding any additional spices or condiments. For instance, adding salt to a steak 
before tasting it first is considered by Sam as a sign of hastiness and impatience.
In this situation, a number of possibilities present themselves: (1) Chris chooses to 
add salt to his steak after tasting it first, being entirely aware that this choice will 
determine his success in getting a second date (i.e., Actual-Control/Awareness); (2) Chris 
chooses to add salt to his steak after tasting it first, even though he his unaware that this 
choice will determine his success in getting a second date (i.e., Actual-Control/ 
No-Awareness); (3) Chris chooses to add salt to his steak after tasting it, being entirely
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aware that he will get a second date regardless of when he salts his steak (i.e., No-Actual- 
Control/Awareness); and (4) Chris chooses to add salt to his steak after tasting it while 
being unaware that he will get a second date regardless of when he salts his steak 
(i. e., No-Actual-Control/No-Awareness).
Yet other situations that combine variations of actual control and awareness of 
choice occur in the context of sport competitions. For example, Sandy wishes to obtain 
first place in a bouldering competition for which she has trained intensely for many 
months. Her odds of winning are increased if she uses smaller rather than larger holds.
The following scenarios may occur: (1) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller hold, 
being entirely aware that this choice will determine a first place win (i.e., Actual-Control/ 
Awareness); (2) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller hold even though she is unaware 
that this choice will determine her first place win (i.e., Actual-Control/No-Awareness);
(3) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller hold, being entirely aware that she will win 
first place regardless of whether or not she has chosen the smaller hold over the larger 
one (i.e., No-Actual-Control/Awareness); and (4) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller 
hold, being unaware that she will win first place regardless of the hold she has chosen 
(i.e., No-Actual-Control/No-Awareness).
Although a number of scenarios illustrate how different levels of actual control 
can be combined with different levels of awareness of choice, the specific conditions 
under which individuals feel helpless or, alternatively, perceive control, responsibility, 
and influence over outcomes remain unknown. Do people need to be aware that they are 
making a choice in order to reap positive effects (Langlois et al., 2002)? Is awareness of
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choice required in order for individuals to perceive control? Furthermore, what would 
occur if various levels of prediction were examined in addition to variables of actual 
control and awareness of choice?
Separating the Effects o f Control, Prediction, and Awareness of Choice 
Cramer and Perreault (2005) researched these questions by examining the effects 
of control, awareness of choice, and prediction. Based on the findings obtained by 
Cramer et al. (1997), Langlois et al. (2002), and Nickels et al. (1992), three hypotheses 
were tested. It was hypothesized that: (1) regardless of prediction and awareness of 
choice, ratings of control, influence, and responsibility will be higher and ratings of 
helplessness lower for participants with actual control. It was also hypothesized that:
(2) ratings of control, influence, responsibility, and helplessness will not vary by 
participants’ awareness that their choice made a difference in the time period they 
receive. Finally, it was hypothesized that: (3) ratings of prediction and confidence will be 
higher for participants who knew which time period they would receive and, specifically, 
ratings of success will be higher for participants who knew they would receive a short 
time period.
In Experiment 1, Cramer and Perreault (2004) asked participants to choose 
between two pencils of either identical or different colours, which would determine the 
time they would spend engaging in a boring motor task. Whereas some participants 
chose a pencil before knowing the implications of their choice, others were fully 
informed about what their choice implied. After making their selection, participants with
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prediction were informed that they would work on the boring motor task for either a short 
or long time period, and then they completed some dependent measures examining levels 
of helplessness, perceived control, influence, and responsibility over the outcome. 
Participants without prediction completed the dependent measures without knowing 
which time period they would receive.
Experiment 1 examined three independent variables: (1) in actual control, 
participants’ choice of pencil-either made a difference (i.e., Actual-Control: where one of 
two different-coloured pencils was selected) or not (i.e., No-Actual-Control: where one of 
two same-coloured pencils was selected) in how long they would engage in a boring 
motor task; (2) in prediction, participants were informed that they would engage in the 
motor task for a short time period (i.e., Predicted-Success), a long time period 
(i.e., Predicted-Failure), or not informed at all about the outcome (i.e., No-Prediction); 
and (3) in awareness of choice, participants were informed of the ramifications of their 
choice either before (i.e., Awareness) or after their choice of pencil (i.e., No-Awareness).
In support of the first hypothesis, the results showed higher ratings of perceived 
control, influence, and responsibility under conditions of actual control where participants 
selected between options that yielded different outcomes. These results were consistent 
regardless of variations in prediction and awareness of choice. This finding has also been 
observed in several prior studies (cf. Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Nickels, 2005;
Gural, 1992; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992).
Curiously, however, the results also showed that participants felt more helpless in 
achieving the desired time period when they selected among identical options, knowing
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that they would receive a short time period. Cramer et al. (1997) have reported a similar 
effect for helplessness across variations in prediction, but this result has occurred without 
any interaction with the actual control variable. In short, it appears that feelings of 
control and influence are enhanced by making a choice between options that yield 
different outcomes.
In partial support of the second hypothesis, the results showed no significant 
differences in awareness of choice for perceived control, influence, and helplessness. 
However, individuals felt more responsibility over the outcome they received when they 
knowingly made a choice, regardless of whether or not they knew exactly what that 
outcome would be. Overall, however, it appears that awareness of choice is somewhat 
less important than actual control in determining individuals’ control-related perceptions.
Finally, the results of Experiment 1 supported the third hypothesis. Participants 
who knew the outcome they would receive, whether it was a short time period or a long 
time period felt they could better predict their outcome than participants who did not 
know their time period at all. Furthermore, participants who knew they would engage in 
the boring motor task for a short time period felt more successful than participants who 
either knew they would work for a long time period, or did not know their time period at 
all.
Despite these overall corroborative findings, Cramer and Perreault (2005) admit 
that the results of Experiment 1 may have been contaminated by a methodological flaw. 
Specifically, by randomly assigning participants to an experimental condition in the 
context of a group setting, it was possible for individuals to observe the materials given to
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others. For example, the fact that some participants received two red pencils may have 
aroused suspicion in those in adjoining seats who received one red and one blue pencil. 
This unintentional display of stimuli may have provided the participants with visual cues, 
leading them to make inferences about the experimental hypotheses. In short, the 
conspicuous protocol of materials may have led to demand characteristics which biased 
the participants to behave a certain way while inviting them to make assumptions about 
the purpose of the study.
Therefore, Cramer and Perreault (2005, Experiment 2) addressed this flaw by 
replicating the first study and using less conspicuous materials. Seated in a large 
classroom, participants each received a booklet with an instruction page on the cover. 
Participants were asked to complete a demographic survey. Instead of choosing between 
same- or different-coloured pencils, participants selected between same or different birth 
year formats (i.e., two-digit or four-digit birth year).
Based on the same hypotheses and experimental conditions as the first 
experiment, Experiment 2 examined the following independent variables: (1) in actual 
control, participants’ choice of birth year format (in the context of a demographic 
questionnaire) either made a difference (i.e., Actual-Control: where one of two different 
birth year formats was selected) or not (i.e., No-Actual-Control: where one of two same 
birth year formats was selected) in how long they would engage in a boring motor task;
(2) in prediction, participants were informed that they would engage in the motor task for 
a short time period (i.e., Predicted-Success), a long time period (i.e., Predicted-Failure), 
or not informed at all about the outcome (i.e., No-Prediction); and (3) in awareness of
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choice, participants were informed of the ramifications of their choice either before 
(i.e., Awareness) or after their choice of birth year (i.e., No-Awareness).
In partial support of the first hypothesis, the results of Experiment 2 showed that 
participants felt more control and responsibility under conditions of actual control. 
Specifically, individuals whose choice of birth year format made a difference in the time 
period they received felt both more perceived control and more perceived responsibility 
than individuals whose choice made no difference. However, there were no significant 
effects for influence, helplessness, or frustration. These findings were consistent 
regardless of the variations in prediction and awareness of choice. In other words, 
participants with actual control felt more control and responsibility regardless of whether 
or not they knew which outcome they would receive, and regardless of whether or not 
they knew exactly which choice would determine the outcome they received. The 
significant effects found for perceived control and perceived responsibility are consistent 
with previous findings (cf. Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Nickels, 2005; Gural, 1992; 
Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992).
Consistent with the second hypothesis, there were no significant differences in the 
awareness of choice variable. In other words, being aware that one’s choice makes a 
difference in the outcome does not affect feelings of control, influence, responsibility, and 
helplessness. As demonstrated in the first experiment, it appears that awareness of choice 
is less important than actual control in determining individuals’ control-related 
perceptions.
Inconsistent with the third hypothesis, there were no significant differences in the
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prediction variables (either by main effect or interaction effect with actual control). In 
other words, perceptions of prediction, confidence, and success were the same for all 
participants; whether they knew that they would engage in a boring motor task for a short 
time period, a long time period, or could not predict their outcome at all.
In summary, Cramer and Perreault’s (2005) findings are consistent with those of 
past investigations. Consistent with Langlois et al. (2002), Cramer and Perreault (2005) 
found that choices are important only under conditions of actual control where they make 
a difference in the outcome received, even when that outcome is unpredictable. It 
appears that simply making a choice, or being aware that an important choice is being 
made, is not enough - it must also be a choice that matters in order for control and 
responsibility to be perceived (see also Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels 
et al., 1992).
These findings are corroborated by Paterson and Neufeld (1995), who examined 
the effects of control and choice when coping with a stressful event. In their study, the 
availability of information was manipulated (i.e., prediction) regarding options to a 
fictitious stressful event. It was found that participants who were given several options 
(in addition to having further information available) had higher ratings of perceived 
control and reduced stress than participants who were provided with several options but 
no available information. Paterson and Neufeld’s (1995) findings suggest that being 
provided with non-productive choices will neither increase perceptions of control nor 
reduce perceptions of threat. Rodin et al. (1980) also report that individuals feel 
inadequate when they are given choices that are not meaningful. In fact, having no choice
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at all may be more beneficial than being presented with a meaningless choice (Rodin et 
al., 1980).
Despite the knowledge gained by investigations of choice as embedded in actual 
control (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002; Paterson & Neufeld, 1995; Rodin et al., 1980) and 
awareness of choice (i.e., Cramer and Perreault, 2005), the control and choice variables 
still remain partly confounded because a choiceless control condition has still not been 
examined. Until choice is completely separated from control, it will be difficult to 
determine for certain whether or not actual control can exist without any choice at all. As 
suggested by Langlois et al. (2002), a next step might include examining how individuals 
feel toward outcomes that are determined by factors that cannot be chosen, such as age, 
height, sex, and ethnicity. For instance, even in cases of extreme aesthetic or surgical 
procedures, one’s chromosomal sex will remain unchanged regardless of genital 
reconstruction, one’s age will remain unchanged regardless of any plastic surgery that is 
performed to enhance appearance, and one’s ethnicity will remain unchanged regardless 
of the superficial changes that are made to skin or hair colour. Therefore, in following 
this recommendation, Nickels et al. (2005) developed a model in which actual control 
variables were entirely separated from choice variables, two of which were based on 
either externally-based (i.e., voluntary choice) or internally-based (i.e., involuntary 
choice) factors.
The Feasibility o f Choiceless Control Without Prediction 
Nickels et al.’s (2005) model thus systematically crosses two levels of actual 
control (i.e., Actual-Control and No-Control) with three levels of choice
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(i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, and No-Choice). Voluntary-Choice denotes 
a choice that is made based on factors that are external to the individual (e.g., choosing an 
ice cream flavour). Involuntary-Choice consists of a choice that is made based on factors 
that are internal to the individual (e.g., choosing a vitamin supplement that is specific to 
one’s gender). Finally, situations involving No-Choice consist of instances in which 
options have been pre-selected for the individual (e.g., assigning a child to a classroom 
seat based on family name).
In the fact that it attempted the complete separation of choice from actual control, 
Nickels et al.’s (2005) model was developed in order to determine the feasibility of 
choiceless control. Figure 3 illustrates the various combinations for two levels of actual 
control crossed with three levels of choice: (1) Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice;
(2) Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice; (3) Actual-Control/No-Choice; (4) No-Actual- 
Control/Voluntary-Choice; (5) No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice; and 
(6) No-Actual-Control/No-Choice.
As with situations pertaining to awareness of choice, many circumstances exist 
which combine variations of actual control and choice. In revisiting the awareness of 
choice example in which an employer may prefer to promote an employee who sits in the 
chair nearest the interviewing team because it indirectly demonstrates positive character 
traits, a number of new scenarios become possible: (1) A candidate interviewing for the 
desired promotion chooses one of two chairs, where the selection of one chair will lead to 
the promotion but the other will not (i.e., Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice);
(2) A candidate interviewing for the desired promotion chooses one of two chairs based
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on her own gender, where the selection of one chair will lead to the promotion but the 
other will not (i.e., Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice); (3) A candidate interviewing for 
the desired promotion is assigned one of two chairs pre-selected by the employer’s 
administrative assistant, where the one pre-selected chair will lead to the promotion but 
the other will not (i.e., Actual-Control/No-Choice); (4) A candidate interviewing for the 
desired promotion chooses one of two chairs, where both chairs will lead to either the 
promotion or no promotion (i.e., No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice); (5) A candidate 
interviewing for the desired promotion chooses one of two chairs based on her own 
gender, where both chairs will lead to either the promotion or no promotion 
(i.e., No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice); and (6) A candidate interviewing for the 
desired promotion is assigned one of two chairs pre-selected by the employer’s 
administrative assistant, where both chairs will lead to either the promotion or no 
promotion (i.e., No-Actual-Control/No-Choice).
Although it is possible to list a number of additional examples which illustrate 
how different levels of actual control can be combined with different levels of choice, the 
specific conditions under which individuals feel helpless or, alternatively, perceive 
control, responsibility, and influence over outcomes remain unknown. How important is 
choice in determining individuals’ positive perceptions over situations? Is choice 
required in order for individuals to perceive control? Specifically, what would occur if 
variations of actual control and choice were examined in the context of unpredictable 
events?
In attempting to answer these questions, Nickels et al. (2005) conducted two
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experiments that differed only in the unpredictable outcomes that participants would 
receive. Specifically, whereas Experiment 1 involved re-rating a questionnaire about how 
strongly one identified with 25 self-descriptions, either once (non-aversive condition) 
or five times (aversive condition), Experiment 2 involved having to solve (aversive 
condition) or not (non-aversive condition) three pages of simple but tedious math 
problems. In both studies, actual control and choice were examined in terms of their 
effects on ratings of: (a) control over; (b) influence on; (c) responsibility for; and 
(d) making a difference in the outcomes received.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions which included a 
combination of two levels of actual control (i.e., Actual-Control, or No-Actual-Control) 
with three levels of choice (i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, or No-Choice).
All of the participants were asked to tear off one of the two comers at the bottom of a 
page and were then informed that the comer which was removed would determine the 
outcome they would receive. In Experiment 1, the bottom left-hand comer of the page 
contained the word ‘male’ or ‘plum,’ and the bottom right-hand comer of the page 
contained the word ‘female’ or ‘orange.’ In Experiment 2, the bottom left-hand comer 
contained the letter ‘M ,’ and the bottom right-hand comer of the page contained the letter 
‘N .’
Whereas participants in the Actual-Control condition were informed that they 
would receive a different outcome depending upon which word or letter was tom off, 
those in the No-Actual-Control condition were informed that they would receive the same 
outcome, regardless of the word or letter which was tom. None of the participants knew
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which word or letter was associated with which outcome until after they had tom the 
sheet of paper and completed a dependent measures questionnaire (i.e., No-Prediction 
was held constant across all conditions).
In addition to being placed into either one of the two actual control conditions, the 
participants were also assigned to one of three choice conditions. Participants with 
Voluntary-Choice were made to feel as though they had genuine options, and their choice 
was both conscious and intentional because it was based on external factors 
(i.e., choice of a fruit word or a letter which referred to working on a math problem or 
not). Participants with Involuntary-Choice were made to feel as though they were 
presented with genuine options, but their choice was inadvertent and was made neither 
consciously nor intentionally because it was based on internal factors (i.e., choice based 
on a gender word or on a letter referring to family name). Participants with No-Choice 
were made to feel as though they had options, but they did not make the choice 
themselves (i.e., pre-selection occurred).
Six experimental conditions therefore represented the combination of two actual 
control variables and three choice variables: (1) in Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice, 
participants were informed that they would receive a different outcome depending upon 
which fruit word (Experiment 1) or letter (Experiment 2) they selected; (2) in Actual- 
Control/Involuntary-Choice, participants were informed that they would receive a 
different outcome depending upon which gender word (Experiment 1, where the word 
indicated the participant’s gender) or letter (Experiment 2, where the letter indicated 
either the first or second half of the alphabet in which their family name appeared) they
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selected; (3) in Actual-Control/No-Choice, participants were informed that they would 
receive a different outcome depending upon which word or letter had already been pre­
selected for them; (4) in No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice, participants were 
informed that they would receive the same outcome regardless of which fruit word 
(Experiment 1) or letter (Experiment 2) they selected; (5) in No-Actual- 
Control/Involuntary-Choice, participants were informed that they would receive the same 
outcome regardless of which gender word (Experiment 1, where the word indicated the 
participant’s gender) or letter (Experiment 2, where the letter indicated either the first or 
second half of the alphabet in which their family name appeared) they selected; and 
(6) in No-Actual-Control/No-Choice, participants were informed that they would receive 
the same outcome regardless of which word or letter had already been pre-selected for 
them.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that Voluntary-Choice (regardless of actual 
control conditions) significantly increased individuals’ perception that they made a 
difference in their outcome, as well as significantly increased their feelings of influence, 
control, and responsibility. The results of Experiment 2 showed that Actual-Control must 
be paired with Voluntary-Choice in order for individuals to feel more control, influence, 
and responsibility over outcomes, and to feel that they made a difference in the outcome 
they would receive. Involuntary-Choice was interpreted as having no choice at all. These 
overall findings challenge the view that making a difference can affect perceptions of 
control, regardless of type of choice (Nickels et al., 1992) or whether or not choice makes 
a difference in the outcome received (Langer, 1975). In order to perceive control over
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outcomes, it appears necessary to experience the combination of having conscious 
intentions toward making a choice between options (i.e., Voluntary-Choice) that lead to 
different outcomes (i.e., Actual-Control).
In summary, Table 3 presents an overview of the findings reported by proponents 
of the new conceptualization of control. It has been difficult for researchers to adequately 
interpret findings pertaining to control and choice variables because investigations have 
neglected to examine situations of choiceless control (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 2005; 
Langlois et al., 2002). This has mainly been due to the conceptual unfeasibility of 
examining an experimental condition that includes control but not choice. Therefore, 
Nickels et al. (2005) devised a model which permitted the complete separation of choice 
from actual control variables. It was found that choice did in fact increase perceptions of 
control, but only under conditions in which externally-based choices were made between 
two options that led to different outcomes. Hence, effective choices alone seem to 
facilitate positive perceptions.
The Feasibility o f Choiceless Control with Prediction 
In the fact that Nickels et al.’s (2004) model of choiceless control generated clear 
and conclusive findings, it appears that a complete separation of choice from control has 
finally become feasible, at least under conditions of unpredictability. However, a number 
of questions remain which warrant further investigation: How might conditions of 
predictability (rather than unpredictability) affect individuals’ feelings of control, 
influence, responsibility, and helplessness over outcomes? What would occur if
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Table 3
A Summary o f Some Significant Findings Examining the Effects o f Actual Control, 
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Table 3 (cont’d)
A Summary o f Some Significant Findings Examining the Effects of Actual Control, 
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PD-S = Prediction-Success; PD-F = Prediction-Failure; and VCH = Voluntary-Choice.
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prediction variables (i.e., Predicted-Success, Predicted-Failure, and No-Prediction) were 
combined with variations in choice (i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, and 
No-Choice) and actual control (i.e., Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control)?
Specifically, how would individuals feel if they were to learn that they had received either 
a positive outcome (Predicted-Success) or a negative outcome (Predicted-Failure) based 
on internally-based information such as eye colour (Involuntaiy-Choice)? Exploring such 
questions is crucial in order to understand individuals’ experiences of choiceless control 
in situations of prediction.
However, before attempting any further investigation it is important to consider a 
new confound that may present itself in situations that pair choicelessness with 
prediction. Langlois et al. (2002) cautioned that there may be some unique challenges for 
researchers investigating situations that pertain to internally-based (unchosen) 
characteristics such as gender, age, height, or ethnicity. For example, a female 
interviewing for a male-dominated job position may predict that she will not get the job 
because of her gender (Langlois et al., 2002). Similarly, a 5-foot tall athlete who tries out 
for the National Basketball Association may predict that he will not make the team 
because of his lack of height. Likewise, an individual who is severely disfigured can 
anticipate being stared at while out in public. In cases such as these, it is involuntary, 
unchosen, intrinsically-based characteristics that influence the outcome received.
Situations of choiceless control seem to be characterized by states of being 
(i.e., involuntary choices based on internal factors) rather than conditions of doing 
(i.e., voluntary choices based on external factors).
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Situations of choiceless control with prediction occur in a number o f‘real’ world 
contexts. In the fact that one’s genetic code is not a personal decision, databanking and 
genetic profiling are contexts that invite conditions of choiceless control (Caruso, 2002). 
For example, Friedrich (2002) describes a case in which more than a dozen middle-aged 
Burlington Northern and Sante Fe railroad workers had filed disability claims related to 
carpal tunnel syndrome. Consequently, the railroad company surreptitiously performed 
genetic tests in order to avoid paying disability claims for any worker carrying the genetic 
marker linked to carpal tunnel syndrome. Choiceless control existed in the fact that an 
unchosen internal characteristic (i.e., genetic marker vs. no genetic marker) determined 
which one of two different outcomes the workers would experience (i.e., disability claim 
payed or denied).
Other situations of choiceless control occur within the context of biopiracy 
(unauthorized access to a genetic resource and using it in a manner that contravenes a 
national regime). For example, DeCODE has constructed three vast databases of 
individual Icelanders which will operate as: (1) a geneological database of the Icelandic 
population for most of the last millenium; (2) a genetic database of DNA sequence and 
other information produced from blood samples; and (3) a database containing past, 
present, and future medical records from every Icelander, living or dead, produced from 
the nationalized system of health care, and usually referred to as the Health Sector 
Database (Caruso, 2002). By national law, the medical records of every Icelander living 
or dead were included as part of the database population without asking their explicit 
permission. Those still alive can fill out a form to be removed from the database, but
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they have no choice about being included in the first place (Caruso, 2002). The creation 
of databases such as those used by DeCODE increases the likelihood of discrimination.
For example, in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the U. S. Public Health Service gathered 
data on a number of individuals and then withheld appropriate treatment from the syphilis 
patients participating in the study.
Choiceless control situations also present themselves in the commercial realm.
For example, through their Info Base Ethnicity System database, Acxiom Corp.
(an information broker that stockpiles names, race, sex, age, and other data on 95 million 
American households) provides a breakdown of ethnic and minority classifications 
(Stepanek, 2000). This micro-segmentation (Weblining) has permitted companies to 
more finely dissect individual profiles, thus determining whether customers will get the 
best service, the best price, and the best access to new products and information 
(Stepanek, 2000). Acxiom can even help companies target specific individuals 
(e.g., middle-aged African American women), hence creating situations of choiceless 
control in which different outcomes (e.g., being offered vs. denied an unlimited range of 
products) are experienced based on an unchosen set of characteristics (e.g., age and 
ethnicity).
The Present Study: Purpose and Hypotheses 
The purpose of the present study is to contribute to the new conceptualization of 
control by refining and extending the experimental design used previously. Whereas 
Nickels et al. (2004) investigated two levels of actual control and three levels of choice 
under conditions of unprediction, the present study will examine two levels of actual
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control (i.e., Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control), three levels of choice 
(i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, and No-Choice), and three levels of 
prediction (i.e., Predicted-Success, Predicted-Failure, and No-Prediction). To date, 
no study has manipulated all three variables under the new conceptualization, nor refined 
the research design to include a condition of choiceless control with prediction.
Based on the findings of Cramer et al. (1997), Langlois et al. (2002), and Nickels 
et al. (1992), it is hypothesized that : (1) regardless of the predicted outcome condition, 
participants with Actual-Control will perceive significantly more influence, 
responsibility, and control over their outcome. Based on the findings of Nickels et al. 
(2005, Experiment 1), it is hypothesized that: (2) regardless of the predicted outcome 
condition, participants with Voluntary-Choice will perceive significantly more influence, 
responsibility, and control over their outcome, but only when Voluntary-Choice is 
accompanied by Actual-Control. Based on the findings of Cramer and Perreault (2005), 
Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 2), and Nickels et al. (1992), it is hypothesized that:
(3) regardless of the actual control or choice conditions, in comparison to participants 
with No-Prediction, those with prediction (either Predicted-Success or Predicted-Failure) 
will feel significantly more confident in their ability to predict their outcome. Based on 
Cramer and Perreault (2005), it is hypothesized that: (4) under conditions of Predicted- 
Success, participants with Actual-Control will feel less helpless over their outcome than 
those who have No-Actual-Control. Finally, based on the results of Langlois et al.
(2002, Experiment 2), it is hypothesized that: (5) regardless of the predicted outcome 
condition, participants with Voluntary-Choice will feel less helpless over their outcome, 
but only when Voluntary-Choice is accompanied by Actual-Control.




Five hundred and eight undergraduate students (95 males and 413 females) from a 
University of Windsor Introduction to Psychology class participated in the present study. 
Participants were not selected based on specific characteristics such as gender, age, or 
ethnicity. All of the participants were compensated by having their names entered in a 
cash draw.
In order to decide the time period under which they would complete a boring 
motor task, some participants were asked to select and tear off either the bottom right or 
bottom left comer of a page. Others were asked to tear off a bottom page comer that was 
pre-selected. Some participants were informed that the page comer they had chosen or 
had been assigned to tear would lead to different time periods. Others were informed that 
the page comer they had chosen or had been assigned to tear would lead to the same time 
period. Participants with prediction learned which time period they would receive before 
completing a dependent measures questionnaire. Those without prediction completed a 
dependent measures questionnaire without knowing the time period they had received.
Materials
Each participant received a consent form (Appendix A), and a booklet containing 
instructions for one of 18 randomly assigned experimental conditions (Appendix B), and 
a dependent measures questionnaire with manipulation checks (Appendix D). As tested
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in previous studies (Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Perreault, 2004; Langlois et al., 2002; 
Nickels et al., 2004; Nickels et al., 1992), the dependent measures questionnaire 
examined perceived control, responsibility, influence, helplessness, frustration, as well as 
confidence and ability to predict the time period received, based on 7-point Likert scales 
ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 7 = ‘To a great extent.’ The questionnaire also consisted 
of three manipulation checks: (1) ‘Did the page comer make a difference in the time 
period you received?’ where options were ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ respectively, denoting either the 
Actual-Control or the No-Actual-Control experimental condition; (2) ‘Did you choose 
which page comer would be tom?’ where options were ‘Yes (I made a choice between 
‘salt’ or ‘pepper’),’ ‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’), or ‘No (the 
choice o f‘right’ or ‘left’ was made for me’),’ in respective order, denoting the 
Voluntary-Choice, the Involuntary-Choice, or the No-Choice experimental condition; 
and (3) ‘Were you informed about how long you would engage in the crossout task?’ 
where options were ‘Yes (a 2-minute short time period),’ ‘Yes (a 20-minute long time 
period),’ or ‘No (I was not informed)’, in respective order, denoting the Predicted- 
Success, the Predicted-Failure, or the No-Prediction experimental condition.
Experimental Design 
The present study utilized a 2 x 3 x 3 randomized between-subjects factorial 
design. The first independent variable, ACTUAL CONTROL, was defined in terms of 
whether or not the options made a difference (i.e., mattered) in the outcome. Options 
mattered based on how the page comer words affected the amount of time participants
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would perform the crossout task. Whereas participants with Actual-Control were 
informed that one page comer would lead to performing the crossout task for a short 
2-minute period and the other would lead to a long 20-minute period (i.e., meaningful 
options), participants with No-Actual-Control were informed that both page comers 
would lead to same time period (i.e., options made no difference). In the 
No-Actual-Control with Prediction conditions, the time periods were counterbalanced so 
that some participants received a short time period and others received a long time period 
as their outcome.
The second independent variable, CHOICE, was defined in terms of who 
performed the act of choosing between options. A choice was made when a page comer 
was tom. In the Voluntary-Choice condition, participants chose one of two page comers 
listing the words ‘salt’ or ‘pepper.’ In the Involuntaiy-Choice condition, participants 
chose one of two page comers listing the words ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ which had to be 
selected based on their own true eye colour. Finally, in the No-Choice condition, 
participants were assigned (by written experimenter instruction) to tear off one of two 
page comers listing the words ‘right’ or ‘left.’ In all three choice conditions (Voluntary- 
Choice; Involuntary-Choice; No-Choice), page comer was counterbalanced so that some 
participants would tear off the bottom right comer of the page (i.e., ‘pepper,’ ‘non-blue,’ 
or ‘right’ respectively) while others would tear off the bottom left comer (i.e., ‘salt,’
‘blue,’ or ‘left’ respectively), and vice-versa.
The third independent variable, PREDICTED OUTCOME, was defined in terms 
of whether information about the outcome was provided to the participants. Prediction
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occurred when participants were informed about how long they would perform the 
crossout task. Specifically, whereas some participants were informed that they would 
perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute time period (Predicted-Success), others 
were informed that they would perform the task for a long 20-minute time period 
(Predicted-Failure). Finally, some participants were not at all informed of their time 
period (No-Prediction). The time periods were counterbalanced based on the words 
presented as part of the CHOICE conditions. For example, whereas some participants 
received a short time period for choosing the word ‘salt,’ others received a long time 
period for choosing the word ‘salt.’
Procedure
Seated in a large Introduction to Psychology classroom, participants received a 
consent form. After the consent forms were completed and returned to the experimenter, 
the participants were informed that they would be compensated for their efforts by having 
their name entered in a cash draw. The experimenter, along with three or four research 
assistants, then distributed a booklet that included instructions (specific to the 
experimental condition that had been randomly assigned to each participant) as well as a 
brief dependent measures questionnaire with manipulation checks. For the Predicted- 
Success and Predicted-Failure conditions, the participants were informed of the time 
period they would receive before the dependent measures and manipulation checks were 
presented. For the No-Prediction condition, the participants were presented with the 
dependent measures and manipulation checks before being informed of the time period
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they would receive.
Alter the booklets were distributed, the participants were informed that the 
purpose of the study was to test their motor skills by seeing how well they performed at a 
boring crossout task (i.e., X-in-the-box) which consists of crossing out small box 
characters that are 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm in size. In order for participants to experience what it 
is like to engage in this task, all of the participants were then asked to cross out as many 
boxes as they could during a one-minute period which was timed by the experimenter.
The participants were then asked to open and complete their booklets. After the 
participants completed the experiment, they were informed that they would not actually 
perform the crossout task, regardless of the time period they had received (all verbal 
instructions are presented in Appendix C). Finally, participants were debriefed about the 
hypotheses, procedures, and expected findings (Appendix E). The research participants 
were also given the opportunity to have the results of this study sent to them by e-mail 
once they became available (Appendix E).






Prior to conducting the main analyses, all of the experimental conditions were 
examined (through various SPSS programs) for missing values, manipulation check 
responses, and fit between data distribution and the multivariate assumptions. Each one 
of the 18 experimental conditions was examined separately. Because these data included 
few missing values, a case was deleted if it included one or more missing values 
(18 cases; see Appendix F for details).
A case was also deleted when an incorrect response was made to the experimenter 
instruction regarding the tom word. The tom word manipulation check was considered 
incorrect if  both words had been tom off the page, or if both words had remained intact 
(rather than one word tom by the participant as instructed). Therefore, the remaining 
571 cases were examined in terms o f these manipulation check responses, and five 
incorrect cases were deleted as a result. All of the remaining 566 cases were retained for 
further analyses.
Because outliers can produce either a Type I or a Type II error, and MANOVA is 
sensitive to outliers, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) highly recommend that a test for 
outliers accompany any use of MANOVA. Therefore, in addition to screening for 
missing and incorrect cases, the present data were also screened for univariate and 
multivariate outliers. Tests for univariate and multivariate outliers were conducted
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separately for each cell of the present 2 x 3 x 3  design.
Using the cutoff criterion of critical standardized score = ± 3.29, p < .001, a total 
of 36 univariate outliers were found among the experimental groups (see Appendix F for 
complete details). Tests for multivariate outliers were then conducted separately for each 
one of the 18 groups. In considering the four main dependent variables (i.e., perceived 
control, responsibility, influence, and helplessness), thus using the cutoff criterion,
%2 (4, n‘) = 18.47,/? = .001, only one multivariate outlier, %2 (4, N  = 29) = 22.53, p = .001 
was found (Appendix F). In addition to deleting the one case containing a multivariate 
outlier, the 36 cases containing univariate outliers were also eliminated from their 
respective groups, leaving a total o f530 participants across the 18 experimental 
conditions.
Both the univariate and multivariate outlier analyses were conducted a second, 
third, or fourth time, until no new outliers (p = .001) were found (see Appendix F).
Overall, these analyses yielded 21 new univariate outliers, and one new multivariate 
outlier, %2 (4, N  = 30) = 18.77, p -  .001. In addition to deleting the one case containing a 
multivariate outlier, the 21 cases containing univariate outliers were also eliminated from 
their respective groups, leaving a total of 508 participants among the 18 experimental 
conditions, where no new outliers were revealed (Table F4 in Appendix F lists the total 
number of participants remaining in each experimental condition after completion of the 
data reduction analyses).
1 where n = number of participants in 1 of the 18 experimental groups
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Data Screening
All of the experimental conditions were further examined to determine which 
participants correctly responded to a set of manipulation check questions. These three 
manipulation checks were presented as questionnaire items: (1) ‘Did the page comer 
make a difference in the time period you received?’ where options were ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ 
respectively, denoting either the Control condition or the No-Control experimental 
condition; (2) ‘Did you choose which page comer would be tom?’ where options were 
‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’),, ‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘blue’ 
or ‘non-blue’), or ‘No (the choice o f‘right’ or ‘left’ was made for me’),’ in respective 
order, denoting the Voluntary-Choice, the Involuntary-Choice, or the No-Choice 
experimental condition; and (3) ‘Were you informed about how long you would engage 
in the crossout task?’ where options were ‘Yes (a 2-minute short time period),’ ‘Yes 
(a 20-minute long time period),’ or ‘No (I was not informed),’ in respective order, 
denoting the Predicted-Success, the Predicted-Failure, or the No-Prediction experimental 
condition.
Overall, 210 cases consisted of at least one incorrect value on the manipulation 
checks (see Appendix F for complete details). Whereas most cases presented only one 
single incorrect value, other cases had incorrect values on two manipulation checks. Due 
to the large number of participants who responded incorrectly to the manipulation checks 
in many of the experimental conditions, /-tests were conducted to determine whether 
significant differences in the four main dependent variables (i.e., perceived control, 
responsibility, influence, and helplessness) existed between the responses of individuals
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who responded correctly to all four manipulation check items and those who responded 
incorrectly to one or more items.
In order to compare the two groups, 72 /-tests were performed overall, where each 
one of the four dependent variables was examined, in turn, for each one of the 
18 experimental conditions (Appendix F). Although some significant values were found 
for perceived control, responsibility, or helplessness, these were not considered important 
enough to warrant action, because a situation of inflated Type I error rate was quite likely 
present due to the multiple tests that were conducted within each experimental condition 
for each one of the four main dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Although it was concluded that no systematically important differences existed between 
participants who answered the manipulation checks correctly and those who did not, it is 
cautioned that the data be examined while considering the possibility of Type I error.
Therefore, all 508 cases were retained for further analyses, which examined 
significant differences in the frequency of incorrect manipulation check responses among 
the independent variables. Specifically, of the three two-way chi squares that examined 
incorrect manipulation check responses, only the ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED 
OUTCOME finding was significant, y2 (2, N - 210) = 21.90,/? < .001 (see Appendix F 
for further details).
An examination of the standard residuals indicated that significantly more 
manipulation check errors occurred when the independent variables were incongruent 
(i.e., Actual-Control with No-Prediction, and Predicted-Success or Predicted-Failure with 
No-Actual-Control), and significantly fewer errors occurred when the independent
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variables were congruent (i.e., Actual-Control with Predicted-Success or Predicted- 
Failure, and No-Prediction with No-Actual-Control). Although the decision was then to 
proceed with the preliminary analyses, this finding was kept under consideration for later 
discussion.
Principal Component Analyses
Before conducting the multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), it was 
important to perform a principal component analysis in order to determine the extent to 
which the dependent variables were correlated with one another. Because little is gained 
by including several measures of the same thing, it was important to first organize the 
dependent variables, which would simplify subsequent multivariate analyses o f variance 
(Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2001). Principal component analyses provided a way o f summarizing patterns 
of correlations that would reduce the dependent variables into smaller independent sets 
(Tabachnick &  Fidell, 2001), thereby ensuring that the subsequent multivariate analyses 
of variance would be performed with appropriate (i.e., correlated) sets of dependent 
variables.
Therefore, principal components analysis with varimax rotation was performed 
through SPSS FACTOR on 11 items from the present sample o f508 participants. This 
procedure was used to estimate the number of components underlying the dependent 
variables. The means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 11 dependent 
variables are presented in Table 4. Five components were extracted, explaining 69% of
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Dependent Variables (N  = 508)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Perc. Control - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Responsbl .47"” - - - - - - - - - -
3. Influence .53” ' .57"" - - - - - - - - -
4. Helpless -.25"* -.23*" -.23*" - - - - - - - -
5. Frustrate .12” .02 .10* .19*" - - - - - - -
6. Predict .26"" .18*" .20*" -.04 .20"* - - - - - -
7. Confident .35"" .21'" .22*** -.09* .05 .47*" - - - - -
8. Want -.13" -.08* -.14" .14" .17*" .02 -.08* - - - -
9. Motivate .03 .05 .03 .04 -.04 .02 .12" -.09* - - -
10. Optimist .11" .17"* .01 -.05 -.04 .10* .16*** .08* .14" - -
ll.Contribu .06 .08* .06 .03 .01 -.00 .10* .02 .35*** .17*** -
M 2.40 2.81 2.82 4.76 3.20 2.88 3.19 6.36 4.78 4.06 5.02
SD 1.81 2.18 2.07 2.33 221 1.88 2.02 129 1.53 1.75 1.52
* p  >.05 ; * * p  > .01; * * *  p >  .001.
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the total variance, and each component was well defined by the variables in the solution. 
Communality values, as seen in Table 5, tended to be high. With a loading cutoff value 
of > .60 for inclusion of a variable in the interpretation of a component, it was found that 
each one of the 11 variables loaded on one o f the components.
Component 1 consisted o f the dependent variables of influence, responsibility, 
and perceived control over the outcome; Component 2 consisted o f confidence in and 
prediction of the outcome; Component 3 consisted of perceived contribution and 
motivation to participate; Component 4 consisted of frustration regarding and 
helplessness over the outcome; and Component 5 consisted o f optimism toward and 
desire for a positive outcome. Loadings of variables on components and communalities 
after orthogonal rotation are shown in Table 5, where variables are ordered and grouped 
by size o f loading in order to facilitate interpretation. Sum of square loadings and 
percentage of variance are also shown in Table 5.
Main Analyses
Because the results of the Principal Component Analyses sorted the dependent 
variables into five separate packages, a 2 x 3 x 3 between-subjects MANOVA was 
performed on each one of the following sets of dependent variables: (1) influence, 
responsibility, and perceived control; (2) confidence and prediction; (3) perceived 
contribution and motivation to participate; (4) frustration regarding and helplessness over 
the outcome; and (5) optimism toward and desire for a positive outcome. Independent 
variables were ACTUAL CONTROL (Actual-Control or No-Actual-Control), CHOICE
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Table 5
Loadings o f Variables and Communalities (hi2)  fo r Principal Components Extraction with 
Varimax Rotation, and Percentage o f Variance Explained by each o f the Rotated 
Orthogonal Components
Item c, c2 c3 c4 c. fr
Influence .85 .06 .03 .05 -.13 .75
Responsibility .80 .09 .07 -.08 .11 .67
Perceived Control .75 .28 .01 -.00 -.02 .64
Predict .13 .83 -.08 .17 .04 .74
Confident .20 .81 .13 -.07 .01 .72
Motivate -.02 .09 .81 .03 -.09 .68
Contribute .10 -.05 .78 .07 .16 .65
Frustration .17 .11 -.05 .82 .04 .71
Helplessness -.40 -.01 .17 .60 -.02 .56
Want -.11 -.13 -.16 .38 .72 .72
Optimist .07 .21 .27 -.27 .72 .71
Eigenvalues (SSL) 2.20 1.53 1.43 1.29 1.10 -
Variance % 19.97 13.91 12.96 11.76 10.04 -
Note. Boldface numbers denote variables extracted for each component.
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(Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, or No-Choice), and PREDICTED OUTCOME 
(Predicted-Success, Predicted-Failure, or No-Prediction).
Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control
The means and standard deviations for the three dependent variables on each 
independent variable are presented in Table 6. Table 7 displays the analysis of variance 
for the combined dependent variables. With the use of Wilks’ criterion, a significant 
multivariate main effect was found for each o f ACTUAL CONTROL, CHOICE, and 
PREDICTED OUTCOME. There was also a significant multivariate two-way interaction 
for ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE, and a significant multivariate three-way 
interaction.
Table 7 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of the 
three dependent variables. These findings showed that, regardless of CHOICE and 
PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether or not participants had ACTUAL CONTROL had a 
significant effect on ratings for each o f influence, responsibility, and perceived control. 
Specifically, participants with Actual-Control (where options made a difference in the 
outcome) felt significantly more influence, M D2 = 0.62,/? < .001, more responsibility,
M D  = 0.69, p < .001, and more perceived control, M D  = 0.47, p  < .01, than individuals 
with No-Actual-Control (where options made no difference in the outcome).
2 M D = Mean difference between the scores o f participants who had Actual-Control 
and the scores o f individuals who had No-Actual Control.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control 
Scores fo r each Experimental Condition
Dependent Variables
Influence Responsibility Perceived Control
IND EPEN DEN T VARIABLES M  (SD) M  (SD) M  (SD)
A CTUAL
CONTROL
Actual-Control (n = 250) 3.14* (2.15) 3.16* (2.28) 2.63* (1.85)
No-Actual-Control (n =  258) 225b (1.94) 2.47b (2.02) 2.17b (1.75)
CHOICE Voluntary-Choice (n = 177) 3.31* (2.12) 3.32* (2.31) 2.67* (1.85)
Involuntary-Choice (ji =  165) 2.81* (2.00) 2.65b (2.05) 2.25* (1.69)
No-Choice (n =  166) 2.34b (1.98) 2.43b (2.07) 2.25* (1.86)
PREDICTED
O UTCOM E
Predicted-Success (n =  177) 2.62* (1.96) 2.95* (2.20) 2.40* (1.85)
Predicted-Failure (n =  162) 2.70* (2.10) 2.44* (2.00) 2.10* (1.54)
No-Prediction (n = 169) 3.17b (2.12) 3.02b (2.28) 2.68b (1.97)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 7
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control (DVs)
Source djs Wilks’ A MS F
ACTUAL CONTROL (AC) Multivariate 3 ,488 .97 - 5.90“
Influence 1,490 - 48.39 12.69“ ’
Responsibility 1,490 - 59.38 13.40*“
Perceived Control 1,190 - 28.06 8.94“
CHOICE (Ch) Multivariate 6 ,976 .95 - 4.53“ *
Influence 2,490 - 40.08 10.51*”
Responsibility 2 ,490 - 38.42 8.67"*
Perceived Control 2 ,490 - 9.34 2.98
PREDICTED O U TC O M E (PO) Multivariate 6 ,976 .96 - 3.41“
Influence 2,490 - 15.46 4.06’
Responsibility 2 ,490 - 17.62 3.98’
Perceived Control 2 ,490 - 13.98 4.46’
A C x C h Multivariate 6 ,976 .97 - 2.43’
Influence 2,490 - 20.21 5.30"
Responsibility 2 ,490 - 15.49 3.49*
Perceived Control 2 ,490 - 6.95 2.22
AC x PO Multivariate 6, 976 .99 - 0.68
Influence 2,490 - 6.34 n.s.
Responsibility 2 ,490 - 3.23 n.s.
Perceived Control 2, 490 - 1.33 n.s.
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Table 7 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance for Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control (DVs)
Source dfs W ilks'A MS F
C h xP O Multivariate 12,1291 .98 - 1.00
Influence 4 ,490 - 3.29 n.s.
Responsibility 4 ,490 - 1.80 n.s.
Perceived Control 4 ,490 - 3.27 n.s.
AC x Ch x PO Multivariate 12,1291 .94 - 2.45“
Influence 4 ,490 - 18.60 4.88”
Responsibility 4 ,490 - 3.50 0.79
Perceived Control 4 ,490 - 5.08 1.62
Error Influence 490 - 3.81 -
Responsibility 490 - 4.43 -
Perceived Control 490 - 3.14 -
Total Influence 508 - 12.26 -
Responsibility 508 - 12.64 -
Perceived Control 508 - 9.02 -
*p <  .05; **p  <  .01; ***p  <  .001.
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The findings also indicated that, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and 
PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether or not participants had CHOICE had a significant 
effect on ratings of both influence and responsibility. Specifically, participants with 
Voluntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’) felt significantly 
more influence than individuals who had No-Choice (where the experimenter chose 
either ‘right’ or ‘left’), M D  = .91, p  < .001. Furthermore, participants with Voluntary- 
Choice felt significantly more responsibility than individuals with either Involuntary- 
Choice (where participants chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye 
colour), MD  = .66, p <  .05, or No-Choice, MD  = .88,/? < .001.
Finally, the findings also indicated that, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and 
CHOICE, whether or not participants had PREDICTED OUTCOME had a significant 
effect on ratings for each of influence, responsibility, and perceived control. Specifically, 
participants with No-Prediction (who were not informed about how long they would 
perform the crossout task) felt significantly more influence than individuals who had 
Predicted-Success (who were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a 
short 2-minute period), M D  = 0.56, p  >  .05. Furthermore, participants who had 
No-Prediction felt significantly more responsible and perceived more control over their 
outcome than individuals who had Predicted-Failure (who were informed that they would 
perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period), MDs = 0.58, ps > .05.
Table 7 also presents the multivariate two-way interactions on each one o f the 
three dependent variables. However, only ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE significantly 
affected participant scores on influence, F ( 2, 508) = 5.30, p  < .01, and responsibility,
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F (2, 508) = 3.49, p  < .05. Figure 4 displays the mean scores on influence and 
responsibility for the significant multivariate ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE 
interaction. The significant effects for influence and responsibility were further examined 
using univariate analyses of variance for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL by each 
level of CHOICE.
Table 8 reports the means and standard deviations of influence and responsibility 
for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level o f CHOICE. Tests of between- 
subjects effects for the Actual-Control condition displayed significant differences on 
participant scores for influence among levels o f CHOICE, F  (2, 247) = 11.89,/? < .001. 
Specifically, multiple comparisons tests revealed significant differences between the 
mean scores for No-Choice (where the experimenter chose either ‘right’ or ‘left’) and 
Voluntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’), M D  = 1.53, 
p <  .001, and the mean scores for No-Choice and Involuntary-Choice (where participants 
chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour), M D  = 1.06, p <  .01. 
In other words, participants with Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice felt significantly 
more influence over their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control but No- 
Choice. Furthermore, participants with Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice felt 
significantly more influence over their outcome than individuals with Actual-Control but 
No-Choice.
Tests o f between-subjects effects for the Actual-Control condition also displayed 
significant differences on participant scores for responsibility among levels of CHOICE,
F  (2,247) = 10.06, p  < .001. Specifically, multiple comparisons tests (Bonferroni)
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Figure 4. Mean scores on influence and responsibility for the two-way interaction of 
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence and Responsibility fo r Each Level of 





M  (SD) M  (SD)
ACTUAL CONTROL CHOICE
Actual-Control V oluntary-Choice 85 3.79a (2.10) 3.98“ (2.30)
Involuntary-Choice 84 3.32“ (2.12) S.Ol”0 (2.10)
No-Choice 81 2.26b (1.96) 2 AT (2.18)
N o-Actual-Control Voluntary-Choice 92 2.86* (2.05) 2.71“ (2.15)
Involuntary-Choice 81 2.27“ (1.71) 2.28“ (1.93)
No-Choice 85 2.41“ (2.00) 2.40“ (1.97)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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revealed significant differences between the mean scores for Voluntary-Choice and 
Involuntary-Choice, MD  = 0.96, p <  .05, and the mean scores for Voluntary-Choice and 
No-Choice, MD  =1.51 ,p <  .001 (Table 8). In other words, participants with Actual- 
Control (where options made a difference in the outcome received) and Voluntary-Choice 
(where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper) felt more responsible in determining 
their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice (where 
participants chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour). 
Furthermore, participants with Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice felt more 
responsible for their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control but No-Choice 
(where the experimenter chose either ‘right’ or ‘left’).
In summary, participants with Actual-Control but No-Choice felt both the least 
amount o f influence and the least amount of responsibility over their outcome, and 
participants with Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice felt both the most influence and 
the most responsibility in determining their outcome. Overall, it appears that the 
combination of Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice leads to the highest perceptions of 
influence and responsibility over outcomes. For the No-Actual-Control condition, there 
were no significant differences on the dependent variables among the levels of CHOICE 
(Table 8).
Finally, Table 7 also shows a significant three-way multivariate interaction 
(ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME) for influence only,
F  (4,490) = 4.88, p < .001. This significant three-way interaction for influence was 
further examined using two-way and one-way univariate analyses of variance for each
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level o f ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED 
OUTCOME.
Specifically, for the Actual-Control condition, a significant two-way interaction 
for CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME was found (Table 9). Figure 5 displays the 
mean scores on influence for the significant CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME 
interaction for participants in the Actual-Control condition and individuals in the No- 
Actual-Control condition. This significant effect on influence for the Actual-Control 
condition was further examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level of 
CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME. Table 10 displays the means and 
standard deviations on influence for each level o f CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED 
OUTCOME for the Actual-Control condition. The only significant differences revealed 
were among levels of CHOICE for participants who had both Actual-Control (where 
options made a difference) and Predicted-Failure (where participants were informed that 
they would perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period). Specifically under 
this Actual-Control with Predicted-Failure condition, participants with Voluntary-Choice 
(where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’) felt significantly more influence over 
their outcome than individuals who had No-Choice (where the experimenter chose either 
‘right’ or ‘left’), M D  = 3.19,/? < .001. Similarly, under the specific condition of Actual- 
Control with Predicted-Failure, participants who had Involuntary-Choice (where 
participants chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour) felt 
significantly more influence over their outcome than individuals who had No-Choice,
M D = 2.55,p  <.001.
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Table 9
Analysis o f Variance on Influence fo r both the Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control 
Conditions by CHOICE and PREDICTED OUTCOME
Source djs MS F
Actual-Control
CHOICE (Ch) 2,241 51.06 12.58*'
PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO) 2,241 1.40 0.34
ChxPO 4,241 17.53 4.32*
Error 241 4.06 -
Total 250 - _
No-Actual-Control
CHOICE (Ch) 2,249 8.16 2.28
PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO) 2,249 20.93 5.86*
ChxPO 4,249 4.51 1.26
Error 249 3.57 -
Total 258 - -
* p <  .01; * * p <  .001.
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Figure 5. Mean scores on influence for the significant CHOICE x PREDICTED 






















t------------ ;------------ 1------------ 1------------ r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence (DV) for each level o f CHOICE by each level 
of PREDICTED OUTCOME for the Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control Conditions
Independent Variables
PREDICTED OUTCOME CHOICE ACTUAL CONTROL  
Actual-Control No-Actual-Control
n M  (SD) n M  (SD)
Predicted-Success Voluntary-Choice 29 3.4? (2.11) 32 2.53* (1.93)
Involuntary-Choice 32 3.06 V 2.09) 25 1.92'(1.38)
No-Choice 26 2.46'(2.06) 33 2.18* (1.76)
Predicted-Failure Voluntary-Choice 29 4.4V (2.04) 28 2.43* (2.06)
Involuntary-Choice 26 3.11K(2.23) 27 1.67* (1.18)
No-Choice 27 122'’ (0,42) 25 2.60 '(2.12)
No-Prediction Voluntary-Choice 27 3.48 '(2.06) 32 3.56'(2.02)
Involuntary-Choice 26 3.19 ‘ (2.06) 29 3.14* (2.05)
No-Choice 28 3.OP (2.34) 27 2.52* (2.21)
Note. 'Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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For the No-Actual-Control condition, the only significant effect revealed was for 
PREDICTED OUTCOME, F  (2,249) = 5.86, p < .  01 (Table 9). This significant main 
effect is further examined in Table 11, which presents the means and standard deviations 
on influence for each level of CHOICE and each level o f PREDICTED OUTCOME for 
the No-Actual-Control condition. Specifically, it was found that participants with 
No-Actual-Control (where options made no difference) and No-Prediction (where 
participants were not informed about their outcome) felt significantly more influence over 
their outcome than individuals who had No-Actual-Control and Predicted-Success (where 
participants were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute 
period), M D =  0.87, p  <  .01. Furthermore, participants with No-Actual-Control and 
No-Prediction felt significantly more influence than individuals who had 
No-Actual-Control and Predicted-Failure (where participants were informed that they 
would perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period), MD  = 0.88, p < .01.
Summary. Significant main effects were found for each o f ACTUAL CONTROL, 
CHOICE, and PREDICTED OUTCOME. For ACTUAL CONTROL, participants who 
had options that made a difference in their outcome (i.e., Actual-Control, where one 
option would lead to performing the crossout task for a short time period, and the other 
option would lead to performing the crossout task for a long time period) felt significantly 
more influence, more responsibility, and perceived more control in determining their 
outcome than individuals who had options that made no difference (i.e., No-Actual- 
Control, where both options would lead to performing the crossout task either for a short 
time period, or for a long time period). For CHOICE, participants with Voluntary-Choice
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence for Each Level of CHOICE and Each Level of 
PREDICTED OUTCOME for the Actual Control and No-Actual-Control Conditions
ACTU A L CONTRO L  
Actual-Control No-Actual-Control 
n M  (SD) n M  (SD)
CHOICE Voluntary-Choice 85 3.19'(2.10) 92 2.86'(2.05)
Involuntary-Choice 84 3.32^(2.12) 81 2.27* (1.71)
No-Choice 81 2.26h (1.96) 85 2.41 '(2.00)
PREDICTED O UTCO M E Predicted-Success 87 3.01 '(2.10) 90 223'(1.73)
Predicted-Failure 82 2.W  (2.23) 80 2.23" (1.86)
No-Prediction 81 3.25* (2.14) 88 3.10 b(2.11)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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(where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’) felt significantly more influence and 
more responsibility over their outcome than individuals who had No-Choice (where the 
experimenter chose either ‘right’ or ‘left’ for the participant). Furthermore, participants 
with Voluntary-Choice felt significantly more responsibility in determining their outcome 
than individuals who had Involuntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘blue’ or 
non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour). For PREDICTED OUTCOME, 
participants with No-Prediction (who were not informed about how long they would 
perform the crossout task) felt significant̂  more influence over their outcome than 
individuals who had Predicted-Success (who were informed that they would perform the 
crossout task for a short 2-minute period). Also, participants with No-Prediction felt 
significantly more responsibility and perceived more control over their outcome than 
individuals who had Predicted-Failure (who were informed that they would perform the 
crossout task for a long 20-minute period).
Furthermore, a significant two-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL 
CONTROL by CHOICE variables. Participants who made a choice between the options 
of ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ (Voluntary-Choice), where each option led to a different outcome 
(Actual-Control), felt significantly more influence and more responsibility than 
individuals who did not make a choice (No-Choice) between options that led to different 
outcomes (Actual-Control). In addition, participants who made a choice between the 
options o f‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ (Voluntary-Choice), where each option led to a different 
outcome (Actual-Control), felt significantly more responsibility than individuals who 
made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ (Involuntary-Choice) where each option led
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to a different outcome (Actual-Control). Furthermore, participants felt significantly more 
influence when they made a choice between ‘blue’ and ‘non-blue’ (Involuntary-Choice) 
where each option led to a different outcome (Actual-Control), but felt less influence 
when they had no choice (No-Choice) between options that each led to a different 
outcome (Actual-Control).
Finally, a significant three-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL 
CONTROL by CHOICE by PREDICTED OUTCOME variables. In addition to repeating 
the significant two-way interaction findings reported for ACTUAL CONTROL x 
CHOICE (where the combinations of Actual-Control with Voluntary-Choice, as well as 
Actual-Control with Involuntary-Choice led to higher perceptions o f influence than the 
combination of Actual-Control with No-Choice), a significant two-way interaction was 
also found for ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME. Specifically, 
individuals who had No-Actual-Control with No-Prediction felt significantly more 
influence over their outcome than participants who had No-Actual-Control with any type 
of prediction (i.e., Predicted-Success or Predicted-Failure). Furthermore, participants 
who had Actual-Control with Voluntary-Choice with Predicted-Failure, or Actual-Control 
with Involuntary-Choice with Predicted-Failure, felt significantly more influence over 
their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control with No-Choice with Predicted- 
Failure.
Confidence and Prediction
The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each
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independent variable are presented in Table 12. Table 13 displays the analysis of 
variance for the combined dependent variables. Roy’s criterion3 revealed a significant 
multivariate effect for PREDICTED OUTCOME, F  (2,490) = 4.08, p < .05, and a 
significant two-way multivariate effect for CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME,
F (4, 490) = 3.07,p < .05.
Table 13 reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of the two 
dependent variables (i.e., confidence, and prediction). For PREDICTED OUTCOME, 
because the linear combinations of the two dependent variables were not significant when 
confidence and prediction were examined separately, but significant at the multivariate 
level according to Roy’s statistic, it was concluded that a truly multivariate effect was 
observed. In other words, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and CHOICE, whether 
participants had PREDICTED OUTCOME had a significant effect on the combined 
ratings for confidence and prediction.
Table 13 also presents the multivariate two- and three-way interactions on each
3 Although Wilks’ criterion was not significant, Roy’s Largest Root revealed a 
significant multivariate effect for PREDICTED OUTCOME. Stevens (2002) explains 
that, as a general rule, it makes little difference which one of the multivariate test 
statistics is used. However, if the significant differences among the groups are 
concentrated in the first discriminant function (which does occur quite often in practice; 
see Bock, 1975), then Roy’s statistic is technically more powerful and therefore preferred. 
Nevertheless, Stevens (2002) warns that Roy’s statistic should only be used in this case if 
there is evidence to suggest that the homogeneity of covariances matrices assumptions is 
tenable. Therefore, Box’s Test of the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for 
PREDICTED OUTCOME. The results indicated that the observed covariance matrices 
of the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, Box’s F  (6, 6147630) = 
0.61 ,p  = .72. Therefore, Roy’s statistic was considered in lieu o f Wilks’ Lambda.
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Table 12




INDEPENDENT VARIABLES M (SD) M (SD)
ACTUAL
CONTROL
Actual-Control (n = 250) 3.05a (1.97) 3.17a (2.06)
No-Actual-Control (n = 258) 2.71b (1.78) 3.20a (1.98)
CHOICE Voluntary-Choice (n = 177) 2.94a (1.90) 3.30a (2.08)
Involuntary-Choice (n = 165) 2.84a (1.86) 3.02a (1.97)
No-Choice (n = 166) 2.86a (1.89) 3.23a (1.99)
PREDICTED
OUTCOME
Predicted-Success (n = 177) 2.82a (1.84) 3.26a (2.07)
Predicted-Failure (n = 162) 3.02a (1.93) 2.96a (1.93)
No-Prediction (n = 169) 2.80a (1.87) 3.33a (2.04)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 13
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Prediction and Confidence Scores (DVs)
Source d/s Roy’s 
Largest Root
MS F
ACTUAL CONTROL (AC) Multivariate 2,489 .01 - 3.00
Prediction 1,490 - 16.59 n.s.
Confidence 1,490 - <.01 n.s.
CHOICE (Ch) Multivariate 2,490 <.01 - 0.77
Prediction 2,490 - 0.44 n.s.
Confidence 2,490 - 2.96 n.s.
PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO) Multivariate 2,490 .02 - 4.08‘
Prediction 2,490 - 2.36 0.66
Confidence 2,490 - 6.36 1.58
AC x Ch Multivariate 2,490 <.01 - 0.09
Prediction 2,490 - 0.28 n.s.
Confidence 2,490 - 0.03 n.s.
AC x PO Multivariate 2,490 <.01 - 0.44
Prediction 2,490 - 1.27 n.s.
Confidence 2,490 - 1.27 n.s.
ChxPO Multivariate 4,490 .03 - 3.07“
Prediction 4,490 - 3.33 0.93
Confidence 4,490 - 12.41 3.07’
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Table 13 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Prediction and Confidence Scores (DVs)
Source dfs Roy's Largest 
Root
MS F
AC x Ch x PO Multivariate 4,490 <.01 - a  nr\  y j. i  y
Prediction 4,490 - 2.08 n.s.
Confidence 4,490 - 2.83 n.s.
Error Prediction 490 - 3.57 -
Confidence 490 - 4.04 -
Total Prediction 508 - 11.82 -
Confidence 508 - 14.22 -
* p  < .05.
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one o f the dependent variables. However, according to Roy’s Largest Root4, only 
CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME significantly affected participant scores on 
confidence, F (4, 508) = 3.18,p <  .05. Figure 6 displays the mean scores on confidence 
for the significant multivariate CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction. The 
mean scores on prediction did not differ significantly. The significant effect on 
confidence was further examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level of 
CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME.
Table 14 reports the means and standard deviations on confidence for each level 
of CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of between-subjects 
effects for the Voluntary-Choice condition (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or 
‘pepper’) displayed significant differences on participant scores for confidence among 
levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (2,177) = 4.09,/? < .05. Specifically, multiple 
comparisons tests revealed significant differences between the means on confidence for 
Predicted-Success (where individuals were informed that they would perform the cross­
out task for a short 2-minute period) and Predicted-Failure (where participants were 
informed that they would perform the cross-out task for a long 20-minute period),
MD = 0.97, p < .05. In other words, participants who had Voluntary-Choice and 
Predicted-Success felt significantly more confident about how long they would perform
4 Box’s Test of the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for CHOICE x 
PREDICTED OUTCOME. The results indicated that the observed covariance matrices 
of the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, Box’s F  (24, 
743852.80) = 0.97, p  = .50. Therefore, as with the findings for PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, Roy’s statistic was considered instead of Wilks’ Lambda for the CHOICE x 
PREDICTED OUTCOME interactioa
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Figure 6. Mean Scores on Confidence for the Significant two-way Interaction of 
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Table 14






M  (SD)PREDICTED OUTCOME CHOICE
V oluntary-Choice Predicted-Success 61 3.90a (2.12)
Predicted-Failure 57 2.93b (1.97)
No-Prediction 59 3.04ab (2.03)
Involuntary-Choice Predicted-Success 57 2.61* (1.82)
Predicted-Failure 53 2.92* (1.96)
No-Prediction 55 3.55b (2.07)
No-Choice Predicted-Success 59 3.22* (2.08)
Predicted-Failure 52 3.02* (1.87)
No-Prediction 55 3.44a (2.02)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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the cross-out task than individuals who had Voluntary-Choice with Predicted-Failure.
Tests of between-subjects effects for the Involuntary-Choice condition also 
showed significant differences on participant scores for confidence among the levels of 
PREDICTED OUTCOME, F  (2 ,165) = 3.29, p  <  .05. Further analyses revealed a 
significant difference between the means on confidence for Predicted-Success and 
No-Prediction, M D  = 0.93, p < .05 (Table 14). In other words, participants with both 
Involuntary-Choice and No-Prediction felt more confident about how long they would 
perform the cross-out task than individuals who had Involuntary-Choice and Predicted- 
Success. No significant differences were found among the levels of PREDICTED 
OUTCOME for the No-Choice condition.
Summary. Neither level o f ACTUAL CONTROL nor level of CHOICE had any 
significant effect on individuals’ perceived ability to predict or on how confident 
participants felt about the amount of time they would engage in the cross-out task. 
However, when levels o f PREDICTED OUTCOME were considered, the combination 
o f perceived confidence and perceived ability to predict one’s outcome was significantly 
affected. Specifically, mean scores on the dependent variables show that participants felt 
better able to predict their outcome but felt less confident about their outcome under the 
condition of Predicted-Failure. Furthermore, participants felt less able to predict their 
outcome but felt more confident about their outcome both under the conditions of 
Predicted-Success and No-Prediction.
Furthermore, a significant effect on perceived confidence emerged when the 
CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction was examined. Specifically,
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regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL, individuals felt more confident about how long they 
would perform the cross-out task when they had both Voluntary-Choice and Predicted- 
Success, and felt less confident about their outcome when they had both Voluntary- 
Choice and Predicted-Failure. In other words, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL:
(a) participants who knew they had received the positive outcome after making a choice 
between ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ felt more confident that they would actually experience their 
outcome; and (b) participants who knew they had received a negative outcome after 
making a choice between ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ felt less confident that they would actually 
experience their outcome.
Also, individuals felt more confident about their outcome when they had both 
Involuntary-Choice and No-Prediction, and felt less confident about their outcome when 
they had both Involuntary-Choice and Predicted-Success. In other words, regardless of 
ACTUAL CONTROL: (a) participants who were not informed of their outcome after 
making a choice based on their own true eye colour felt less confident that they would 
actually experience their outcome; and (b) participants who knew they had received the 
positive outcome after making a choice based on their own true eye colour felt more 
confident that they would actually experience their outcome. Finally, in situations where 
participants had No-Choice, neither ACTUAL CONTROL nor the CHOICE x 
PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction mattered.
Frustration Regarding and Helplessness Over the Outcome
The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each
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independent variable are presented in Table 15. Table 16 displays the analysis of 
variance for the combined dependent variables. With the use of Wilks’ criterion, a 
significant multivariate main effect was found for both ACTUAL CONTROL,
F  (2 ,489) = 3.62, p <  .05, and PREDICTED OUTCOME, F ( 4, 978) = 26.19, p  < .001. 
There was also a significant two-way interaction for ACTUAL CONTROL x 
PREDICTED OUTCOME, F  (4,978) = 4.09. < -01-
Table 16 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of 
the two dependent variables. For ACTUAL CONTROL, because the linear 
combinations of the two dependent variables were not significant when frustration and 
helplessness were examined separately, but significant at the multivariate level 
according to Wilks’ criterion, it was concluded that a truly multivariate effect was 
observed. In other words, regardless of CHOICE and PREDICTED OUTCOME, level 
of ACTUAL CONTROL had a significant effect on participants’ combined ratings for 
frustration and helplessness.
The findings also showed that, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and 
CHOICE, level of PREDICTED OUTCOME had a significant effect on participants’ 
ratings of frustration. Specifically, participants who had Predicted-Failure felt 
significantly more frustration than individuals who had either Predicted-Success,
M D = 2.18, p <  .001; or No-Prediction, MD  = 1.19, p  < .001. Furthermore, participants 
who had No-Prediction felt significantly more frustration than individuals who had 
Predicted-Success, MD  = 0.99, p < .001.
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Table 15




INDEPENDENT VARIABLES M (SD) M (SD)
ACTUAL
CONTROL
Actual-Control (n = 250) 3.37a (2.24) 4.62* (2.29)
No-Actual-Control (n = 258) 3.03“ (2.16) 4.89* (2.37)
CHOICE Voluntary-Choice (n = 177) 3.29® (2.32) 4.66® (2.27)
Involuntaiy-Choice (n = 165) 322* (2.28) 5.03* (2.27)
No-Choice («= 166) 3.08® (2.01) 4.60* (2.44)
PREDICTED
OUTCOME
Predicted-Success (n —177) 2.17* (1.76) 4.88* (2.29)
Predicted-Failure (n = 162) 4.36b (2.23) 5.01* (2.27)
No-Prediction (n = 169) 3.17° (2.07) 4.40* (2.40)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 16
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Frustration and Helplessness Scores (DVs)
Source dfs Wilks'A MS F
ACTUAL CONTROL (AC) Multivariate 2,489 .99 - 3.62*
Frustration 1,490 - 14.68 3.67
Helplessness 1,490 - 1124 2.07
CHOICE (Ch) Multivariate 4,978 .99 - 0.95
Frustration 2,490 - 1.49 n.s.
Helplessness 2,490 - 8.38 n.s.
PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO) Multivariate 4,978 .82 - 26.19"*
Frustration 2,490 - 201.20 50.28*"
Helplessness 2,490 - 16.49 3.04
AC x Ch Multivariate 4,978 1.00 - 0.47
Frustration 2,490 - 0.92 n.s.
Helplessness 2,490 - 2.78 n.s.
AC x PO Multivariate 4,978 .97 - 4.09“
Frustration 2,490 - 27.52 6.88"
Helplessness 2,490 - 1.86 0.34
ChxPO Multivariate 8,978 .99 - 0.66
Frustration 4,490 - 4.75 n.s.
Helplessness 4,490 - 0.95 n.s.
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Table 16 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Frustration and Helplessness Scores (DVs)
Source dfs Wilks’ A MS F
AC x Ch x PO Multivariate 8,978 .99 - 0.63
Frustration 4,490 - 2.24 n.s.
Helplessness 4,490 - 4.50 n.s.
Error Frustration 490 - 4.00 -
Helplessness 490 - 5.43 -
Total Frustration 508 - 15.10 -
Helplessness 508 - 28.08 -
*p < .05; **p  <  .01; ***p  < .001.
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Table 16 also presents the multivariate two-way interactions on each one of the 
two dependent variables. However, only ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED 
OUTCOME significantly affected participant scores on frustration, F  (2,490) = 6.88,/?
< .01. Figure 7 displays the mean scores on frustration for the significant multivariate 
ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction. The significant effects 
for frustration were further examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level 
of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME.
Table 17 reports the means and standard deviations of frustration for each level 
of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of between- 
subjects effects for the Actual-Control condition displayed significant differences on 
participant scores for frustration among levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME,
F  (2,247) = 53.25, p <  .001. Specifically, multiple comparison tests revealed significant 
differences between the mean scores for Predicted-Success and Predicted-Failure,
M D  = 2.98, p  < .001, the mean scores for Predicted-Failure and No-Prediction,
MD  = 1.74,/? < .05, and the mean scores for Predicted-Success and No-Prediction,
MD = 1.23,p < .001.
In conditions of Actual-Control, therefore, participants felt most frustrated when 
they Predicted-Failure, felt less frustrated when they had No-Prediction, and felt the least 
frustrated when they Predicted-Success. Specifically, participants who had Actual- 
Control with Predicted-Failure felt significantly more frustration over their outcome 
than: (a) individuals who had Actual-Control with Predicted-Success; and









Figure 7. Mean Scores on Frustration for the Significant two-way Interaction of 
ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME Conditions.
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Table 17
Means and Standard Deviations on Frustration for each level o f ACTUAL CONTROL 





M  (SD)ACTUAL CONTROL PREDICTED OUTCOME
Actual-Control Predicted-Success 87 2.00a (1.69)
Predicted-Failure 82 4.98b (1.94)
No-Prediction 81 3.23° (2.01)
No-Actual-Control Predicted-Success 90 2.34a (1.82)
Predicted-Failure 80 3.73b (2.33)
No-Prediction 88 3.10* (2.14)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
(b) individuals who had Actual-Control with No-Prediction. Furthermore, participants 
who had Actual-Control with No-Prediction felt significantly more frustration over their 
outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control with Predicted-Success.
Tests of between-subjects effects for the No-Actual-Control condition displayed 
significant differences on participant scores for frustration among levels of PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, F  (2,255) = 9.25, /? < .001. Specifically, multiple comparison tests 
revealed significant differences between the mean scores for Predicted-Success and 
Predicted-Failure, MD  = 1.38,/? < .001. In other words, participants who had No- 
Actual-Control with Predicted-Failure felt significantly more frustration over their 
outcome than individuals who had No-Actual-Control with Predicted-Success.
Summary. Significant main effects were found for each of ACTUAL CONTROL 
and PREDICTED OUTCOME. Specifically, regardless of CHOICE and PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, whether or not participants had ACTUAL CONTROL significantly 
affected the combined ratings for frustration and helplessness. Furthermore, regardless 
of ACTUAL CONTROL and CHOICE, whether or not participants had PREDICTED 
OUTCOME significantly affected ratings for frustration. Specifically, participants who 
were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period felt 
significantly more frustration than individuals who were: (a) informed that they would 
perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute period; or (b) not informed about how 
long they would perform the crossout task. Furthermore, participants who did not know 
their outcome felt significantly more frustration than individuals who knew they would 
perform the task for 2 minutes. However, level of CHOICE did not significantly affect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
participants’ ratings of frustration or ratings of helplessness over the outcome.
Finally, a significant two-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL 
CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME variables. In situations where each option 
presented to the participants actually led to a different outcome (Actual-Control):
(a) those who were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a long 
20-minute period felt more frustration over their outcome than individuals who were 
informed that they would perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute period and 
individuals who were not at all informed about their outcome; and (b) those who were 
not at all informed about their outcome felt significantly more frustrated about their 
situation than individuals who were informed that they would perform the crossout task 
for 2 minutes. In situations where both options presented to the participants would make 
no difference at all in the outcome received (No-Actual-Control), those who knew they 
would perform the crossout task for a long period felt significantly more frustrated than 
individuals who would perform the task for only a short period.
Secondary Analyses 
Perceived Contribution and Motivation to Participate
The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each 
independent variable are presented in Table 18. Table 19 displays the analysis of 
variance for the combined dependent variables. Roy’s Largest Root5 revealed a
' Box’s Test of the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for ACTUAL 
CONTROL. The results indicated that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent 
variables were significantly equal across groups, Box’s F  (3, 4800000) = 0.21, p  = .85. 
Therefore, Roy’s criterion was considered instead of Wilks’ Lambda for ACTUAL 
CONTROL.
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Table 18




INDEPENDENT VARIABLES M (SD) M (SD)
ACTUAL
CONTROL
Actual-Control (n = 250) 5.10a (1.56) 4.66a (1.53)
No-Actual-Control (« = 258) 4.94a (1.49) 4.89a (1.53)
CHOICE Voluntary-Choice (n = 177) 5.08a (1.48) 4.84a (1.44)
Involuntary-Choice {n = 165) 5.00a (1.46) 4.78a (1.47)
No-Choice (n = 166) 4.98a (1.64) 4.73a (1.68)
PREDICTED
OUTCOME
Predicted-Success (« = 177) 4.94a (1.50) 4.66a (1.41)
Predicted-Failure (n = 162) 5.02a (1.51) 4.74a (1.57)
No-Prediction (n = 169) 5.1 l a (1.57) 4.95a (1.61)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 19
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Contribution and Motivation Scores (DVs)
Source dfo Roy's Largest 
Root
MS F
ACTUAL CONTROL (AC) Multivariate 2,489 .01 - 3.37*
Contribution 1,490 - 3.49 1.51
Motivation 1,490 - 6.95 2.93
CHOICE (Ch) Multivariate 2,490 <.01 - 0.40
Contribution 2,490 - 0.80 n.s.
Motivation 2,490 - 0.48 n.s.
PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO) Multivariate 2,490 <.01 - 1.88
Contribution 2,490 - 1.49 n.s.
Motivation 2,490 - 4.17 n.s.
AC x Ch Multivariate 2,490 <.01 - 1.81
Contribution 2,490 - 0.89 n.s.
Motivation 2,490 - 1.93 n.s.
AC x PO Multivariate 2,490 .02 - 3.19'
Contribution 2,490 - 8.55 3.10'
Motivation 2,490 - 0.40 0.17
ChxPO Multivariate 4, 490 .01 - 0.72
Contribution 4,490 - 1.51 n.s.
Motivation 4,490 - 0.51 n.s.
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Table 19 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis of Variance fo r Contribution and Motivation Scores (DVs)
Source dfs Roy's largest 
Root
MS F
AC x Ch x PO Multivariate 4,490 .01 - 1.65
Contribution 4,490 - 3.70 n.s.
Motivation 4,490 - 1.50 n.s.
Error Contribution 490 - 2.31 -
Motivation 490 - 2.37 -
Total Contribution 508 - 27.54 -
Motivation 508 - 25.21 -
* p  < .05.
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significant multivariate effect for ACTUAL CONTROL, F  (2, 489) = 3.37, p < .05, and 
a significant two-way multivariate effect for ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, F (2, 490) = 3.79,/? < .05.
Table 19 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of 
the two dependent variables (i.e., perceived contribution and motivation to participate). 
For ACTUAL CONTROL, because the linear combinations of the two dependent 
variables were not significant when perceived contribution and motivation to participate 
were examined separately, but significant at the multivariate level according to Roy’s 
criterion, it was concluded that a truly multivariate effect was at hand. In other words, 
regardless of CHOICE and PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether participants had 
ACTUAL CONTROL had a significant effect on the combined ratings for perceived 
contribution and motivation to participate in the study.
Table 19 also presents the multivariate two- and three-way interactions on each 
one of the dependent variables. According to Roy’s Largest Root6, only ACTUAL 
CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME significantly affected participant scores on 
perceived contribution, F  (2, 490) = 3.70, p  < .05. The mean scores on motivation to 
participate did not differ significantly.
The significant effect on perceived contribution was further examined using 
univariate analyses of variance for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of
0 Box’s Test of the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for ACTUAL 
CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME. The results indicated that the observed 
covariance matrices of the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, 
Box’s F (  15, 1347960) = 1.08,/? = .37. Therefore, Roy’s criterion was considered instead 
of Wilks’ Lambda for ACTUAL CONTROL.
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PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of between-subjects effects for the Actual-Control 
condition displayed marginally significant differences on participant scores for perceived 
contribution among levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME, F  (2, 258) = 2.93, p = .06. 
Multiple comparisons tests revealed no significant differences among the levels of 
PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of between-subjects effects for the No-Actual-Control 
condition also displayed no significant differences for perceived contribution among 
levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (2 , 250) = 1.31,/? = .27.
In summary, neither level of CHOICE nor level of PREDICTED OUTCOME 
affected the participants’ perceived contribution or motivation to participate in the 
present study. However, ACTUAL CONTROL significantly affected the combination of 
perceived contribution and motivation to participate. Specifically, mean scores on the 
dependent variables show that participants felt they had contributed more but were less 
motivated to participate under the condition of Actual-Control. Furthermore, 
participants felt they had contributed less but were more motivated to participate under 
the condition of No-Actual-Control.
Optimism Toward and Desire fo r a Positive Outcome
The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each 
independent variable are presented in Table 20. Table 21 displays the analysis of 
variance for the combined dependent variables. Roy’s criterion7 revealed a significant
Although Wilks’ criterion was not significant, Roy’s Largest Root revealed a 
significant multivariate effect for CHOICE. Therefore, Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance 
Matrices was examined for CHOICE. The results showed that the observed covariance matrices 
of the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, Box's F  (6, 6197568) = 1.70, 
p = . 12. Therefore, Roy’s criterion was used instead of Wilks' Lambda.
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Table 20




INDEPENDENT VARIABLES M (SD) M (SD)
ACTUAL
CONTROL
Actual-Control (n = 250) 4.05a (1.79) 6.45a (1.25)
No-Actual-Control (n = 258) 4.073 (1.72) 6.29a (1.32)
CHOICE Voluntary-Choice (n = 177) 4.24a (1.71) 6.33a (1.37)
Involuntary-Choice (n = 165) 3.78b (1.74) 6.36a (1.27)
No-Choice (n = 166) 4.14ab (1.79) 6.40a (1.22)
PREDICTED
OUTCOME
Predicted-Success (« = 177) 4.18a (1.67) 6.48a (1.13)
Predicted-Failure (n = 162) 3.89a (1.89) 6.56ab (0.96)
No-Prediction (n = 169) 4.08a (1.71) 6.06° (1.62)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Source dfa Roy's 
Largest Root
MS F
ACTUAL CONTROL (AC) Multivariate 2,489 <.01 - 0.66
Optimism 1,490 - <0.01 n.s.
Desire 1,490 - 2.03 n.s.
CHOICE (Ch) Multivariate 2,490 .01 - 3.11’
Optimism 2,490 - 9.31 3.06'
Desire 2,490 - 0.21 0.13
PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO) Multivariate 2,490 .04 - 8.69'"
Optimism 2,490 - 4.41 1.45
Desire 2,490 - 13.15 8.49'”
AC x Ch Multivariate 2,490 .04 - 10.50'”
Optimism 2,490 - 2.85 0.93
Desire 2,490 - 15.83 10.21
AC x PO Multivariate 2,490 .01 - 2.19
Optimism 2,49  0 - 0.82 n.s.
Desire 2,490 - 2.80 n.s.
Ch x PO Multivariate 4,490 .02 - 1.85
Optimism 4,490 - 5.60 n.s.
Desire 4,490 - 0.76 n.s.
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Table 21 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis of Variance fo r Optimism and Desire Scores (DVs)
Source dfs Roy's Largest 
Root
MS F
AC x Ch n PO Multivariate 4,490 .02 - 2.14
Optimism 4,490 - 2.44 n.s.
Desire 4,490 - 3.12 n.s.
Error Optimism 490 - 1.55 -
Desire 490 - 3.05 -
Total Optimism 508 - 19.52 -
Desire 508 - 42.16 -
* p <  .05; * * p  < .01; *** p  < .001.
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multivariate effect for CHOICE, F  (2, 490) = 3.11, p  < .05 and PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, F  (2, 490) = 8.69, p < .001. Also, a significant two-way multivariate effect 
was found for ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE, F(2 , 490) = 10.50,/? < .001.
Table 21 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of 
the two dependent variables. These findings show that, regardless of ACTUAL 
CONTROL and PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether or not participants had CHOICE 
significantly affected ratings for optimism, F (2,490) = 3.06,p  < .05. Specifically, 
individuals who had Voluntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or 
‘pepper’) felt significantly more optimistic about getting a positive outcome than 
individuals who had Involuntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘blue’ or 
‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour), M D  = 0.46, p  < .05.
The findings also indicated that, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and 
CHOICE, whether or not participants had PREDICTED OUTCOME significantly 
affected ratings for desire, F  (2, 490) = 8.69,/? < .001. Specifically, participants who 
Predicted-Failure wanted a positive outcome to a greater degree than individuals who 
had No-Prediction, M D  = 0.50,/? <.01, and participants who Predicted-Success wanted 
a positive outcome significantly more than individuals who had No-Prediction,
M D  = 0.42, p < .01. In other words, individuals who were informed about their outcome 
(whether it involved performing the crossout task for 2 or 20 minutes) wanted a positive 
outcome significantly more than individuals who did not know what to expect.
Table 21 also presents the multivariate two-way interaction for ACTUAL 
CONTROL x CHOICE on desire for a positive outcome, F ( 2, 490) = 10.21,/? < .001.
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Figure 8 displays the mean scores on desire for the significant multivariate ACTUAL 
CONTROL x CHOICE interaction. The significant effect for desire was further 
examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL 
by each level of CHOICE.
Table 22 reports the means and standard deviations of desire for each level of 
ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of CHOICE. Tests of between-subjects effects for 
the Actual-Control condition displayed significant differences on participants’ ratings of 
desire among levels of CHOICE, F  (2, 247) = 5.40, p < .01. Specifically, multiple 
comparisons tests revealed significant differences between the mean scores for 
Voluntary-Choice and Involuntaiy-Choice, M D  = 0.47,/? < .05, and the mean scores for 
Involuntary-Choice and No-Choice, M D  = 0.60, p < .01. In other words, participants 
with Actual-Control and No-Choice wanted a positive outcome more than individuals 
with Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice. Furthermore, participants with Actual- 
Control and Voluntary-Choice wanted a positive outcome more than individuals with 
Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice.
Tests of between-subjects effects for the No-Actual-Control condition displayed 
significant differences on participant scores on desire for a positive outcome among 
levels of CHOICE, F  (2, 255) = 4.53, p < .05. Specifically, multiple comparisons tests 
revealed significant differences between the mean scores for Voluntary-Choice and 
Involuntary-Choice, MD = 0.53,/? < .05, and Involuntary-Choice and No-Choice,
M D = 0.51, p < .05. In other words, participants with No-Actual-Control and 
Involuntary-Choice wanted a positive outcome more than individuals who had








Figure 8. Mean Scores on Desire for the Significant two-way Interaction of ACTUAL 
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Table 22
Means and Standard Deviations on Desire for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL by 





M  (SD)ACTUAL CONTROL CHOICE
Actual-Control Voluntary-Choice 85 6.S53 (1.14)
Involuntary-Choice 84 6.08b (1.55)
No-Choice 81 6.68“ (0.91)
No-Actual-Control Voluntary-Choice 92 6.12a (1.53)
Involuntary-Choice 81 6.65b (0.81)
No-Choice 85 6.14“ (1.41)
Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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No-Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice, and more than individuals who had 
No-Actual-Control and No-Choice.
In summary, significant main effects were found for CHOICE and PREDICTED 
OUTCOME. For CHOICE, participants who chose between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ were 
more optimistic about getting a positive outcome than individuals who chose between 
‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour. Level of CHOICE did not 
significantly affect desire for a positive outcome. For PREDICTED OUTCOME, 
participants who were informed about their outcome, whether positive (2-minutes) 
or negative (20-minutes) wanted a positive outcome significantly more than individuals 
who were not at all informed about their outcome. Level of PREDICTED OUTCOME 
did not significantly affect feelings of optimism toward a positive outcome.
Furthermore, a significant two-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL 
CONTROL by CHOICE variables. In situations where each option led to a different 
outcome (i.e., Actual-Control), participants who either had no choice (i.e., where the 
experimenter chose ‘right’ or ‘left) or made a choice between the options o f‘salt’ or 
‘pepper’ wanted a positive outcome significantly more than individuals who made a 
choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour. In situations 
where both options led to the same outcome (i.e., No-Actual-Control) participants who 
made a choice between the options o f‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye 
colour wanted a positive outcome significantly more than individuals who either made a 
choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ or had no choice at all (i.e., where the experimenter 
chose ‘right’ or ‘left’).
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Discussion
Debate has surrounded the definition and conceptualization of control, particularly 
with regard to people’s beliefs about the causal connections between action and effort, 
and outcome. Whereas traditional control theorists postulate that providing a choice for 
an individual’s actions increases feelings of control and decreases feelings of helplessness 
(e.g., Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1973), recent findings indicate that the benefits of 
control result only when a person’s choices make a difference in the outcome 
(e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992). These recent 
findings have instigated a new conceptualization of the traditional view of control, 
choice, and prediction in explaining responses to challenging situations.
Whereas traditional views have failed to unconfound the concepts of control, 
choice, and prediction, the new conceptualization has permitted the separation of control 
and prediction (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992), and 
has also emphasized the importance of examining both choice and control as conceptually 
separate entities (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 
2005). Nevertheless, the new conceptualization has had some difficulties in fully 
disentangling the concepts of control and choice. For example, Langlois et al. (2002, 
p. 172) omitted a choiceless control condition from their experimental design “...due to 
conceptual difficulties.”
One reason why choiceless control has been a challenge for researchers is the 
existence of an ambiguity inherent in the new conceptualization of control (Langlois
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et al., 2002). For instance, Nickels et al. (1992) broadly explain that having control 
involves affecting an event, contributing to it, making an impact on it, or even simply 
bringing it about. In addition to implying that actions or behaviours may not necessarily 
be required for actual control to occur, this explanation also suggests that control may 
even imply choice. It seems quite possible for individuals to make choices that affect an 
event, contribute to it, or make an impact on it. Consequently, the new conceptualization 
remains unclear about whether any observed psychological benefits are due to simply 
having actual control, due to having choice, or due to having both actual control and 
choice.
Theoretical Implications 
The purpose of the present study was to further develop the new conceptualization 
by systematically examining the separate effects of actual control, choice, and predicted 
outcome. Appendix G summarizes the findings pertaining to the following variables:
(a) influence, responsibility, and perceived control over the outcome; (b) confidence and 
prediction; (c) frustration and helplessness toward the outcome; (d) perceived 
contribution and motivation to participate; and (e) optimism toward and desire for a 
positive outcome. The theoretical implications of these findings will be discussed 
accordingly.
Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control
Hypothesis I. Inconsistent with past research (Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al.,
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2002; Nickels et al., 1992), the present results only partly confirmed the hypothesis that, 
regardless of whether they could predict their outcome, participants with Actual-Control 
will perceive significantly more influence, responsibility, and perceived control over their 
outcome. Indeed, individuals who were given Actual-Control (i.e., options that made a 
difference in the outcome) felt more influence, more responsibility, and more control over 
their outcome than individuals whose options made no difference at all.
However, inconsistent with the new conceptualization (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 
2005; Langlois et al., 2002) was the finding that unpredictable (rather than predictable) 
situations increased the participants’ perceptions of influence, responsibility, and control. 
Specifically, individuals felt more responsible for and perceived more control over 
unpredictable situations than situations of Predicted-Failure. Individuals even felt more 
influence over situations of No-Prediction than in situations of Predicted-Success. The 
finding that unpredictable situations caused individuals to experience positive feelings is 
surprising, especially considering the fact that the new conceptualization has consistently 
reported that perceived control, influence, and responsibility over outcomes are affected 
by actual control, regardless of predicted outcome (Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & 
Perreault, 2005; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992, Experiment 2).
Also inconsistent with the new conceptualization was the finding that, when 
presented with options that made no difference, individuals who could not predict their 
outcome felt more influence over their situation than individuals who were informed of 
their outcome (whether negative or positive). In other words, when options did not 
matter and individuals could not predict their outcome, perceptions of influence over the
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situation were significantly higher -  when options did not matter and individuals could 
predict their outcome, perceptions of influence were significantly lower.
Why would the participants take more credit for unpredictable situations, and take 
significantly less credit for predictable situations? Perhaps the element of 
unpredictability created some uncertainty about whether the experimenter would actually 
follow through on the outcome. It might be easier for individuals to take credit for an 
outcome they believe may not occur at all. On the other hand, being informed of the 
specific details of a predictable outcome might have made it easier for the participants to 
believe in its actual occurrence. It might be more difficult for individuals to take credit 
for an outcome that they can predict in detail, because it might seem more tangible and 
real. This might be especially true when the participants predicted a negative outcome.
For instance, the self-serving bias explains that individuals will attribute failure outcomes 
to external factors (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Fiske & Taylor,
1984; Greenwald, 1980).
However, the self-serving bias also states that individuals will tend to attribute 
successful outcomes to internal factors (e.g., Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Fiske &
Taylor, 1984; Greenwald, 1980). But why did the participants take less credit for their 
situation when they predicted a positive outcome? Perhaps the participants felt the same 
way about both the 2-minute and the 20-minute crossout tasks. If  the participants 
perceived both outcomes as being negative, then the finding that they took less credit for 
a predictable outcome could be explained by the self-serving bias.
Indeed, it was found that those participants who could predict their outcome
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(whether 2 or 20 minutes) wanted to experience a short time period more than those 
individuals who could not predict their outcome at all. In other words, the participants 
were unhappy about any predictable outcome. According to the self-serving bias, 
therefore, it appears that the participants took: (a) less credit for the predictable outcomes 
because any outcome was considered a negative outcome; and (b) more credit for the 
unpredictable outcome because an unknown outcome was possibly a positive outcome.
Hypothesis 2. The present findings only partly supported the hypothesis that, 
regardless of predicted outcome, participants with Voluntary-Choice will perceive 
significantly more influence, responsibility, and control over their outcome, but only 
when Voluntary-Choice is presented under the Actual-Control condition. Consistent with 
Nickels et al. (2005), the second hypothesis was confirmed in the fact that participants 
who made a choice that mattered between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’: (a) felt more responsible for 
their outcome than individuals who either made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ or 
had the experimenter make a choice that matters between ‘right’ or ‘left’; and (b) felt 
more influence over their outcome than individuals who had the experimenter make a 
choice that matters between ‘right’ or ‘left.’
However, inconsistent with Nickels et al. (2005) was the finding that perceived 
influence also increased when individuals made a choice that mattered between ‘blue’ or 
‘non-blue.’ It seems that perceived influence increased when Actual-Control was 
combined with any type of choice. In short, the act of choosing between options that 
make a difference in the outcome (whether based on internal or external characteristics)
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increased individuals’ perceptions of influence over that outcome.
Also inconsistent with the new conceptualization (Cramer & Nickels, 2005; 
Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 2005) was the finding that individuals’ perceptions of 
influence and responsibility increased when they made a choice between ‘salt’ or 
‘pepper’ -  regardless of whether these options made a difference in the outcome. 
Specifically, compared to individuals who had the experimenter choose for them, those 
participants who had Voluntary-Choice felt more influence over and more responsibility 
for their outcome (cf. Cramer & Nickels, 2005). Individuals also felt more responsible 
for their outcome when they made a choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ rather than ‘blue’ 
or ‘non-blue.’ In short, it is not necessary that options that matter be combined with the 
act of choosing (cf. Nickels et al., 2005) -  the simple act of choosing between ‘salt’ or 
‘pepper’ is sufficient for increasing perceptions of influence and responsibility.
Inconsistent with Langlois et al. (2002) and extending the new conceptualization 
of control was the finding that Predicted-Failure, in combination with Actual-Control and 
any type of choice, affected participants’ perceptions of influence. In fact, when informed 
that they would perform the crossout task for 20 minutes, individuals who made a choice 
between options that mattered felt more influence over their outcome than those who had 
not made a choice between options that mattered.
In other words, when individuals made a choice between options that made a 
difference in their outcome and then found out that their choice had led to a negative 
outcome, they took more credit for the outcome. However, when the experimenter made 
a choice between options that mattered and then the participants were informed of a
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negative outcome, they took less credit for the outcome.
In situations in which a negative event is predicted, the amount of influence 
perceived seems to hinge upon who is actually making the choices that make a difference 
in our life. When a negative outcome was expected: (a) individuals who made their own 
choice that matters (whether that choice was based on inherent physical characteristics or 
on factors external to the individual) took more credit for the negative outcome that was 
predicted; and (b) individuals took less credit when someone else made the choice (that 
matters) for them.
The present findings support Paterson and Neufeld’s (1995) contention that the 
most important issue is not the simpler confound between two variables (i.e., actual 
control and choice, or actual control and predictability) but the confound among all three 
variables. The re-conceptualization of choice as the act of choosing between options and 
actual control as the presentation of options that make a difference in one’s outcome has 
made it possible to investigate situations of choiceless control -  whether or not these 
situations were predictable. Separating the concept of choice from that of actual control 
has permitted the emergence of a more complex depiction of how people respond in the 
face of challenging outcomes.
Specifically, when a negative event is anticipated, the amount of influence 
individuals feel over that event seems to hinge upon who is actually making the choices 
that make a difference in their life. Specifically, when anticipating a difficult event:
(a) individuals who made their own choices that matter (whether these choices are based 
on inherent physical characteristics or on factors external to our physical selves) felt more
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influence over the situation; and (b) individuals who did not make their own choices that 
matter (i.e., someone else made the choice for them) felt less influence over the situation.
Whereas Cramer and Nickels (2005) have shed doubts on the necessity of choice 
by demonstrating that control can be perceived even before a choice is made, the present 
findings demonstrated the importance of each of the three independent variables 
(i.e., actual control, choice, and predicted outcome) in determining perceptions of control, 
influence, and responsibility over an event. Inconsistent with Cramer and Perreault 
(2005), Langlois et al. (2002), and Paterson and Neufeld (1995) who demonstrated that 
choice will not yield benefits unless meaningful options are provided, it was found that 
having a choice can indeed yield benefits whether or not choice is combined with options 
that make a difference. The finding that choice alone was sufficient in increasing 
perceived influence and responsibility is consistent with the notion that individuals who 
are given a choice show better personal adjustment and better coping (e.g., Burleson et 
al., 1990; Harchiket al., 1993).
Perhaps one reason why the present findings are different from those of previous 
investigations of the new conceptualization (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et 
al., 2002; Nickels et al, 1992) is because of important differences in the conceptualization 
of the independent variables (i.e., choice and actual control). For instance, whereas the 
present design conceptualized choice as the act of choosing and actual control as the 
presentation of options that make a difference in the outcome, Cramer and Perreault 
(2005) conceptualized choice in terms of awareness that a choice was being made, and 
Nickels et al. (1992) conceptualized choice as confounded with actual control, where
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actual control involved the presence of options that affect, contribute, or impact an 
event -  a definition which could also apply to choice or to situations of no actual control. 
Therefore, conceptualizing choice as separate from actual control might produce findings 
that emphasize the importance of all three independent variables (i.e., actual control, 
choice, and predicted outcome) in determining feelings of influence over an outcome.
Confidence and Prediction
Hypothesis 3. Inconsistent with Cramer and Perreault (2005), Langlois et al.
(2002, Experiment 2), and Nickels et al. (1992), the present findings only partly confirm 
the hypothesis that, regardless of actual control and choice, in comparison to participants 
with No-Prediction, individuals with prediction (either Predicted-Success or Predicted- 
Failure) will feel significantly more confident in their ability to predict their outcome. 
Indeed, when the participants were informed that they would perform the crossout task 
for 2 minutes, they felt more confident about how long they would perform the task, even 
though they felt less able to predict how long they would actually perform it.
However, when the participants were informed that they would perform the 
crossout task for 20 minutes, they felt less confident about how long they would perform 
the task, even though they felt better able to predict how long they would actually perform 
it. Furthermore, individuals who were not at all informed about their outcome felt more 
confident (rather than less confident, as hypothesized) but less able to predict how long 
they would perform the cross-out task.
In other words, when individuals were informed that they would perform the
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crossout task for 20 minutes, they felt they could predict it would occur but did not feel 
confident that they would actually have to perform it. Furthermore, whether the 
participants were informed that they would receive a positive outcome or were not 
informed at all about their outcome, they did not feel they could predict what would 
occur, but felt quite confident that they would actually have to experience the outcome 
received. These findings seem to indicate that individuals felt ambivalent about what to 
expect, whether or not they had been informed about their outcome. Perhaps the 
participants had some doubts about whether the experimenter would actually follow 
through with the implementation of the outcomes.
Also disconfirming Hypothesis 3 was the finding that, when the participants made 
a voluntary choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper,’ they felt: (a) more confident about how 
long they would perform the cross-out task when they knew it would be for a short 
2-minute period; and (b) less confident about how long they would perform the task when 
they knew that it would be for a long 20-minute period. It appears that, when choices 
were made based on options that were external to one’s own personal characteristics 
(i.e., ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’), it was easier for individuals to believe that they would actually 
engage in a positive outcome but more difficult to believe that they would have to engage 
in a negative outcome. In other words, when choosing between options that are not based 
on one’s own personal characteristics, individuals seem to feel that the experimenter 
could not possibly follow through on an outcome so time-consuming as a 20-minute 
crossout task. Perhaps the participants doubted that the experimenter would follow 
through on the long time period, but more easily believed that the experimenter would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
implement the short time period.
Furthermore, when the participants made an involuntary choice between ‘blue’ or 
‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour, they felt: (a) more confident about how 
long they would perform the cross-out task while not at all being informed about their 
outcome, and (b) less confident about how long they would perform the task while being 
informed that it would only be for a short 2-minute period. It appears that, when choices 
were made between options that were based on one’s own physical characteristics 
(i.e., ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ eyes), it was easier for participants to believe that they would 
actually engage in a task they could not predict but more difficult to believe that they 
would have to engage in a task for a short time period.
In other words, when choosing between options based on one’s own physical 
characteristics, individuals may have more difficulty believing that the experimenter 
would actually follow through on a positive outcome. The participants may have 
questioned whether the experimenter would follow through on a predicted outcome based 
on a reason as personal as one’s own true eye colour. It did, however, seem easier for the 
participants to believe that the experimenter would follow through on an unpredicted 
outcome. The element of unpredictability seems to have increased the participants’ belief 
that the experimenter would actually follow through with an unknown performance task.
Frustration and Helplessness
Hypothesis 4. The present findings disconfirmed the hypothesis that, under 
conditions of Predicted-Success, participants with Actual-Control will feel less helpless
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over their outcome than those individuals who have No-Actual-Control (Cramer & 
Perreault, 2005). Indeed, predicting a short time period significantly decreased feelings 
of frustration, but feelings of helplessness were not affected.
Specifically, when presented with options that made a difference in the outcome, 
individuals who knew they would perform the crossout task for 20 minutes felt more 
frustrated (but not significantly more helpless) about their outcome than individuals who: 
(a) were informed that they would perform the task for only 2 minutes, or (b) were not 
informed about their outcome. Furthermore, when options made a difference, individuals 
who were not at all informed about their outcome felt more frustrated (but not more 
helpless) than individuals who knew they would perform the crossout task for 2 minutes.
In other words, the anticipation of a positive outcome decreased feelings of frustration. In 
fact, when options made a difference in the outcome, frustration was highest when the 
worst outcome was anticipated and frustration was lowest when the best outcome was 
expected.
Interestingly, this finding also held true in situations of No-Actual-Control. 
Specifically, participants who had options that made no difference felt more frustrated 
when they knew they would perform the crossout task for 20 minutes but felt less 
frustrated when they predicted the task would only last 2 minutes. In other words, when 
options made no difference, individuals who were informed of a failed outcome felt 
more frustrated than individuals who were informed of a successful outcome.
In short, regardless of choice, predicting a positive outcome seems to decrease 
feelings of frustration both in situations in which the options provided made a difference
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in the outcome and in situations in which options made no difference in the outcome. In 
other words, situations of both Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control decreased the 
participants’ feelings of frustration when a positive outcome was predicted, and increased 
participants’ feelings of frustration when a negative outcome was predicted.
The fact that feelings of helplessness were not affected by any of the independent 
variables is not entirely surprising considering the inconsistencies reported in the 
literature8. For instance, whereas some research has found that outcome predictability is 
not needed in order for participants to feel less helpless (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002, 
Experiment 2; Nickels et al., 1992, Experiment 2), other studies report that ratings of 
helplessness decrease when Actual-Control is combined with Predicted-Success 
(e.g., Cramer and Perreault, 2005, Experiment 1). Furthermore, whereas Cramer 
et al. (1997) reported that helplessness ratings decreased with Actual-Control independent 
of decreases with Predicted-Success, Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 1) found no 
significant results at all for helplessness ratings.
Hypothesis 5. Inconsistent with Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 2), the present 
findings disconfirmed the hypothesis that, regardless of predicted outcome, participants 
with Voluntary-Choice will feel less helpless over their outcome, but only when 
Voluntary-Choice is accompanied by Actual-Control. In fact, helplessness and frustration
8 It is important to note that, in studies examining the reconceptualization of 
control, feelings of helplessness (based on the temporary and immediate effect of a short­
lived environmental manipulation) rather than learned helplessness (based on 
internal/external, stable/unstable, and global/specific attributions) have been assessed.
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scores were not at all affected by any type of choice nor by the combined effects of actual 
control with choice (cf. Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Instead, the combination of 
actual control (or lack of actual control) with the knowledge that a positive outcome will 
occur decreased the amount of perceived frustration felt for the outcome. Ratings of 
frustration also decreased when actual control was combined with lack of predictability.
In short, feelings of frustration were affected in situations that combined variables of 
actual control with variables of predicted outcome.
The finding that feelings of helplessness did not decrease when Actual-Control 
and Voluntary-Choice conditions were combined further demonstrates the inconsistent 
effects of the independent variables on ratings of helplessness. Whereas some studies 
have demonstrated that helplessness ratings significantly decrease when choice is 
combined with actual control conditions (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002, Experiment 2), other 
studies have reported non-significant effects for helplessness ratings (e.g., Langlois et al. 
2002, Experiment 1; Cramer & Perreault, 2005, Experiment 2), or have demonstrated that 
helplessness clearly decreases with increased actual control (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; 
Nickels et al., 1992; Tiggeman & Winefeld, 1987).
Partly consistent with learned helplessness theory, which predicts that a lack of 
actual control is sufficient to produce emotional deficits (Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 
1975), the present findings showed that the combination of lack of actual control with 
predicted failure increased the participants’s ratings of frustration over their outcome. 
Inconsistent with learned helplessness theory, however, was the finding that ratings of 
frustration also increased in actual control conditions (combined with Predicted-Failure or
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No-Prediction). Furthermore, lack of actual control was not sufficient to produce higher 
ratings of helplessness. In fact, helplessness scores neither increased nor decreased with 
variations of actual control, predicted outcome, and choice.
Langlois et al. (2002) admit that the new conceptualization has been inconsistent 
at uncovering significant differences in helplessness. It has also been suggested that 
future research consider additional variables such as awareness of choice (Cramer 
et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002) in order to further understand helplessness in the 
context of the new conceptualization. However, varying methodologies and operational 
definitions of actual control, choice, and predicted outcome variables are likely 
responsible for inconsistencies among the studies that have examined helplessness.
Indeed, when comparing individual studies that have examined the new 
conceptualization, there are inconsistencies in helplessness findings (Table 3;
Appendix G). For instance, whereas Nickels et al. (1992, Experiment 2) found that 
helplessness ratings decreased in conditions of actual control regardless of prediction, 
Cramer and Perreault (2005, Experiment 1) found that helplessness ratings decreased 
when actual control was combined with predicted success. However, an overview of all 
of these studies demonstrates that each of the actual control, choice, and predicted 
outcome variables, whether considered separately or in combination, can have significant 
effects on helplessness ratings (Table 3; Appendix G). Additional research is necessary 
to further clarify how levels of actual control, choice, and predicted outcome affect 
feelings of helplessness (e.g., future studies might consider using a longer scale such as 
Beck’s hopelessness scale).
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Perceived Contribution and Motivation to Participate
Although no hypotheses were related to the participants’ feelings of contribution 
and motivation to participate, it is important to mention that these feelings did not seem 
to play a significantly important role in the present study. Specifically, the participants’ 
mean scores for perceived contribution and motivation to participate were moderately 
high, whether their options made a difference in the outcome or not. Overall, the 
independent variables did not affect individuals’ feelings of contribution and motivation 
to participate in the study. Based on their mean scores, it can be concluded that the 
participants felt they contributed and were motivated to participate in the present study, 
regardless of the experimental condition in which they were randomly assigned.
Optimism Toward and Desire fo r a Positive Outcome
Although no hypotheses were related to the participants’ feelings of optimism and 
desire to experience a positive outcome, the findings should be briefly discussed as they 
pertain to the present study. Specifically, when the participants made a choice between 
‘salt’ or ‘pepper,’ they felt significantly more optimistic about receiving a positive 
outcome than individuals who made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their 
own true eye colour. It appears that making a choice between options that are based on 
internal characteristics such as eye colour, as opposed to choosing between more external 
options such as ‘salt’ or ‘pepper,’ decreased feelings of optimism toward receiving a 
positive outcome.
In other words, feelings of optimism toward a positive outcome seemed to
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increase based on the type of choice being made. When a choice was made based on 
one’s own personal characteristics, a positive outcome seemed less likely. Feelings of 
optimism were only affected when individuals were presented with some sort of choice.
Furthermore, when the participants could predict their outcome (whether the 
outcome was negative or positive), they wanted to experience the short time period more 
so than those individuals who could not predict their outcome at all. In other words, 
desire for a positive outcome was stronger when the participants knew what their 
outcome would be, whether the predicted outcome was positive or negative. Knowing 
the outcome increased the desire to get a positive outcome. Getting a positive outcome 
did not seem quite as important to those individuals who did not know what to expect.
Also, the participants’ desire for a positive outcome increased when they had 
actual control with a voluntary choice, or actual control with no choice. Having actual 
control while choosing between options that are based on personal characteristics 
(i.e., eye colour) decreased individuals’ desire to receive the short time period. In other 
words, individuals who wanted a positive outcome the least were those who had made an 
involuntary choice.
Furthermore, lack of actual control combined with involuntary choice increased 
the participants’ desire to receive the short time period in comparison to those individuals 
who had no actual control with either voluntary choice or no choice. In other words, the 
participants whose choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ made no difference at all in the 
outcome wanted a positive outcome more than individuals whose choice between ‘salt’ or 
‘pepper’ (or whose choice was made by someone else) made no difference.
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In short, choosing between options that both matter and are based on 
characteristics that are external to one’s own personal characteristics increased feelings of 
optimism about receiving a positive outcome. Furthermore, the factors that significantly 
increased one’s desire to receive the positive outcome were: (a) being able to predict the 
outcome; (b) the combination of actual control with either voluntary choice or no choice; 
and (c) the combination of no actual control with involuntary choice.
Social Psychological Applications 
Although the new conceptualization has not yet been examined in non-laboratory 
contexts, the present findings can be quite important in addressing issues such as patient 
response to ineffective treatment options. For instance, regarding the finding that one’s 
actions must make a difference in order to feel control, Langlois et al. (2002) described a 
a scenario in which a cancer patient was given the choice of receiving a new drug that 
might either completely eradicate the liver tumour (positive outcome), or might not at all 
have an effect on the tumour (negative outcome). Langlois et al. (2002) explained that 
what was important for perceiving control was not making the choice itself, but the 
understanding that one’s choice would actually have an effect on one’s own health. 
According to Langlois et al. (2002), therefore, it is not simply making a choice that 
permits an individual to feel control over their situation, but the fact that one’s choice will 
make at least some difference in the outcome.
As an extension of Langlois et al. (2002), the present findings demonstrated that 
experiencing a combination of both actual control and choice is particularly important
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when a failed outcome is predicted. Whereas individuals responded with lower ratings of 
influence and responsibility when they were put in situations of choiceless control, the 
lowest ratings of influence occurred when choiceless control was combined with 
predicted failure.
In returning to Langlois et al.’s (2002) scenario, therefore, it seems that the best 
way of increasing patients’ feelings of influence over their own health is to let them make 
their own choices between options that make a difference in their treatment -  before they 
are informed that their drug treatment failed. Therefore, when a failed treatment outcome 
is predicted, the most important thing for a patient’s positive perceptions over that 
outcome is who is making the choice between the options that matter — whether the 
treatment option was chosen based on the patient’s age or gender (i.e., Involuntary- 
Choice), or based on characteristics external to the individual such as drug name 
(i.e., Voluntary-Choice). As long as the patients (rather than family members or health 
professionals) choose between treatment options that make a difference, then their 
feelings of influence over a failed treatment outcome will be higher.
Situations of choiceless control combined with predicted failure can also present 
themselves in the realm of romantic relationships. For example, many individuals 
actively search for a romantic partner who is caring and interesting (desired outcome) 
rather than someone who is self-absorbed and dull (undesired outcome). On the one 
hand, when a dating service sets up a blind date for a client (i.e., the blind date is chosen 
between one of two people who could end up being either caring or self-absorbed), the 
client will feel less influence over the situation when he or she finds out that the partner is
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self-absorbed. On the other hand, when the client chooses one of two dating partners who 
ends up being dull company, then the client will feel more influence over the undesired 
outcome. As long as the clients (rather than the dating service) choose between options 
(i.e., dating partners) that make a difference, then their feelings of influence over a failed 
dating outcome will be higher.
Similar scenarios can occur in the workplace. For example, many staff persons 
prefer to work on engaging projects that end up making a profit (desired outcome) rather 
than handle projects that make no profit at all (undesired outcome). On the one hand, 
when a senior manager chooses a project for his staff members (i.e., chosen between one 
of two projects that could end up being profitable or not), the staff members will feel less 
influence over their situation when they find out that the project has been unprofitable.
On the other hand, when the staff members have choosen a work project that ends up 
being unprofitable, they will feel more influence over the undesired outcome. As long as 
the staff members (rather than the manager) choose between project options that make a 
difference, then their feelings of influence over a failed outcome will be higher.
Indeed, increased feelings of influence over an undesired outcome can have 
beneficial consequences. For example, if an entrepreneur chose to develop a company 
that ended up failing, then feelings of influence over that past failure will likely affect his 
or her future choices. In other words, some individuals who feel they have influenced a 
failed outcome perceive their situation as a learning experience that has provided them 
with a hint about what does not work. Past failures might even increase one’s drive or 
desire for success, especially for those individuals who are highly motivated to succeed in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
their endeavours. The expression ‘paying one’s dues’ refers to the idea that one must 
experience difficulties and failures before eventually experiencing success.
However, increased feelings of influence over an undesired outcome can also have 
negative consequences. For example, in their experience of illusion of control, some 
gamblers who feel they have influenced a failed game of chance might develop 
problematic behaviours. In other words, motivation from past failures can have different 
consequences based on contextual and individual differences. Future research might 
attempt to uncover such differences by manipulating the type or number of choices made, 
or by examining the type or level of motivation that leads individuals to make certain 
choices both before and after the discovery of a failed outcome.
New Directions fo r Future Research 
A Positive Psychology Framework
Historically, the learned helplessness literature has emphasized responses to 
aversive situations, and interest in responses to positive or enjoyable situations has been 
comparatively minimal (Lefcourt, 1991b). However, as societal concern about good 
character increases (Hunter, 2000), researchers seem to be moving away from traditional 
views and conceptualizations concerning learned helplessness and other control-related 
concepts. In fact, there has been a growing interest in positive psychology which 
examines positive personality characteristics and positive affective responses to stressors 
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004).
For instance, in the literature concerned with the link between stress and
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personality characteristics, there is evidence implicating positive mood, humour, and 
optimism (Lefcourt, 1991b). Furthermore, it is becoming easier to study the effects of 
positive moods because the measurement tools appropriate for that type of study have 
increased in variety and number.
In concert with the growing interest in positive psychology, Peterson and 
Seligman (2004) have introduced a classification of character strengths that is intended 
“to reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry” 
(p. 3). Peterson and Seligman (2004) present many conceptual and empirical tools that 
can help researchers focus on psychological health (i.e., strengths of wisdom and 
knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence) rather than 
psychological illness -  a negative framework that still pervades much of the current 
psychological literature. Other researchers have examined the role of positive situations, 
perspective, and coping styles in moderating stress. For example, Lefcourt and 
colleagues have focused on stress-moderating variables such as humour (e.g., Lefcourt, 
2001; Lefcourt, Davidson, Prkachin, & Mills, 1997; Martin & Lefcourt, 1983).
Divergent from the positive psychology movement, the new conceptualization of 
control has focused its research on aversive events or boring motor tasks. Despite the 
distinction between predicted success and predicted failure conditions, both types of 
predicted events nevertheless lie on a continuum from least aversive or least boring 
(i.e., predicted success) to most aversive or most boring (i.e., predicted failure). The fact 
that unpredictability led to higher ratings of perceived control, influence, and 
responsibility in the present study leads one to question how the manipulation of
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predicted outcome conditions could have demonstrated itself to be so unimportant in 
previous studies (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992). Is 
the importance of unpredictability (and predicted failure) simply an artefact that appears 
when the concepts of actual control, choice, and predicted outcome are completely 
separated? Further research is needed in order to determine whether the present findings 
occurred due to the excessive dissection of a simple concept, or due to the necessary and 
appropriate separation of the components of a larger control-related construct.
According to Peterson (1991), an adequate investigation of explanatory style for 
good events should measure both positive and negative life events, as well as the good 
and bad moods that may follow as a consequence. Similarly, examining how individuals 
respond to positive outcomes as well as negative outcomes might help proponents of the 
new conceptualization determine the relevance and appropriateness of separately 
manipulating each of the actual control, choice, and predicted outcome variables in a 
variety of life contexts.
A Cross-Cultural Framework
The traditional control literature has seldom conducted any type of cultural 
analyses. This has been so despite the findings reported in the cross-cultural literature 
which explain that people’s tendencies to respond to events differ based on cultural 
context. Peterson (1991) acknowledges the possibility that the tendency to respond to 
negative events shows historical and cultural boundaries. This may be of particular 
concern to the people of Western societies who value individuality and who try to control
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and predict the events with which they are faced (Baumeister, 1986; Weisz, Rothbaum, & 
Blackburn, 1984). Similarly, socialization into a particular culture might entail culture- 
specific responses to events in which control-related variables are presented.
In the Western world, choice has been considered both a human right and an 
essential human need (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Individual choice (as a means of 
enjoying life) has become a dominant cultural value in much of the modem Western 
world, particularly since the rise of the ‘me’ generation in the 1970s (Ahuvia, 2001). The 
North American assumption that people will benefit from having choice is so ingrained 
that psychologists have seldom paused to investigate the more general applicability of 
these findings (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999).
However, personal choice is not considered beneficial in a ll parts of the world. 
Whereas values like ‘uniqueness’ are stronger in Western societies (e.g., Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991b), different values such as ‘honouring parents’ are particularly strong in 
Eastern societies (e.g., Triandis, McCusker, &  Hui, 1990). Iyengar and Lepper (1999) 
found that personal choice generally enhanced motivation more for American 
independent selves than for Asian interdependent selves. It was also reported that Anglo 
American children showed more intrinsic motivation when they made their own choices 
than when choices were made for them by others (whether authority figures or peers). In 
contrast, Asian American children showed more intrinsic motivation when choices were 
made for them by trusted authority figures or peers.
An influential cultural analysis conducted by Markus and Kitayama (1991a,
1991b) seems to shed light on the mechanisms that might underlie these differences.
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Because North Americans and Western Europeans possess a model of the self as 
fundamentally independent, making choices provides an opportunity to express one’s 
internal attributes and to assert one’s autonomy. In contrast, most non-Westem 
(particularly East Asian) cultures possess a model of self as fundamentally 
interdependent, whereby the exercise of personal choice might threaten the harmony and 
belongingness with their reference group. In cultures that value interdependence, choice 
is often made by and for close others (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997).
Furthermore, the tendency to seek variety of choices depends in part on cultural 
assumptions of choice and uniqueness (Kim & Drolet, 2003). Variety-seeking is the 
tendency for a person to switch away from a choice that was made on a previous occasion 
(Kahn, Kalwani, &  Morrison, 1982; Ratner, Kahn, & Kahneman, 1999), and it appears to 
be commonplace in North American culture (see McAlister & Pessemier, 1982 for a 
review). For example, Kim and Drolet (2003) found that participants from an 
individualist culture (i.e., United States) tended to vary their choice, whereas participants 
from a collectivist culture (i.e., Korea) did not.
Because the actor is seen as the main cause of behaviour in Western cultures, it 
could be assumed that a sense of personal control is more important in the West than it is 
in the East (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). In fact, control is so important to Westerners that 
they often fail to distinguish between objectively controllable and uncontrollable events, 
tend to perceive more control than they actually have (Langer, 1975), and mistakenly 
report high levels of predictability of events (see Presson & Benassi, 1996 for a review).
Cross-cultural research suggests that a sense of perceived personal control is more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
important for North Americans than it is for East Asians (Ji et ai., 2000). Perceived 
control over external events is stronger for European Americans than it is for East Asian 
and Hispanic Americans or for Asians (e.g., O’Connor & Shimizu, 2002; Sastry & Ross, 
1998; Weisz et al., 1984). The evidence implies that North Americans and East Asians 
respond differently to being given control (Ji et al., 2000). The protective effects of 
perceived control seem most evident in individualistic Western cultures (O’Connor & 
Shimizu, 2002).
Despite the fact that cultural context tends to promote characteristic response 
patterns even among people who have different personalities (Triandis, 1994), some 
researchers have investigated within-culture variation in values and behaviour tendencies. 
For example, in their cross-cultural study of organizational behaviour, Brockner and Chen 
(1996) found that some Chinese students ‘bucked the trend’ and responded in a more 
idiocentric way. Similarly, some American students deviated from the group norms and 
were more allocentric in their responses to negative feedback. Schaubroeck, Lam, and 
Xie (2000) found similar results with regard to the role of job control in helping workers 
cope with job demands.
The cross-cultural differences reported in the literature could affect the 
generalizability of the new conceptualization of control. For instance, differences might 
emerge between European-Canadian and Asian-Canadian ratings of influence, 
responsibility, and perceived control or; differences might emerge among the individuals 
of one particular cultural group. If  the availability of actual control, or choice (or variety- 
seeking), or predictability is indeed less relevant for individuals from more socially
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interdependent cultures, then proponents of the new conceptualization of control might be 
faced with the challenge of revising (contextualizing) their reconceptualization of 
traditional control and learned helplessness theories. Based on previous cross-cultural 
research, the new conceptualization of control might require a modification that includes 
an examination of those individuals who fundamentally value fate, duty, and 
interdependence, as well as those individuals who fundamentally value choice, personal 
control, and independence.
Conclusion
In similarity to the subsequent investigators of locus of control who have 
developed a number of domain-specific measures to increase the power of their 
predictions for specific life areas (e.g., Miller, Lefcourt, & Ware, 1983), traditional 
control theorists have adopted a wide variety of assessment tools, methodologies, and 
conceptualizations that describe and explain how humans respond to life events. 
Consequently, there exists much discordance in the literature, particularly with regard to 
the effects of control. Further complicating matters are the numerous studies that have 
combined and confounded concepts that are qualitatively different from one another 
(i.e., actual control; perceived control; choice; prediction).
Traditional control researchers often focus on narrow literatures, which gives 
them a sense of coherence that is false. Lefcourt (1991b) acknowledges this phenomenon 
by explaining that: “Parochialism is comforting in the same way as religious 
fundamentalism, providing simplicity where complexity could reign” (p. 34). Indeed,
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narrow theoretical conceptualizations do have some comfort value. However, much more 
value can be gained by stepping “beyond the confines of one’s own research model to 
other empirical areas” (Lefcourt, 1991b, p. 35).
For example, the original learned helplessness model hypothesized that 
uncontrollable events produced a state of helplessness that was characterized by different 
types of difficulties (Maier & Seligman, 1976; Seligman, 1975). Whereas induced 
helplessness sometimes involved long-lasting difficulties, or pervasive difficulties, or the 
loss of self-esteem, other times, induced helplessness did not affect these variables in the 
same way at all. It is when these three sources of contradictory evidence were taken 
together that explanatory style (i.e., dimensions of intemality, stability, and globality) was 
presented as a means for accounting for the variance in the findings pertaining to the 
original helplessness model (Peterson, 1991).
Furthermore, psychology often tries very hard to distinguish one concept or 
variable from another when the individuals that are studied often do not (Lefcourt, 1991b; 
Peterson, 1991). For example, Peterson (1991) describes a study which examined 
students’ descriptions of bad events they had experienced in the recent past. These 
descriptions were examined along a number of dimensions that were deemed important 
by various theorists (e.g., many dimensions involving the event itself, the ‘one major 
cause’ of the event in question, the ‘one major consequence’ of the event, and one’s 
coping with the event).
An unexpectedly simple conclusion was drawn from the results from which a 
clear two-factor solution emerged. One factor was labelled the ‘Big Deal’ way of
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perceiving events. The other factor was labelled the ‘Predict and Control’ way of looking 
at events. The ‘Predict and Control’ factor included ratings of intemality of the cause 
plus all the ratings of predictability and controllability, regardless of whether the rating in 
question was made with respect to the event, its cause, or its consequence. This finding is 
incongruent with the reformulation of learned helplessness theory (cf. Abramson et al., 
1978; Peterson & Seligman, 1984).
Indeed, those individuals included in our research studies do not always 
“segregate their thoughts as neatly as our theoretical disagreements assume” (Peterson, 
1991, p. 3). In the present study, despite previous research supporting the benefits of 
separating predictability from actual control and choice (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002;
Nickels et al., 2005), the participants became significantly confused when actual control 
and predicted outcome conditions were presented incongruently. This was demonstrated 
in the fact that participants made more manipulation check errors when they experienced 
situations of actual control without prediction, and when situations of prediction were 
presented without actual control. In comparison, fewer manipulation check errors were 
made when the participants experienced situations of actual control with prediction, and 
no actual control without prediction.
In other words, the participants had difficulty conceptualizing actual control as 
separate from predicted outcome, and confusion arose particularly when these two 
variables were presented incongruently. This result is surprising when it is compared to 
previous findings reported by proponents of the new conceptualization of control.
Perhaps individuals conceptualize actual control and predictability as yoked when choice 
is completely extricated from the actual control variable. This interpretation can neither
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be confirmed nor disconfirmed until further studies are conducted which further test the 
reconceptualization.
Furthermore, the generalizability of the new conceptualization to real life 
situations remains unclear. Studies researching the reconceptualization of control have 
employed experimental designs that tend to limit the generalizability of the findings to 
real life settings. In the present study, for example, the participants made relatively 
passive choices between dichotomous options that were linked to participation in either a 
successful or a failed outcome. Furthermore, in the fact that the outcomes would be 
short-lived and non-threatening, the experimental situation may have induced a somewhat 
trivial context.
In real life situations, however, options are not so obviously dichotomous, choices 
usually involve much more effort, and outcomes often have a much deeper effect on an 
individual’s well-being. For example, despite the fact that individuals who have 
combined medication with lifestyle changes tend to experience more successful health 
outcomes, many cardiac patients often prefer to simply take medication rather than make 
any significant changes in their diet or level of physical activity. Health-relevant choices 
are likely much more important for our sense of well-being than choices that affect less 
relevant outcomes such as amount of time participating in a non-threatening motor task.
The importance and the value we place upon the option-outcome relationship 
(or lack thereof) might determine how we respond to choices. How do people respond 
when they are faced with choices they value as particularly relevant to their well-being? 
Individual differences variables such as locus of control orientation might be important in 
further understanding the effects of control, choice, and prediction on perceptions of
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control. Whereas some individuals may prefer to take control and make their own 
choices in important situations (i.e., internal locus of control), others may prefer to cede 
control and avoid making choices in situations that are particularly relevant for their well­
being (i.e., external locus of control) (see Burger, 1989 for a review).
Studies examining the reconceptualization of control have tended to rely on paper 
and pencil assessments of the dependent variables. However, additional information 
about such effects might be gained by using other types of assessments as well. For 
example, the examination of physiological (e.g., blood pressure) or behavioural responses 
(e.g., amount of time it took for a choice to be made) to varying levels of choice, control, 
and predictability might provide additional information regarding individuals’ responses 
to stressful events.
Furthermore, assessments of the dependent variables have typically been 
presented immediately after the experimental manipulations have taken place. In many 
life contexts, however, we do not often see the repercussions of our actions until some 
time after the choice has been made (either for us or by us). There is often a delay before 
we gain information about the successful or failed outcomes that have resulted from our 
(or others’) choices. In fact, whereas some situations can remain unpredictable over 
extensive periods of time (e.g., a delayed impact of unhealthy habits on physical health), 
other situations can involve unawareness that an outcome has occurred (e.g., no 
knowledge of a smoking-related cancerous tumour on the lungs). Yet despite our 
unawareness or our uncertainty of future outcomes, we continue to make choices.
An individual’s previous experience with (or exposure to) various combinations 
of choice, control, and predictability may provide important information about one’s
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possible reactions to stressful events. For example, it is well documented that individuals 
who experience consistently stressful situations over a long period of time tend to have 
lower immune system functioning. Similarly, the responses of individuals who have 
often experienced situations of choiceless control (e.g., growing up in an abusive home) 
will likely be different than the responses of those who have seldom experienced similar 
situations.
What might be important for testing the generalizability of the reconceptualization 
of control is to investigate its application to areas such as medical treatment practices 
(e.g., treatment follow-through), safety behaviours (e.g., wearing seatbelts), educational 
programming practices (e.g., academic achievement), training and supervisory practices 
(e.g., worker satisfaction), employee recruitment and selection (e.g., employee retention), 
and coaching practices (e.g., athletic performance) in various cross-cultural contexts. As 
researchers and practitioners begin to show more interest in a positive psychology 
framework, and as the world becomes more globally integrated, it will become 
particularly important to investigate both the generalizability and the practical 
applicability of the new conceptualization of control.
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CONSENT FORM
As part of my dissertation research, I (Lynn Perreault) invite you to participate in my study (Department of 
Psychology, University of Windsor). If you have any questions or concerns about my research, please feel free to 
contact my research supervisor, Dr. Ken Cramer (253-3000, ext. 2239, or E-mail kcramer@uwindsor.ca).
PURPOSE OF TH E STUDY: I am researching the effects of motor skills performance.
PROCEDURES: If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked (1) to practice a motor skill task 
for 1-minute, and (2) to complete the exercise booklet that is included with this form. The total participation time is 
a maximum of 20 minutes. If you would like a copy of the research findings once they become available, please 
include your E-mail address underneath your signature at the bottom of this page.
PO TEN TIA L RISKS &  DISCO M FO RTS: None.
P O TEN TIA L BENEFITS: This study will provide you with an opportunity to explore your motor skills while 
gaining experience about what it is like to participate in a psychological study. By participating in this study, you will 
also be entered in a cash draw.
P A YM EN T FOR PA R TIC IP A TIO N : Your name will be entered in a $50 cash draw. 
C O N F ID E N T IA L IT Y : Your participation in this study is anonymous. Do NOT write your name on the booklet.
P A R TIC IP A TIO N  & W ITH D R A W A L: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may 
exercise the option of removing your data from the study, and you may refuse to answer any questions. Also, you 
can end your participation in this study at any time without penalty or explanation.
R IG H TS OF RESEARCH PA RTIC IPANTS: You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue 
participation without penalty. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University 
of Windsors Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant contact: 
Research Ethics Co-Ordinator, University o f Windsor, 253-3000 (x39I6), E-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca
Please sign the Consent Form at the bottom of this page, detach it  and return it to me immediately prior to 
your participation. You may retain the top portion for your records.
T H A N K  Y O U !©
B A LLO T FOR SOS D R A W :
I understand the above information and agree to participate in Lynn’s study examining motor skills performance. I 
also understand that the overall results of this study may be published at a later date, and that my identity will be kept 
confidential. I have been offered a copy of this consent form to keep for my own records.
Printed name Signature Date
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INSTRUCTION BOOKLET
DO NOT OPEN YOUR BOOKLET.
PLEASE WAIT QUIETLY FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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Actual-Control /  Voluntary-Choice /  Predicted-Success (salt)
or
Actual-Control /  Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive. 
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to a different time period 
than the word ‘pepper’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
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At this point, 
we can tell you how long 
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE




Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predict ed-Success (pepper)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (salt)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to a different time period 
than the word ‘pepper’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
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At this point, 
we can tell you how long 
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B3:
Experimental condition #1 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (salt)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘salt’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
PEPPER SALT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B4:
Experimental condition #2 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control /  Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (pepper)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (salt)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘salt’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
PEPPER SALT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE




Actual-Control /  Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two eye colours (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to a different time period 
than the word ‘non-blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
~ i
BLUE NON-BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE




Actual-Control /  Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (non-blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two eye colours (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to a different time period 
than the word ‘non-blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
BLUE NON-BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B7:
Experimental condition #3 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (non-blue)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two eye colours (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
“ i
NON-BLUE BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B8:
Experimental condition #4 (counterbalanced): 
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (non-blue)
or
Actual-Control /  Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two eye colours (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
NON-BLUE BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B9:
Experimental condition #5:
Actual-Control /  No-Choice / Predicted-Success (right)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period 
than the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘right’ 
comer of this page.
“ i
RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the word ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you were assigned the word ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE




Actual-Control / No-Choice /  Predicted-Success (left)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period 
than the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘right’ 
comer of this page.
~ i
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the word ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you were assigned the word ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B11:
Experimental condition #5 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control /  No-Choice / Predicted-Success (right)
or
Actual-Control /  No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (left)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period 
than the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘left’ 
comer of this page.
n
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the word ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you were assigned the word ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B12:
Experimental condition #6 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (left)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice /  Predicted-Failure (right)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period 
than the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘left’ 
comer of this page.
n
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the word ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you were assigned the word ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE




Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction(salt or pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to a different time period 
than the word ‘pepper’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
!
SALT ! PEPPER
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Remember that your choice of word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B14:
Experimental condition #7 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction condition(pepper or salt)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘salt’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
PEPPER SALT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Remember that your choice of word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE




Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction(blue or non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to a different time period 
than the word ‘non-blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
BLUE NON-BLUE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Remember that your choice of colour word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B16:
Experimental condition #8 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction(non-blue or blue)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
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Remember that your choice of colour word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... N E X T  P A G E




Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction(right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period 
than the other option.
P L E A S E  T U R N  T H E  P A G E  T O  C O M P L E T E  T H E  S U R V E Y .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘right
comer of this page.
~ !
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B18:
Experimental condition #9 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction(left)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes a difference in the time period you receive. 
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period 
than the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘left’ 
comer of this page.
“ i
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success(salt & pepper)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead 
to the same time period as the word ‘pepper’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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SALT
Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
~ i
PEPPER
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B20:
Experimental condition #10 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success(pepper & salt)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive. 
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead 
to the same time period as the word ‘salt’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
286
Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
PEPPER SALT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control /  Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (salt & pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead 
to the same time period as the word ‘pepper’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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SALT
Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
PEPPER
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B22:
Experimental condition #11 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (pepper & salt)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive. 
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead 
to the same time period as the word ‘salt’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
PEPPER SALT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘pepper’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period
If you chose the word ‘salt’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (blue & non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to the same time period 
as the word ‘non-blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
~ i
BLUE NON-BLUE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue5, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B24:
Experimental condition #12 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (non-blue & blue)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘blue’.
P L E A S E  T U R N  T H E  P A G E  T O  C O M P L E T E  T H E  S U R V E Y .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
NON-BLUE BLUE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice /  Predicted-Failure (blue & non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to the same time period 
as the word ‘non-blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
BLUE NON-BLUE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B26:
Experimental condition #13 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice /  Predicted-Failure (non-blue & blue)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
NON-BLUE BLUE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you chose the word ‘non-blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you chose the word ‘blue’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (right & left)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘right’ 
comer of this page.
~ i
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B28:
Experimental condition #14 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (left & right)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period 
as the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘left’ 
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a SHORT time period.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a for a SHORT time period.
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (right & left)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
321
IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period 
as the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘right’ 
comer o f this page.
n
RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a for a LONG time period.
... NEXT PAGE
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B30:
Experimental condition #15 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (left & right)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period 
as the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘left’ 
comer of this page.
n
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a LONG time period.
If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’, 
then you will work at the cross-out task 
for a for a LONG time period.
... N E X T  P A G E
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Appendix B31:
Experimental condition #16:
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction (salt & pepper)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to the same time period 
as the word ‘pepper’.
P LE A S E  T U R N  T H E  P A G E  T O  C O M P L E T E  T H E  S U R V E Y .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
 !
SALT ! PEPPER
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Remember that your choice of word
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... N E X T  P A G E
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Appendix B32:
Experimental condition #16 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction (pepper & salt)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘salt’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.
Please choose one of these words 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
~ i
PEPPER SALT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Remember that your choice of word
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice /  No-Prediction (blue & non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to the same time period 
as the word ‘non-blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
~ i
BLUE NON-BLUE
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Remember that your choice of colour word
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B34:
Experimental condition #17 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction (non-blue & blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
You must make a choice between 
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that your choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘blue’.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.
Please choose the word that represents your tme eye colour 
by tearing off that comer of the page.
n
NON-BLUE BLUE
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Remember that vour choice of colour word
m/
makes no difference in how long 
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE




No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction (right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘right’ 
comer of this page.
n
RIGHT
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
347
Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B36:
Experimental condition #18 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction (left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:
A choice between two options 
has been made for you.
This choice is important in determining whether 
you will work at the cross-out task for 
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).
You should also know that this choice 
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period 
as the other option.
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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LEFT
A page comer has been pre-selected for you.
Please tear off the bottom ‘left’ 
comer of this page.
n
RIGHT
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.
Before learning your time period, 
please complete the brief questionnaire 
that appears on the following page.
... NEXT PAGE
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INSTRUCTIONS
1. [B E  D IR E C TIV E ] M y name is Lynn. I'm  a Ph.D. student in the Psychology Department, and 
I'm here today to conduct some very important research on the effects o f fatigue on motor skills 
performance. This w ill take about 20 minutes total, and I really need all the help I can get.
2. It's  very important that you remain quiet. Every one must listen very carefully.
3. I w ill compensate you for your time.
4. [SHOW  50$ BILLJ I f  you help me out, you w ill be entered in a draw for 50$ cash.
5. [D ISTR IB U TE CONSENT FORM ] Your ballots are being distributed.
6. Make sure to read the consent form very' carefully, and then return the bottom portion to me.
This way, I can include your ballot in the draw for the 50$. I f  you would like to know the results 
of my study, please write your e-mail address on the ballot as well.
7. Are there any questions?
8. [ALL BALLOTS W ILL B E PICKED UP] Are there any ballots left?
9. It's  very important that you remain quiet throughout the entire study. Do N O T share your 
answers with anyone. This w ill make sure that your answers stay confidential. When you 
receive your study booklet, do N O T look inside until I  say it's  time. Please follow' my 
instructions to the 'T '
10. [D ISTR IB U TE  BOOKLETS TO FEMALES FIRST] Do N O T look inside the booklet yet!
11. [-D ISTR IB U TE BOOKLETS TO M ALES-] Reminder - no peeking yet!
12. Before we begin, I would like to give you an opportunity to practice the cross-out task that you 
w ill later be asked to perform as part o f the study. On the front o f your booklet is a page that 
contains some empty boxes. The cross-out task requires you to place an 'X ' in each individual 
square, and you must do this as fast as possible. I w ill give you one minute to practice this motor 
task. But do N O T open your booklet until I give you instructions to do so. You may begin your 
practice session now. [W ait one minutej
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13. [ W AIT ONE M IN U T E f Time is up! That was 1 minute. Later on, some o f you w ill do this 
cross-out task for 2 minutes, w'hile others w ill have to do it for 20 minutes. Remember, I am 
studying the effects o f fatigue on your ability- to complete this motor task. So don't start yet!
14. To find out how long you'll do the crossout task, you must first complete your study booklet.
Make sure to follow’ all o f the instructions carefully and quietly. Do not share your answers with 
your friends.
15. Are there any questions?
16. Once you have completed the survey, please wait quietly for further instructions.
17. You may begin.
18. [W A IT  SOME TIM E} Who needs more time? You have about 1 minute left.
19. Thanks so much for helping me out! I really appreciate it. How- many o f you have to do the 
cross-out task for 2 minutes? For 20 minutes? W ell... You w ill N O T cross out anymore boxes. 
The experiment is complete. No one w ill do the cross-out task!
20. Earlier, I  told you I was testing levels o f fatigue on a motor task. But that is N O T the true 
purpose o f my study. I just really needed you to believe that you w ould have to do the cross-out 
task for a given amount o f time.
21. I had to fool you because what I ’m really interested in are your thoughts and feelings about the 
choices you made during the study. In order to get an honest assessment of your true thoughts 
and feelings, I had to have you convinced that you would do the cross-out task as part o f the 
study.
22. Because I am conducting this exact same study with another class, you absolutely must keep this 
study a secret -  at least until tomorrow afternoon w hen the true purpose o f my study w ill be 
posted on the course website. Please - my entire study w ill be ruined if  the other class hears 
about my study. So keep this a secret "til tomorrow' afternoon!
23. Are there any questions? Comments?
24. MONDA Y=> Draw held tomorrow at noon — TUESDA Y=> Conduct draw immediately
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Please read the following questions and circle the MOST appropriate answer.
1. To what extent did you control how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all To a great
extent
2. To what extent were you responsible for how long you would perform the cross-out task? 
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all To a great
extent
3. To what extent did you influence how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all To a great
extent
4. To what extent were you helpless in determining how long you would perform the cross- 
out task? (Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all To a great
extent
5. To what extent were you frustrated with how long you would perform the cross-out task? 
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all To a great
extent
6. To what extent did you predict how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
Not at all To a great
extent
...NEXT PAGE
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To what extent were you confident about how long you would perform the cross-out 
task? (Please circle one of the numbers below)
2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all To a great 
extent
To what extent did you want to receive the short time period? 
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
2 3 4 5 6
Not at all To a great 
extent
9. To what extent were you motivated to participate in this study? 
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all To a great 
extent
10. To what extent were you optimistic that you would receive the short (2-minute) time 
period? (Please circle one of the numbers below)
1
Not at all To a great 
extent
11. To what extent do you feel you contributed to this study? 
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all To a great 
extent
Please read the following questions and check (%/) the MOST appropriate answer.
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□  1st □  13th □  25th Birth Year: □  1986
□  2nd □  14th □  26th □  1985
□  3rd □  15th □  27th □  1984
□  4 * □  16th □  28* □  1983
□  5th □  17th □  2 9 * □  1982
□  6 * □  18th □  3 0 * □  1981
□  7 * □  19th □  31* □  1980
□  8 * □  20th □  1979
□  9th □  21st □  1978
□  10th □  22nd □  1977
□  11th □  23rd Other year (specify):
□  12th □  24th □
13. What is your birth date? (Please check Sone answer only)












14. Did the page comer make a difference in the time period you received?
(Please check Sone answer only)
□ Yes
□ No
15. Were you informed about how long you would engage in the crossout task?
(Please check S  one answer only)
□ Yes (a 2-minute short time period)
□ Yes (a 20-minute long time period)
□ No (I was not informed)
16. Did you choose which page comer would be tom? (Please check Sone answer only)
□ Yes (I made a choice between 'salt’ or 'pepper')
□ Yes (I made a choice between 'blue' or 'non-blue')
□ No (the choice of 'right' or 'left' was made for me)
17. (a) Have you heard any rumours about the real purpose of this study?
□ Yes □ No
(b) If  yes, what do you think this experiment is reallv about?
PLEASE WAIT QUIETLY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
THANK YOU! ©
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Debriefing Sheet
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PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL IN SITUATIONS OF 
CHOICELESS CONTROL
Researcher: Lynn Perreault (perrea3@uwindsor.ca)
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: Whereas traditional control theorists postulate that providing choice increases 
feelings of control and decreases feelings of helplessness (e.g., Seligman, 1975), recent findings indicate that the 
benefits of control result only when a person's choices make a difference in the outcome experienced (e.g., Cramer et al., 
1997). These recent findings have instigated a new conceptualization of control, choice, and prediction in explaining 
responses to difficult situations, which has permitted the complete separation of the effects of control and prediction.
PURPOSE: By refining and extending previous research designs, the present study will seek to completely 
unconfound the effects of control and choice under both predictable and unpredictable conditions.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: Regardless of whether or not they know how long they will have to do the cross-out task,
(1) Will individuals feel more control, more influence, and more responsibility over the situation when their choices make a 
difference in the outcome they will experience? (i.e., each page comer leads to a different time period)
(2) Will individuals feel more control, more influence, more responsibility, and less helplessness over the situation when 
they have a made a choice between the words 'salf and 'pepped? (rather than choosing between the words 'blue' and 
'non-blue', or'right and left).
(3) Will individuals feel less helpless when their choices make a difference (i.e., each page comer leads to a different time 
period), especially when they are told that they will only do the cross-out task for 2 minutes?
(4) Will individuals feel more successful when they find out that they only have to do the cross-out task for 2 minutes?
(in comparison to those who were told they would have to do the cross-out task for 20 minutes, and to those who didn't 
know how long they would have to do the cross-out task)
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN:
(1) CHOICE variable -> In order to decide the time period under which they completed the cross-out task, some 
participants were asked to tear off either the bottom right or left comer of a page based on a choice between the words 
'salt* and 'pepper1 (voluntary-choice condition) or the eye-colour words 'blue' and 'non-blue' (involuntary-choice condition). 
Others were told that they must tear off a pre-selected page comer containing the words 'righf and 'left* (no-choice 
condition).
(2) CONTROL variable -> Some participants were informed that they would have to engage in the cross-out task for 
either 2-min or 20-min depending on the page comer that was tom. In other words, their choice made a difference in the 
time period they received (control condition). Others were told that both page comers would lead to either a 2-minute 
time period ora 20-minute time period. In other words, their choice made no difference at all in the time they would 
spend at the cross-out task (no-control condition).
(3) PREDICTION variable -> Some participants were informed about how long they would spend on the cross-out task 
(prediction condition). Others were not told how much time they would spend on the cross-out task (no-prediction 
condition)
DECEPTION: The participants were deceived with regard to the true purpose of the study. Deception was 
necessary to:
► Ensure that the results remained unbiased for all participants.
► Prevent providing cues that might lead to participant demand characteristics.
► Prevent participants from making inferences & assumptions about the experimental hypotheses.
► Prevent participants from behaving according to any assumptions they may have about the study.
SOCIETAL APPLICATIONS:
(1) Discrimination - > includes situations where discrimination occurs based on genetically-determined factors that are 
NOT chosen by individuals themselves, such as a person's ethnicity or their predisposition to certain genetically 
transmitted illnesses For example, there are cases where disability claims have been denied due to 'potential1 genetic 
predispositions toward carpal tunnel syndrome.
(2) Privacy & misuse of personal information -> includes circumstances in which genetic information is taken or used 
without the person's consent (especially DNA databanks). Also includes situations of genetic profiling, biopiracy, and 
commercial weblining.
For a copy of the RESULTS, please e-mail perrea3@uwindsor.ca
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Appendix F:
Preliminary Analyses: Details Regarding Data Reduction and
Data Screening
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Preliminary Analyses: Details Regarding Data Reduction and
Data Screening
Data reduction
Missing values. Prior to conducting the main analyses, all of the experimental 
conditions were examined (through various SPSS programs) for missing values, 
manipulation check responses, and fit between data distribution and multivariate 
assumptions. Each one of the 18 experimental conditions was examined separately. 
Because the present data set consisted of very few cases containing missing values, a case 
was deleted if it included one or more missing values. Overall, 18 cases were deleted 
among the 18 experimental conditions (Table F I).
For experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Success), out of 38 cases, two were deleted due to missing values on the actual control 
manipulation check, where one of these cases also had missing values for the choice and 
predicted outcome manipulation checks as well as age. One case with a single missing 
value on the predicted outcome manipulation check was deleted from each one of the 
experimental conditions 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure),
8 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction), and 12 (No-Actual-Control/ 
Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), leaving, in respective order, 31,29, and 32 cases 
in each group.
One case with a single missing value on the choice manipulation check was 
deleted from experimental condition 4 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure), leaving 31 cases in that group. For experimental condition 5 (Actual-Control/
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Table FI















1 .Ctrl/V ol-choice/Predict-success 38 2 1 1 1 0 36 (94.74)
2 .Ctrl/V ol-choice/Predict-failure 32 0 0 1. 0 0 31 (96.88)
3 .Ctrl/In v-choice/Predict-success 35 0 0 0 0 0 35(100.00)
4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 32 0 1 0 0 0 31 (96.88)
5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 33 1 0 2 0 0 31 (93.94)
6.CtrI/No-choice/Predict-failure 32 0 0 0 0 0 32 (100.00)
7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 31 2 0 1 0 0 28 (90.32)
8 .Ctrl/In v-choice/No-predict 30 0 0 1 0 0 29 (96.67)
9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 32 1 0 1 0 0 31 (96.88)
1O.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 33 0 0 0 0 0 33 (100.00)
11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/ Predict-feilure 32 0 0 0 0 0 32(100.00)
12.No-ctrl/lnv-choice/ Predict-success 33 0 0 1 0 0 32 (96.97)
13.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/ Predict-feilure 33 1 1 1 2 1 31 (93.94)
14.No-ctrl/No-choice/ Predict-success 33 0 0 0 0 0 33 (100.00)
15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-6ilure 31 0 0 1 0 0 30 (96.77)
16.No-ctr!/Vo!-choice/No-predict 33 1 0 0 0 1 32 (96.97)
17.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/No-predict 33 0 0 0 0 0 33(100.00)
18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 33 1 2 1 1 1 31 (93.94)
Total 589 9 5 11 4 3 571 (96.94)
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No-Choice/ Predicted-Success), out of 33 cases, two were deleted due to missing values 
on the predicted outcome manipulation check, where one of these cases also had a 
missing value on the actual control manipulation check.
For experimental condition 7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction), two 
cases with a single missing value on the actual control manipulation check and one case with 
a single missing value on the predicted outcome manipulation were deleted, leaving 28 
cases for that group. One case with missing values on both the control and predicted 
outcome manipulation checks was deleted from experimental condition 9 (Actual- 
Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), leaving 31 cases in that group.
For experimental condition 13 (No-Actual-ControV Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure), one case was deleted because all values were missing, and another case was 
deleted due to a missing value for age, leaving 31 cases in that group. One case was 
deleted from experimental condition 15 (No-Actual-Control/ No-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure), due to a missing value on the predicted outcome manipulation check, leaving 30 
cases for that group. For experimental condition 16 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary- 
Choice/No-Prediction), out of 33 cases, only one case was deleted due to a missing value 
on the actual control manipulation check and a missing value on the frustration dependent 
variable measure.
Finally, out of 33 cases, two were deleted because either one value was missing on 
the choice manipulation check or all values were missing, leaving 31 cases for 
experimental condition 18 (No-Actual-Control/ No-Choice/No-Prediction). There were 
no missing values and therefore no deleted cases for experimental conditions 3
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(Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), 6 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ 
Predicted-Failure), 10 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/ Predicted-Success),
11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure), 14 (No-Actual-Control/ 
No-Choice/Predicted-Success), and 17 (No-Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/ 
No-Prediction).
Incorrect values. A case was also deleted when an incorrect response was made 
to the experimenter instruction regarding the word to be tom off the page. The tom word 
manipulation check was considered incorrect if both words had been tom off the page or 
if  both words had remained intact (rather than one word tom by the participant as 
instructed). Therefore, the remaning 571 cases were examined in terms of the 
manipulation check responses to the tom word instruction.
Only five cases were deleted due to an incorrect response on the tom word 
manipulation check. Specifically, one case was deleted for each of experimental 
conditions 3 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/ Predicted-Failure), 10 (No-Actual- 
Control/Voluntary-Choice//Predicted-Success), and 13 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary- 
Choice/Predicted-Failure), and two cases were deleted for experimental condition 15 (No- 
Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predicted-Failure). All of the remaining 566 cases were 
retained for further data screening analyses.
Univariate and Multivariate Outliers. Because outliers can produce either a Type I 
or a Type II error, and MANOVA is sensitive to outliers, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001)
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highly recommend that a test for outliers accompany any use of MANOVA. Therefore, in 
addition to screening for missing and incorrect cases, the present data were also screened 
for univariate and multivariate outliers. Tests for univariate and multivariate outliers 
were conducted separately for each cell of the present 2 x 3 x 3  design. Using the cutoff 
criterion of critical standardized score = ± 3.29, p  < .001, a total of 36 univariate outliers 
were found among the experimental groups (Table F2).
Two univariate outliers were found on perceived control, specifically, one for 
experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/ Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Success) and one 
for experimental condition 11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure). 
The influence variable contained four univariate outliers, where two outliers were found 
in experimental condition 6 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure), and one 
outlier was found in both experimental conditions 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary- 
Choice/Predicted-Success) and 13 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure).
The want variable consisted of eight univariate outliers, where one outlier was 
found in each one of experimental conditions 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/ 
Predicted-Failure), 5 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predicted-Success), 6 (Actual- 
Control/No-Choice/Predicted-Failure), 9 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), 11 
(No-Actual-Control/ Voluntary-Choice/ Predicted-Failure), 12 (No-Actual-Control/ 
Involuntary-Choice/ Predicted-Success), 13 (No-Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice 
/Predicted-Failure), and 15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure).
Five univariate outliers were found for the actual control manipulation check,
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Table F2.
Frequency of Univariate Outliers per Variable for Each Experimental Condition (first set of 
analyses)
Experimental condition n







Choice Total cases 
f  (° ̂
l.Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-S 36 1 0 0 0 3 0 4(11.11)
2.Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-F 31 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 (3-23)
3. Ctrl/Inv-Ch/Pr-S 34 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (2.94)
-r. C iri/Inv-Ch/Pr-F 31 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (3.23)
5.Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-S 31 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 (9.68)
6.Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-F 32 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 (9.38)
7.Ctrl/Vol-Ch/No-Pr 28 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 (3.57)
8.Ctrl/Inv-Ch/No-Pr 29 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 (10.34)
9.Ctrl/No-Ch/No-Pr 31 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 (9.68)
lO.No-Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-S 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
11 .No-Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-F 32 1 0 1 1 0 1 4(12.50)
12,No-Ctrl/Inv-Ch/Pr-S 32 0 1 1 0 0 2 4(12.50)
13 .No-Ctrl/Inv-Ch/Pr-F 30 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 (6.45)
14.No-Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-S ■*» «■»JO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
15.No-Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-F 28 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 (10.00)
16.No-Ctrl/Vol-Ch/No-Pr 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
17.No-Ctrl/Inv-Ch/No-Pr 33 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 (6.06)
18.No-Ctrl/No-Ch/No-Pr 31 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 (3.23)
Total 566 2 4 8 5 9 1 0 36 (6.36)
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where experimental conditions 5 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Success) and
15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure) contained two outliers, and 
experimental condition 11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure) 
contained one outlier. The predicted outcome manipulation check contained nine 
univariate outliers, where one outlier was found in each one of experimental conditions 
7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction), 8 (Actual-Control/Involuntary- 
Choice/No-Prediction), 17 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction), and
18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ No-Prediction), two outliers were found in condition 
9 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), and three outliers were found in 
experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Success).
Finally, 10 univariate outliers were found in the choice manipulation check, 
specifically, two outliers for both experimental conditions 8 (Actual-Control/Involuntary- 
Choice/No-Prediction) and 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Success), and one outlier for each of experimental conditions 3 (Actual-Control/ 
Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), 4 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure), 7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction), 11 (No-Actual-Control/ 
Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure), 17 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/ 
No-Prediction), and 18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction). No univariate 
outliers were found in experimental groups 10 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/ 
Predicted-Success), 14 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Success), and
16 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction).
Tests for multivariate outliers were then conducted separately for each of the 18
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groups (i.e., experimental conditions). In considering the four main dependent variables 
(i.e., perceived control, responsibility, influence, and helplessness), thus using the cutoff 
criterion, y 2 (4, /?*) 18.47,/? = .001, only one multivariate outlier, y 2 (4, N =  29) = 22.53, 
p = .001, was found in experimental condition 13 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary- 
Choice/Predicted-Failure). In addition to deleting the one case containing a multivariate 
outlier, the 36 cases containing univariate outliers were also eliminated from their 
respective groups, leaving a total of 530 participants across the 18 experimental 
conditions.
Both the univariate outliers analyses and the multivariate outliers analyses were 
conducted a second, third, or fourth time, until no new outliers (p = .001) were found. 
Table F3 reports the 21 new univariate outliers for each one of the experimental 
conditions. Only one new multivariate outlier, y 2 (4, N = 3 0 )  = 18.77, p = .001, was 
found in experimental condition 18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction). In 
addition to deleting the one case containing a multivariate outlier, the 21 cases containing 
univariate outliers were also eliminated from their respective groups, leaving a total of 
508 participants among the 18 experimental conditions, where no new outliers were 
revealed (Table F4).
Data screening
All of the experimental conditions were further examined to determine which 
participants correctly responded to a set of manipulation checks. Out of the four
8 Where n = number of participants in 1 of the 18 experimental groups
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Table F3.
Frequency of Univariate Outliers per Variable fo r Each Experimental Condition (second.
third, and fourth set of analyses)
Experimental condition n
Relevant variables
Perceived Responsibility Want 
control
Choice Total cases 
/  (%)
1 .Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 32 0 0 •» 0 3 (9.38)
2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 30 0 0 1 0 1 (3.33)
3. Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 33 0 0 0 1 1 (3.03)
4. Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 30 0 0 2 2 4(13.33)
5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 28 0 0 2 0 2(7.14)
6. Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 29 1 0 1 0 2 (6.90)
7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 27 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
8. Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 26 0 0 0 0 0(0.00)
9. Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 28 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
1O.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 32 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 28 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
12.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/Predict-success 28 0 0 3 0 3(10.71)
13. No-ctrl/Inv-choicc/Predict-failure 28 0 1 0 0 1 (3.57)
14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 33 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 25 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
16.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 32 0 0 0 0 0 (0.00)
17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 31 0 0 2 0 2 (6.45)
18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 30 0 0 0 2 2 (6.67)
Total 530 I 1 14 5 21 (3.96)
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Table F4.
Total Number of Participants Remaining in Each Experimental Condition after Preliminary 
Analyses
Experimental condition n
1. Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success 29
2. Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure 29
3. Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success 32
4. Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure 26
5. Control I  No-Choice /  Predicted-Success 26
6. Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure 27
7. Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction 27
8. Control /  Involuntary-Choice /  No-prediction 26
9. Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction 28
10. No-Control /  Voluntary-Choice /  Predicted-Success 32
11. No-Control /  Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure 28
12. No-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success 25
13. No-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure 27
14. No-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success «■>
15. No-Control /  No-Choice /  Predicted-Failure 25
16. No-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction 32
17. No-Control /  Involuntary-Choice /  No-Prediction 29
18. No-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction 27
TOTAL 508
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manipulation checks, one consisted in determining whether or not participants correctly 
followed experimenter instructions concerning which word should be tom from the page, 
and the other three were presented as questionnaire items: (1) ‘Did the page comer make 
a difference in the time period you received?’ where options were ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ 
respectively, denoting either the Actual-Control or the No-Actual-Control condition;
(2) ‘Did you choose which page comer would be tom?’ where options were ‘Yes (I made 
a choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’),’ ‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non­
blue’), or ‘No (the choice o f‘right’ or ‘left’ was made for me’),’ in respective order, 
denoting the Voluntary-Choice, the Involuntary-Choice, or the No-Choice experimental 
condition; and (3) ‘Were you informed about how long you would engage in the crossout 
task?’ where options were ‘Yes (a 2-minute short time period),’ ‘Yes (a 20-minute long 
time period),’ or ‘No (I was not informed),’ in respective order, denoting the Predicted- 
Success, the Predicted-Failure, or the No-Prediction experimental condition.
Frequency and percentage of incorrect values for each manipulation check are 
presented in Table F5. Two hundred and ten cases consisted of at least one incorrect 
value on the manipulation check items, ranging from 6 to 19 cases per experimental 
condition. In most instances, there was only one single incorrect value per case.
However, there were instances in which one case simultaneously contained incorrect 
values on two of the manipulation check items.
For experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Success), all seven cases presented an incorrect answer on the actual control manipulation 
check. Experimental condition 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
373
Table F5
Number of Incorrect Values in Each Experimental Condition for Each Manipulation Check.
Experimental condition n
Manipulation check errors




1 .Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 29 7 0 0 7(24.14)
2. Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 29 4 0 4 8 (27.59)
3 .Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 32 6 0 10 14(43.75)
4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 26 6 0 6 9 (34.62)
5 .Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 26 0 0 4 4(15.38)
6. Ctrl/N o-choice/Predict-failure 27 5 0 4 7(25.93)
7.Ctxl/Vol-choice/No-predict 27 11 0 j 11 (40.74)
8. Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 26 10 0 6 14(53.85)
9.CtrI/No-choice/No-predict 28 18 0 0 18(64.29)
10.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 32 5 0 14 19 (62.50)
11 .No-ctrL̂ Vol-choice/Predict-failurc 28 0 0 18 18 (64.29)
12 .N o-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 25 -> 0 10 13 (52.00)
13 .No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 27 0 16 17(62.96)
14 .No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success «■%jj 8 0 9 16(48.48)
15 .No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failurc 25 0 0 15 15 (60.00)
16,No-ctrlA^oI-choice/No-predict 32 4 0 7(21.88)
17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 29 5 0 7(24.14)
18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-prcdict 27 0 0 6 6 (22.22)
Total 508 95 0 131 210(41.34)
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displayed eight incorrect cases, where four participants answered the actual control 
manipulation check incorrectly, and four incorrectly answered the predicted outcome 
manipulation check item by selecting the No-Prediction,/=  3, or Predicted-Success,/=  1, 
options. There were fourteen incorrect cases for experimental condition 3 (Actual- 
Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), where six incorrect answers were given 
for the actual control manipulation check, and ten incorrect answers were given for the 
predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting the No-Prediction,/= 7, or Predicted- 
Failure,/ = 3, options. Two participants incorrectly answered both the control and 
predicted outcome manipulation check items.
Experimental condition 4 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure) 
consisted of nine incorrect cases. Specifically, there were six incorrect responses on the 
actual control manipulation check, and six on the predicted outcome manipulation check 
where No-Prediction,/ =  4, or Predicted-Success,/ =  2, were incorrectly selected. Three 
cases contained two incorrect answers on both the control and predicted outcome 
manipulation checks. Experimental condition 5 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predicted- 
Success) displayed only four cases with incorrect responses, where all four participants 
incorrectly responded ‘No-Prediction’ to the predicted outcome manipulation check. 
Experimental condition 6 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure) contained seven 
cases with incorrect values, where five participants incorrectly responded to the actual 
control manipulation check, and four participants incorrectly answered ‘No-Prediction’ to 
the predicted outcome manipulation check. Two participants incorrectly answered both 
the actual control and predicted outcome manipulation checks.
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Experimental condition 7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction) 
displayed a total of eleven incorrect cases, where eleven participants responded 
incorrectly to the actual control manipulation check, and three participants responded 
incorrectly to the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting Predicted-Success. 
Experimental condition 8 (Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction) included a 
total of fourteen incorrect responses to the manipulation check items. Specifically, ten 
participants responded incorrectly to the actual control manipulation check, and six 
participants incorrectly answered the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting 
Predicted-Success.
For experimental condition 9 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), there 
was a total of eighteen cases containing incorrect responses, all of which belonged to the 
actual control manipulation check item. Experimental condition 10 (No-Actual- 
Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Success) included nineteen cases which displayed 
incorrect responses. Specifically, five participants had a single incorrect answer on the 
actual control manipulation check, and fourteen participants had a single incorrect 
response to the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting No-Prediction.
Experimental condition 11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure) displayed eighteen incorrect responses to the manipulation checks, all of which 
made an error in the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting No-Prediction.
For experimental condition 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Success), thirteen cases displayed incorrect responses. Specifically, three participants 
incorrectly answered the actual control manipulation check, and ten participants
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incorrectly answered the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting either 
No-Prediction,/ =  9, or Predicted-Failure,/ =  1.
Experimental condition 13 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted- 
Failure) consisted of seventeen incorrect responses. Specifically, there were three 
incorrect responses for the actual control manipulation check, and sixteen incorrect 
answers to the predicted outcome manipulation check where No-Prediction,/ =  11, and 
Predicted-Success,/ =  5, were selected. Two participants incorrectly answered both the 
actual control and predicted outcome manipulation check items. For experimental 
condition 14 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predict-Success), there were sixteen cases 
with incorrect responses. Specifically, eight cases incorrectly responded to the actual 
control manipulation check, and nine participants incorrectly answered the predicted 
outcome manipulation check by selecting either No-Prediction,/ = 8, or Predicted- 
Failure,/ =  1. One participant responded incorrectly to both the actual control and 
predicted outcome manipulation checks.
Experimental condition 15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predict-Failure) 
included fifteen incorrect responses overall, which were all made during the predicted 
outcome manipulation check. Experimental condition 16 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary- 
Choice/ No-Prediction) consisted of seven incorrect responses, where four participants 
responded incorrectly to the actual control manipulation check, and three participants 
responded incorrectly to the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting 
Predicted-Success.
For experimental condition 17 (No-Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/
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No-Prediction), there were seven cases with incorrect responses. Specifically, five 
participants incorrectly responded to the actual control manipulation check, and three 
participants incorrectly answered the predicted outcome manipulation check item by 
selecting Predicted-Success. One participant incorrectly responded to both the actual 
control and predicted outcome manipulation checks. Finally, experimental condition 18 
(No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction) displayed six incorrect responses, which 
all belonged to the predicted outcome manipulation check due to the selection of 
Predicted-Success.
1-Tesl Analyses. Due to the large number of participants who responded 
incorrectly to the manipulation checks in many of the experimental conditions, /-tests 
were conducted to determine whether or not significant differences in the four main 
dependent variables (i.e., perceived control, responsibility, influence, and helplessness) 
existed between the responses of individuals who responded correctly to all four 
manipulation check items and those who responded incorrectly to one or more items.
In order to compare the two groups, 72 /-tests were performed overall, where each 
one of the four dependent variables was examined, in turn, for each one of the 18 
experimental conditions. In respective order, Tables F6, F7, F8, and F9 display the /-test 
results for the four main dependent variables: perceived control, responsibility, influence, 
and helplessness. Overall, very few significant values were found. For perceived control, 
only experimental condition 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure) 
displayed a significant difference between participants who responded correctly to the 
manipulation checks and those who responded incorrectly, / = 2.76,/? < .05.
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Table F6
Means, Standard Deviations, and t-test Results for Total Number of Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Perceived Control Variable
Experimental condition n M SD d f t
Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect)
1 .Ctrl/VoI-choice/Predict-success 22(7) 3.36 (2.29) 2.13 (1.60) 27 1.23
2.CtrI/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 21(8) 3.10(1.75) 1.48(1.04) 27 2.76'
3 .Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 18(14) 2.00(2.71) 1.53(1.94) 30 -1.17
4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-faiIure 17(9) 2.82 (2.78) 2.01 (1.48) 24 0.06
5 .Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 22(4) 2.68 (3.00) 1.99(2.83) 24 -0.28
6 .Ctrl/N o-choice/Predict-failure 20 (7) 1.40(1.86) 0.88(1.57) 25 -0.96
7.Ctrl/V ol-choice/No-predict 16(11) 2.88 (3.36) 1.82(1.69) 25 -0.71
8.CtrI/Inv-choice/No-predict 12(14) 2.58 (3.07) 1.78(2.16) 24 -0.62
9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 10(18) 2.20 (2.78) 1.99(2.37) 26 -0.65
10.No-ctrI/Vol-choice/Predict-success 12 (20) 2.75 (2.55) 2.30(1.96) 30 0.26
1 l.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 10(18) 1.50(1.83) 1.08(1.47) 26 -0.63
12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 12(13) 2.25(1.31) 1.71 (1.11) 23 1.62
13 .No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 10(17) 1.60(1.76) 1.07(1.30) 25 -0.34
14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 18(15) 1.89 (1.80) 1.57(1.26) 31 0.18
15.No-ctr 1/No-choice/Predict-failure 10(15) 1.60(2.53) 1.07(2.13) 23 -1.44
16.No-ctrl/VoI-choice/No-predict 25 (7) 2.60 (3.29) 2.14(1.70) 30 -0.78
17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 22(7) 2.00 (2.43) 1.66(1.62) 27 -0.60
18.No-ctrI/No-choice/No-predict 21(7) 2.57 (3.50) 2.18(1.97) 25 -0.94
*p  < .05.
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Table F7
Means. Standard Deviations, and t-test Residts fo r Total Number o f Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Responsibility Variable
Experimental condition n M SD d f t
Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect)
1 .CtrWol-choice/Predict-success 22 (7) 4.50(4.14) 2.35 (2.27) 27 0.35
2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 21(8) 3.95 (3.25) 2.25 (2.66) 27 0.72
3. C trl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 18(14) 3.28 (3.07) 2.32(1.98) 30 0.27
4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 17(9) 2.71 (3.11) 1.99(1.62) 24 -0.52
5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 22(4) 2.68 (2.50) 2.19(3.00) 24 0.15
6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 20 (7) 1.75(1.86) 1.71 (1.57) 25 -0.15
7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 16(11) 3.38 (4.27) 2.45 (2.05) 25 -1.00
8. CtrL/Inv-choice/No-predict 12(14) 1.92 (3.86) 1.62(2.54) 24 -2.36"
9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 10(18) 3.00 (2.94) 2.83 (2.29) 26 0.06
10.No-ctr 1/Vol-choice/Predict-success 12(20) 2.58 (2.55) 2.35 (2.11) 30 0.04
11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failurc 10(18) 3.60(1.89) 2.88(1.32) 26 1.78
12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 12(13) 3.67(1.54) 1.97 (1.33) 23 3.14“
13 .No-ctri/Inv-choicc/Prcdict-failure 10(17) 1.30(1.71) 0.67(1.31) 25 -0.91
14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 18(15) 2.28 (2.40) 1.78(1.99) 31 -0.19
15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 10(15) 2.20 (2.07) 1.99(1.91) 23 0.17
16.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 25 (7) 2.96 (3.29) 2.07 (2.63) 30 -0.35
17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 22 (7) 2.68 (2.86) 2.40 (2.27) 27 -.017
18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 21 (6) 2.52 (3.50) 2.09 (2.51) 25 -0.97
* p < .05; **  p < .01.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
380
Table F8.
Means, Standard Deviations, and t-test Results fo r Total Number o f Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Influence Variable
Experimental condition n M SD df t
Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect)
1 .Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 22 (7) 3.55 (3.14) 2.18(2.04) 27 0.43
2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 21(8) 4.71 (3.63) 1.71 (2.72) 27 1.06
3.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 18(14) 3.17(2.93) 2.26(1.94) 30 0.31
4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 17(9) 3.65 (4.00) 2.42(1.94) 24 -0.38
5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 22(4) 2.45 (2.50) 1.95(3.00) 24 -0.04
6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 20(7) 1.20(1.29) 0.41 (0.49) 25 -0.45
7,Ctrl/Vol-choice/Nopredict 16(11) 3.19(3.91) 2.26(1.76) 25 -0.89
8.Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 12(14) 2.42 (3.86) 1.31 (2.38) 24 -1.95
9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 10(18) 3.00(3.11) 2.49 (2.32) 26 -1.12
10.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 12(20) 2.67 (2.45) 1.97(1.96) 30 0.30
11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 10(18) 2.60 (2.33) 2.41 (1.91) 26 0.32
12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 12(13) 2.33 (1.54) 1.61 (1.05) 23 1.47
13.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 10(17) 1.30(1.88) 0.67(1.36) 25 -1.48
14. No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 18(15) 2.00 (2.40) 1.46 (2.10) 31 -0.65
15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 10(15) 2.10(2.93) 1.60(2.40) 23 -0.96
16.No-ctrl/V ol-choice/No-predict 25 (7) 3.56 (3.57) 2.14(1.62) 30 -0.01
17.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/No-predict 22(7) 2.91 (3.86) 2.04 (2.04) 27 -1.07
18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 21(6) 2.48 (2.67) 2.25 (2.25) 25 -0.18
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Table F9.
Means. Standard Deviations, and t-test Residts for Total Number of Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Helplessness Variable
Experimental condition n M SD df t
Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect)
1. C trl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 22 (7) 4.32 (5.00) 2.42 (2.08) 27 -0.67
2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 21(8) 5.00 (4.50) 1.64 (2.73) 27 0.49
3. Ctrl/Inv-choiceTPredict-success 18(14) 5.89 (4.57) 1.53(2.14) 30 2.03
4. Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure 17(9) 4.71 (3.89) 2.14(2.32) 24 0.90
5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 22(4) 4.82 (3.75) 2.40(3.20) 24 0.78
6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 20(7) 4.50(6.14) 2.65(1.21) 25 -2.19'
7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 16(11) 4.94 (3.82) 2.38 (2.27) 25 1.22
8.Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict 12(14) 6.17(2.93) 1.19(2.37) 24 4.49'"
9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 10(18) 4.70 (3.50) 2.54 (2.38) 26 1.25
1O.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success 12(20) 5.17(4.60) 2.21 (2.52) 30 0.64
11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure 10(18) 5.70 (4.83) 1.95 (2.57) 26 1.00
12. No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success 12(13) 4.33 (5.92) 2.50(2.14) 23 -1.71
13.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-fai!ure 10(17) 6.30 (5.53) 1.89(2.24) 25 0.91
14. No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success 18(15) 5.06 (4.53) 2.15(2.59) 31 0.63
15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure 10(15) 6.40 (3.80) 1.58 (2.48) 23 3.20"
16.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict 25 (7) 4.20 (4.29) 2.29 (2.43) 30 -0.09
17.No-ctrl/lnv-choice/No-predicl 22 (7) 4.82 (5.43) 2.46 (2.30) 27 -0.58
18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict 21(6) 5.00 (2.33) 2.47(1.21) 25 3.65"
*p  < .05; * * p <  .01; *** p < .001.
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For responsibility, experimental conditions 8 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/ 
No-Prediction) and 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success) 
displayed a significant difference between participants who responded correctly to the 
manipulation checks and those who responded incorrectly, respectively, t = -2.36, 
p  < .05 and t = 3.14,/; < .01. There were no significant differences found for influence. 
For helplessness, however, four experimental conditions displayed significant 
differences between those who responded correctly to the manipulation checks and 
those who did not. These consisted of experimental condition 6 (Actual-Control/ 
No-Choice/Predicted-Failure; t = -2.19, p < .05), experimental condition 8 
(Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction; t = 4.49,/? < .001), experimental 
condition 15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure; t = 3.20,/? < .01), 
and experimental condition 18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction; t = 3.65,
p < .  01).
Although some significant /-test values were found for perceived control, 
responsibility, and helplessness, these were not considered important enough to warrant 
action, because a situation of inflated Type I error rate was quite likely present due to the 
multiple tests that were conducted within each experimental condition for each one of the 
four main dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Although it was concluded 
that no systematically important differences existed between participants who answered 
the manipulation checks correctly and those who did not, it is cautioned that the data be 
examined while considering the possibility of Type I error.
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Chi Square Analyses. Therefore, all 508 cases were retained for further analyses 
which examined significant differences in the frequency of incorrect manipulation check 
responses among the independent variables. Specifically, two-way chi squares were 
calculated for the incorrect manipulation check responses for each of ACTUAL 
CONTROL x CHOICE, * 2 (2, N =  210) = 2.66, p = .26, CHOICE x PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, X2 (4, N =  210) = 2.54,p  = .64, and ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED 
OUTCOME, X2(2, N =  210) = 21.90, p  < .001.
Table F10 and Figure FI describe the significant two-way chi square results for 
each of the ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME conditions. When they 
could predict their outcome (whether success or failure), the participants with Actual- 
Control made significantly fewer manipulation check errors than those individuals who 
had No-Actual-Control. However, these findings were reversed under conditions of 
unpredictability. Specifically, when they could not predict their outcome, the participants 
with Actual-Control made significantly more manipulation check errors than those 
individuals who had No-Actual-Control.
Whereas confusion seemed to arise when the ACTUAL CONTROL and 
PREDICTED OUTCOME variables were incongruent (i.e.,actual control without 
prediction, and prediction without actual control), a better understanding occurred when 
the two independent variables were congruent (i.e., actual control with prediction, and no 
prediction without actual control). Although the decision was then to proceed with the 
preliminary analyses, this finding was kept under consideration for later discussion.
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Table F10.
Standard Residuals and Frequency of Incorrect Manipulation Checks for the Significant 




Total jf m f ( S R ) f ( S R )
Actual-Control 25 (-1.20) 24 (-1.50) 43 (2.90) 92
No-Actual-Control 48(1.10) 50(1.30) 20 (-2.60) 118
Total / 73 74 63 210
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Figure F I. Frequencies of Incorrect Manipulation Checks for the Significant Two-Way 
Chi Square of ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME Conditions.
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Appendix G:
A Summary of the Significant Findings
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Table G l.
A Summary o f the Significant Effects o f the Independent Variables on the Dependent
Variables
Dependent Variables Significant Findings
Influence: • AC + Vol-Ch + P-F >  AC + No-Ch + P-F
• AC + Inv-Ch + P-F >  AC + No-Ch + P-F
• No-AC + No-P >  No-AC+ P-S
• No-AC + No-P >  No-AC + P-F
• AC + Vol-Ch >  AC + No-Ch
• AC + Inv-Ch >  AC + No-Ch
• AC >  No-AC
• Vol-Ch >  No-Ch
• No-P >  P-S
Responsibility:
• AC + Vol-Ch >  AC + Inv-Ch
• AC + Vol-Ch >  AC + No-Ch
• AC >  No-AC
• Vol-Ch >  Inv-Ch
• Vol-Ch >  No-Ch
• No-P >  P-F
Perceived control:
• AC >  No-AC
• No-P >  P-F
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Table G l. (cont’d)
A Summary o f the Significant Effects o f the Independent Variables on the Dependent 
Variables
Dependent Variables Significant Findings
Confidence: • Vol-Ch + P-S >  Vol-Ch + P-F
• Inv-Ch + No-P >  Inv-Ch + P-S
Confidence + Prediction: combined multivariate effect for P-F versus P-S 
combined multivariate effect for P-F versus No-P
Frustration:
AC + P-F >  AC + P-S 
AC + P-F >  AC + No-P 
AC + No-P >  AC + P-S 
No-AC + P-F >  No-AC + P-S 
P-F >  P-S 
P-F >  No-P 
No-P > P -S
Frustration + Helplessness: combined multivariate effect for AC versus No-AC
Perceived Contribution 
and Motivation to 
Participate:
combined multivariate effect for AC versus No-AC 
multivariate effect for Actual Control x Predicted 
Outcome (at no particular level of the I Vs)
Optimism toward a 
positive outcome: Vol-Ch >  Inv-Ch
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Table G l. (cont’d)
A Summary of the Significant Effects o f the Independent Variables on the Dependent
Variables
Dependent Variables Significant Findings
Desire for a positive 
outcome: • AC + Vol-Ch >  AC + Inv-Ch
• AC + No-Ch >  AC + Inv-Ch
• No-AC + Inv-Ch >  No-AC + Vol-Ch
• No-AC + Inv-Ch >  No-AC + No-Ch
• P-S >  No-P
• P-F >  No-P
Note. AC = Actual-Control; No-AC = No-Actual-Control; Vol-Ch = Voluntary-Choice; 
Inv-Ch = Involuntary-Choice; No-Ch = No-Choice; P-S = Predicted-Success;
P-F = Predicted-Failure; No-P = No-Prediction.
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